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There is also another sacred bird, whose name is the Phoenix. I for my
part did not see him except only in picture; for indeed he in fact resorts
to them quite rarely, at intervals of ﬁve hundred years, as the inhabitants
of the City of the Sun say. He resorts then, they assert, when his father
dies. He is, if closely resembling his picture, of this size and of this kind:
some of his feathers are of golden plumage and some red. In the highest
degree he is most similar in shape and his size to an eagle. He then, they
say, contrives the following, although they make statements not credible
to me: starting out from Arabia, he conveys his father, after plastering
him in myrrh, to the shrine of the Sun and buries him in the Suns shrine
and he conveys him thus: ﬁrst he moulds as large an egg of myrrh as he
is able to carry and afterward makes trial of carrying it; next, when he is
done with making trial, just then after hollowing the egg, he puts his
father into it and with other myrrh he plasters in that space at whichever
point in the egg he made the hollow and puts in his father; ﬁnally, his
father placed within, the object becomes the same weight and, after
ﬁnishing the plastering in, he conveys him toward Egypt to the Suns
shrine. That, they say, that bird does.
(Herodotus, Inquieries)1 Introduction
As in the legends of the ﬁrebird ‘Phoenix’, death is often seen as a new beginning.
Rising from the ashes of the old bird comes a new bird, the new generation. This
image can be found in many religions, but also in everyday life — even in economics:
From an economics perspective, life and death of ﬁrms is normal. New ﬁrms enter the
market just as old ﬁrms decline. New products appear just as old products are no longer
produced. However, the death of a ﬁrm — like the death of a close person — has its
consequences on the surroundings, and in this case even on the bits and pieces a ﬁrm
is made of: the employees of the ﬁrm, the knowledge they embody as a person but also
as an organization, and the machinery. The workers of the ﬁrms have to be reallocated,
they have to ﬁnd new employers that can make use of their skills, or learn new skills
altogether. In this thesis, life after the ﬁrm closure is examined. In other words, an
examination of what rises out of the ashes of the dying company.
Already in the early writings of economics one can ﬁnd references to the learning,
usage and the reward for skills. Adam Smith refers to the value of skills in a society as
wealth. In his description, he already appears to see skills and knowledge embodied in
the workforce as human capital.
“When any expensive machine is erected, the extraordinary work to be per-
formed by it before it is worn out, it must be expected, will replace the
capital laid out upon it, with at least the ordinary proﬁts. A man educated
at the expence of much labour and time to any of those employments which
require extraordinary dexterity and skill, may be compared to one of those
expensive machines. The work which he learns to perform, it must be ex-
pected, over and above the usual wages of common labour, will replace to
him the whole expence of his education, with at least the ordinary proﬁts of
an equally valuable capital. It must do this too in a reasonable time, regard
being had to the very uncertain duration of human life, in the same manner
as to the more certain duration of the machine.” — Smith (1776, Book I.x.b)
Smith describes the investment in the skills of the workers in analogy to a machine.
Thus, he argues, human capital can be seen as an asset, which on its own will lead to
some reward when it is put into use. Such skills and knowledge will yield higher rewards,
or higher wages. However, the skills and knowledge have to be acquired, and often their
application or use is linked to some form of production, machine, or even company. The
value of the skills should — according to Adam Smith — be accounted into the ‘wealth
of a nation’:
2“[...] of the acquired and useful abilities of all the inhabitants or members
of the society. The acquisition of such talents, by the maintenance of the
acquirer during his education, study, or apprenticeship, always costs a real
expence, which is a capital ﬁxed and realized, as it were, in his person. Those
talents, as they make a part of his fortune, so do they likewise of that of the
society to which he belongs. The improved dexterity of a workman may
be considered in the same light as a machine or instrument of trade which
facilitates and abridges labour, and which, though it costs a certain expence,
repays that expence with a proﬁt.” — Smith (1776, II.i.17)
The wealth embodied in skills and abilities of workers depends on its usefulness in
the economy, as the skill and the abilities have to be linked to a production process, an
industry or even a speciﬁc ﬁrm. After the closure of a ﬁrm, the question remains as to
how far the skills acquired can still be used, and what happens when these skills become
superﬂuous altogether. In the beginning of the 19th century, Say warns us that as a
result of specialization in the economy we do now enjoy higher productivity, but at the
cost of lower ﬂexibility of the worker:
“A man, whose whole life is devoted to the execution of a single operation,
will most assuredly acquire the faculty of executing it better and quicker than
others; but he will, at the same time, be rendered less ﬁt for every other
occupation, corporeal or intellectual; his other faculties will be gradually
blunted or extinguished; and the man, as an individual, will degenerate in
consequence. To have never done any thing but make the eighteenth part
of a pin, is a sorry account for a human being to give of his existence. Nor
is it to be imagined that this degeneracy from the dignity of human nature
is conﬁned to the labourer, that plies all his life at the ﬁle or the hammer;
men, whose professional duties call into play the ﬁnest faculties of the mind,
are subject to similar degradation. This division of occupations has given
rise to the profession of attorneys, whose sole business it is to appear in the
courts of justice instead of the principals, and to follow up the diﬀerent steps
of the process on their behalf. These legal practitioners are, confessedly,
seldom deﬁcient in technical skill and ability; yet it is not uncommon to
meet with men, even of eminence in this profession, wholly ignorant of the
most simple processes of the manufactures they every day make use of; who,
if they were set to work to mend the simplest article of their furniture, would
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scarcely know how to begin, and could probably not drive a nail, without
exciting the risibility of every carpenter’s awkward apprentice; and if placed
in a situation of a greater emergency, called upon, for instance, to save a
drowning friend, or to rescue a fellow-townsman from a hostile attack, would
be in a truly distressing perplexity; whereas a rough peasant, inhabiting
a semi-barbarous district, would probably extricate himself from a similar
situation with honour.” — Say (1802, Book I, Chapter VIII, I.VIII.24)
The insight that specialization leads to inﬂexibility, and that workers loose skills they
do not employ are used in the literature that concerns itself with the investment in
education, or the human capital literature. In this literature, the returns to investment
in general and speciﬁc education is estimated. As we could see in the above quotes, these
were concepts that were already seen at or before early industrialization took place, and
subsequently became more and more important. Using the examples of Say, the ‘rough
peasant’ becomes less and less important in the more industrialized settings, whereas
the specialized workmen can be found almost everywhere. This has implications for
those workmen that specialized in skills speciﬁc to technologies or ﬁrms that became
less important, superﬂuous or died out altogether.
Can they make use of some of their insights, knowledge or skills at diﬀerent ﬁrms,
in diﬀerent industries or working with diﬀerent production technologies? This question
was tackled in studies on innovation and the ‘displacement’ of men. Early and lucid
accounts are given by two studies of Elizabeth Baker on changes in the printing industry
(see also Chapter 2).
The formalization of the human capital literature by Mincer, Schulz and Becker has
led to a renewed interest in the returns of education, but also in skills or informal
education. In the displacement literature, examining the (wage) losses of ﬁrm closures,
the distinction between general and industry speciﬁc knowledge was introduced by Neal
(1995). This was a result of his ﬁnding that experience with one industry is rewarded
more if a worker stays within his own industry after displacement than those workers
that switch industry. This gives an indication that skills learned within a ﬁrm of one
industry can be used at other ﬁrms of the same industry.
However, even accounting for age, tenure, education levels and industry speciﬁc skills,
the variation of the post-displacement outcomes varied signiﬁcantly (cf. Kletzer, 1998).
Following the plant level studies of displacement and incorporating the knowledge of
the career within the ﬁrm allowed us to lift the curtain a little further in this disserta-
tion. The method used to develop the survey among the displaced workers follows the
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‘Informed Observer Approach’ which will be described in the next section.
1.1 Informed Observer Approach
The ‘Informed Observer Approach’ is a central concept linking diﬀerent branches of
research within the NWO Pionier project that also ﬁnanced this study. Rather than
relying solely on ones own intuition, a researcher should enhance his understanding of
the processes at hand by talking to those persons that take the decisions of interest,
that are involved in the process at hand. Based on these talks with experts and the
existing economic theory, new models can be derived. In the proposal the methodol-
ogy is described “[...] to combine the interview/survey approach, frequently applied
in management sciences, and the analytical modelling and estimation techniques from
economics to investigate investment decisions of ﬁrms.”
The use of using interviews to understand an economic agent’s decision is not new
per se. In his discussion of the revealed preference theory, Sen (1973) suggests that
Economists should not only look at the behavior of economic agents — as was done
in the revealed preference theory: “The idea that behavior is the one real source of
information is extremely limiting for empirical work and is not easy to justify in terms of
the methodological requirement of our discipline.” It limits the economist to speculations
which might result in causal relationships modelled that seem to ﬁt the data, but have
nothing to do with the decision process of the agent involved.
A second pillar of the ‘Informed Observer Approach’ is therefore to collect data on
the insights gained by the expert talks. These data allow us then to test or develop new
models. The ‘Informed Observer Approach’ grounds its theories on practical experiences
of the actors involved, and hence insures a reality check of theories. The data collection
and model building insures that theories are ﬁrmly grounded in economic theory and
empirically tested. By using a combination of interviews and (empirical) observation,
based on economic models we can go beyond simple observation but also beyond simple
theorizing. While we as researchers try to understand the real world, hence, we should
put much eﬀort into the gathering of new data. All too often, however, economists still
rely on government statistics and on personal intuition for the veriﬁcation of theories.
Their intuition can be faulty, for they have little direct experience with economic life.
Government data often do not address the questions that are central to the researcher’s
questions. Interpretation or the use of proxies are used to ﬁt the data with models,
while a self-collected data-set might have been better equipped to address the problem,
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and answer the researcher’s questions. Before we can move on to more aggregate and
more elaborate questions, the inner workings of the ﬁrm, its investment decisions and
the internal employment relationships have to be studied. Using the informed-observer
approach enables us to achieve a better understanding of the working of ﬁrms’ decisions.
The ‘Informed Observer Approach’ was also central to this study. Based on the
existing models and estimation of workers’ displacement losses, we invited a group of
former employees to focus group meetings and in-depth interviews. These meetings gave
us a basis to understand both the ﬁrm level data that we obtained as well as to develop
a questionnaire that was geared to our target population. We beneﬁted from several
talks to the bankruptcy trustee as well as several workers who answered our questions
and clariﬁed problems encountered.
1.2 History of Fokker
This study is based on the bankruptcy of the Dutch aircraft manufacturer Fokker. In
order to gain some understanding of the circumstances of the company, its development
and roots, its historical development will be shortly summarized in this section. This
section draws from several sources: the beginning years and information on the founder
of the company, Anthony Fokker, can be found in book length in Franquinet (1946). A
general history of the company is written by van Huijstee (1997), while an insightful
book on the last years of Fokker is written by Martijn (1996).
Anthony Fokker and the beginning of aviation
The ﬁrst decades of the company were molded by the aviation pioneer Anthony Fokker.
In his young years, Anthony Fokker — after having studied for four years at Polytech-
nic college — dropped out of college to construct his own aircraft. However, his father
disagreed with his son’s decision and sent him to the engineering school of Bingen (Ger-
many) to specialize in the construction of automobiles. Arriving in Germany he found
an engineering school close to the one in Bingen that besides teaching a course in auto-
mobile technology also taught an aviation course. Even though the course turned out
to be a disappointment — the teacher had no ideas on how to build aircraft — Anthony
Fokker convinced his father and a German oﬃcer von Daum to ﬁnance his endeavor of
building an aircraft. Lieutenant von Daum also arranged the usage of an assembly hall
in the Zeppelin hangars of Baden-Baden for the construction. While the ﬁrst model was
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a total mishap, Anthony Fokker eagerly went on to build a second improved model. This
second model, ﬁnished around Christmas of 1910, actually took oﬀ — one meter oﬀ the
ground to be precise — but was crashed by his companion von Daum. In the spring of
1911, Anthony ﬁnished his third model. This model could ﬂy for 20 minutes and reach
a speed of 90 km/h. When von Daum crashed with this model again, he was bought out
by Anthony Fokker using his father’s money. He repaired the damage on the aircraft
and called it ”the Spider” — the ﬁrst ‘Fokker aircraft’. With this aircraft he obtained
his pilot licence on May 16th 1911. He continued to give public demonstrations and
invested the money he earned to improve and build new aircraft.
In February 1912 he opened a plant near Berlin. Up until 1913 some twenty aircraft
— variations of the original spider design — were manufactured. Subsequently diﬀerent
designs were developed and sold mainly to the German military. When the war broke
out the demand for his military aircraft rose substantially. At the end of the war more
than 3000 aircraft had been produced by ‘Fokker Flugzeugwerke GmbH’. Anticipating
the disarmament and the destruction of any aircraft remaining in Germany, Anthony
Fokker shipped as much equipment and as many parts as possible to the Netherlands.
The golden interwar years
In 1919, the ‘NV Nederlandsche Vliegtuigenfabriek’ was founded, settling its plant in
Amsterdam-North. Due to the connection of Anthony Fokker with the German military,
the company did not use his family name, initially. As the military aircraft found little
interest, the company developed passenger aircraft. Fokker also expanded to the United
States in the 1920s under the name Atlantic Aircraft. At the end of the 1920s Fokker
was the biggest aircraft manufacturer of that time, employing some 1500 workers in the
Netherlands and the United States. More than 65 percent of all aircraft built at that
time came from Fokker.
In 1929, the American part of Fokker became a subsidiary of General Motors as
General Aviation Corp (GAC). A crash in 1931, killing a famous football coach and
seven other passengers, ended the golden era of Fokker in the United States. The death
of Anthony Fokker in 1939 ended the era of the aircraft pioneer leading his company.
Post WWII, rebuilding
Just prior to the occupation, KLM had ordered the ﬁrst full-metal passenger aircraft,
the Fokker F24. As the order could never be fulﬁlled due to the occupation, the aircraft
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was never built. However, its design was the precursor to the Fokker F27 which reestab-
lished Fokker’s fame after the war. The ﬁrm never reached similar levels to those of the
1920s, however in niche markets and with some technologies it remained market leader.
For example adhesive technology, which was developed by engineer Schliekelmann set
the groundwork for innovative construction from Fokker. Just after the war, he experi-
mented with possibilities of gluing metal. This would allow construction of lighter and
cheaper aircraft. The methodology that evolved from this process, is used by many other
producers such as Boeing, British Aerospace, Airbus. The company remained one of the
leaders in using innovative concepts of gluing in aircraft design.
The post war era left a battered plant behind. Most of the useful material was
plundered, and production was at a standstill. The ﬁrst aeroplane to be built, the F25
‘Promotor’, was a four seater. The prototype had its maiden ﬂight on 20 October 1946,
and Fokker was back into aircraft production again. Only 21 of these aeroplanes were
built, as market demand was insuﬃcient to support a bigger line. In these early postwar
years trainers, small aircraft, and building licensed (military) aircraft designs kept the
company going.
In April 1949 a merger from 1947 between Fokker, Aviolanda en ‘Mij De Schelde
(vliegtuigbouw)’ was reversed. As this coincided with the 30th anniversary of the com-
pany, they were allowed to use the predicate ‘Koninklijke’ (‘royal’) in their name, from
which henceforth the company was called ‘NV Koninklijke Nederlandse Vliegtuigen-
fabriek Fokker’.
The ﬁrst announced crisis and reorganization, in which concerns were raised that
Fokker would not be able to independently construct aircraft, hence should reorganize
or close the departments for aircraft development altogether, was in the fall of 1949.
This uncertainty about the future of aircraft development allowed several American
companies to oﬀer contracts to Fokker personnel. It lead to a signiﬁcant exodus of
talented people to the United States.
In 1950s the development of the F27 commenced, giving room to 28 passengers and
using two turboprop engines. The maiden ﬂight of F27 was on 24 November 1955. It
was the beginning of a new era for Fokker. The interest in the aircraft was, at ﬁrst,
quite small. However, from the 1960s onwards orders for this most successful aircraft of
the company came in. By 1968 more than 400 of the aircraft had been sold. In 1964
Fokker started to develop the F28 ‘Fellowship’, a 65 seater with jet engines. However,
the aircraft never came close to the success of the F27 Friendship.
In 1971, the ﬁrm had to pass through more turbulences. As the sales of the F27 were
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decreasing, a reorganization had to take place. In 1971, 1750 employees were sacked. In
that time it constituted about 20 percent of its entire personnel. In the 1980s, history
repeated itself. In the aftermath of the second oil crisis, sales of the F27 and F28 dropped
yet again. The plans for a cooperation with McDonnell Douglas to build a successor of
the F28 were cancelled nine months after they were started, resulting in a reorganization
that cost 1400 workers their job.
F50 and F100 period
In 1983 the decision was taken to simultaneously construct a successor to the F27 and
the F28. This simultaneous development of two new aircraft brought high development
costs. In December 1985, the Fokker 50, made its maiden ﬂight, followed a year later by
the Fokker 100. The market seemed right for these aircraft, yet in 1987 Fokker walked
the thin line of bankruptcy as the development costs had been enormous. However,
by 1989, several huge orders for the Fokker 100 were coming in. Fokker had to hire
additional personnel to increase its size to about 14.000 employees. This was a period
of hope for a bright future. However, the Gulf war in 1990/91 disturbed this picture. It
lead to a crisis among the airline companies, which translated itself into fewer orders for
aircraft or even the cancellation of existing orders. In addition, the dollar exchange rate
kept falling, leaving Fokker with relatively high production costs relative to the prices it
could obtain in dollars. The maiden ﬂight of the Fokker 70 in April 1993 was preceded
by an announcement of massive reorganization within the company: the lay-oﬀ of more
than 1800 employees. In this year, DASA took a majority stake of 51 percent in the
company, following talks and negotiations since the early 1990s. Ever since 1993, Fokker
made losses. More reorganizations followed in 1994, 1995. When in January 1996 the
negotiations between DASA and the Dutch government to save the company failed, it
sounded the death toll for Fokker. The company went bankrupt on March 15, 1996.
1.3 Problem Statement
Displaced workers are not ﬁred for personal reasons but for structural causes. This study
aims to analyze the carryings-on of workers who used to be employed by the one and
only large aeroplane manufacturing ﬁrm in the Netherlands, Fokker Aircraft Company.
Fokker went oﬃcially bankrupt in 1996, but began systematically reducing its workforce
in 1992, a period of major stagnation in the Dutch economy and in most other Western
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European countries (Deterink, Kn¨ uppe, Leuftink and Schimmelpenninck 1997).
The main problem statement of displacement research and also of this thesis can be
summarized in the following two questions:
• Does displacement diminish the values of workers’ skills, prior education, or expe-
rience?
• If so, what groups suﬀer the most severe losses and how can we measure these
losses?
Since 1980 studies have used large household data sets, with either retrospective in-
formation on pre- and post-displacement history, or histories based on longitudinal data
(with the latter type of data sets containing usually very few displaced workers). The
outcomes of these studies stressed that displaced workers have been concentrated in
occupations (i) with below-average levels of education; (ii) related to high-tenured po-
sitions or of workers with a high age proﬁle with substantial variation by occupation
and industry (Kletzer 1989); (iii) with high pre-displacement earnings (Fallick 1991).
Moreover, displaced workers with vocational training were often found to be less mobile
than those with more general training, managerial experience, or higher education.
Evidence from the United States suggests that the average displaced worker loses
perhaps 10 to 15 percent of prior wage upon reemployment. Losses are greatest for
more senior workers. Many authors attribute the loss to destroyed ﬁrm-speciﬁc human
capital.
The policy interest, on which much has been written, is twofold: In Europe the interest
is in protection of declining plants, to identify vulnerable groups of displaced workers
and if possible cushion their losses. In the U.S., less so than in Europe because there is
less need for a speciﬁc focus, the emphasis has been on giving advance notice to workers
prior to displacement and to providing longer-term payments for subsistence and job
search to those displaced.
Novel in this study is the concentration on the individual plant level, re-establishing
the old-style mass shutdown study but analyzing the data using what we now know about
modelling investment in human capital. All the research on displacement in the last 15
years has used massive amounts of micro (often household) data that were typically not
well designed to answer the questions of interest. All the old case studies had great data,
but no framework of theory from which to form questions.
Before investigating the displacement component of the study, a study of the work-
ings of the ﬁrm before the displacement was performed. Here, we investigated careers,
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position changes, and reorganizations to answer research questions such as:
• What is the pattern of job mobility within the ﬁrm?
• What is the relation between careers and wages within the ﬁrm?
At the date of the bankruptcy, the viable parts of the ﬁrm were preserved, and slimmed
components of the ﬁrm were spun-oﬀ by the bankruptcy trustees. This allowed us to
investigate the downsizing problem:
• Who should be selected to stay given a ﬁrm’s structure and the information on
the workers available?
One of the problems of displacement research using household data-sets is the hetero-
geneity of workers that is not reﬂected in the data, but inﬂuences the post displacement
outcomes. Our case allowed us to investigate the workers for ten years before the dis-
placement, observing all internal career data of the ﬁrm. Further, job descriptions and
hierarchical levels are comparable within our ﬁrm, whilst this is not necessarily the case
across ﬁrms. This leads us to some sub-questions that can be addressed using ﬁrm level
data of the type that were available for this thesis:
• What is the inﬂuence of the position a worker has within a ﬁrm on the post
displacement outcome?
• How do careers within a ﬁrm inﬂuence the post displacement experience?
• How do workers learn about their labor market opportunities and the value of their
skills after displacement?
We may be able to distinguish between good and unsuccessful strategies for the dis-
placed worker. Given that the workers were from one single ﬁrm and used the network
of former employees extensively to meet even after the bankruptcy, we could also inves-
tigate the inﬂuence of the group’s reaction to wages paid to similar workers.
1.4 Outline of the Study
In the subsequent chapter the literature on displacement will be surveyed. We will start
with the early historical studies from the 1920s and the related case studies from the
1950s, to then go on discussing the ’modern’ displacement studies and the data-sets
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used. In Chapter 3, the internal labor market of the company from 1987-1996 will be
analyzed. The hierarchical structure, careers, and their dynamics will be discussed. In
Chapter 4, the challenging question of the selection of workers in reorganization will be
examined. Building on an option model under uncertainty, we estimate an hierarchical
elimination model. In Chapter 5, we discuss the development and set-up of the survey
among displaced workers. Here we also examine the problem of non-response. Chapter
6 gives an overview of the aggregate results of the survey. Chapter 7 examines the
question of displacement losses in more depth. Making use of the information of previous
careers within the company, and including speciﬁc variables on pre-displacement jobs, we
investigate the heterogenous outcome of wage losses and search time. We also propose
a model of worker learning, which is then extended in Chapter 8 where we focus on the
local labor market and the integration of search time and reservation wages.
122 Displacement Literature and Data
Used
“The last group of questions, which still remain to be discussed, is
concerned with the relation of capital in general to wages in general. It is
obvious that though capital in general is constantly competing with
labour for the ﬁeld of employment in particular trades; yet since capital
itself is the embodiment of labour as well as of waiting, the competition
is really between some kinds of labour aided by a good deal of waiting,
and other kinds of labour aided by less waiting. When for instance it is
said that ”capitalistic machinery has displaced much labour that was
employed in making boots,” what is meant is, that formerly there were
many who made boots by hand, and a very few who made awls and other
simple implements, aided by a little waiting; while now there are rather
fewer persons occupied in boot making; and they make a much larger
number of boots than before by aid of powerful machines, made by
engineers aided by a good deal of waiting. There is a real and eﬀective
competition between labour in general and waiting in general. But it
covers a small part of the whole ﬁeld, and is of small importance
relatively to the beneﬁts which labour derives from obtaining cheaply the
aid of capital, and therefore of eﬃcient methods in the production of
things that it needs.”
(Marshall, 1920, Book VI, Chapter II.36)2 Literature
The interest in displaced workers is an old one in the history of labor economics. From
as far back as a century ago, studies into the displacement of workers can be found. While
the perceived causes of plant closings and subsequent worker displacement changed over
time, the interest remained. In the early 20th century, economists were most concerned
with the mechanization of work, leading to the dismissal of many workers, and for non-
mechanized plants to plant closings. This fear of mechanization remained the main
factor of worker displacement until the increase in trade ﬂows started a discussion of
plant closings as a result of free trade from the 1970s onwards. This fear of the result of
the free trade on the employment of (American) workers led to programs to aid displaced
workers. In the 1980s the availability of socio-economic panel data eased investigation
into the causes and consequences of displacement. The research was also spurred by
the discussion around ‘advanced notice’ regulation,1 requiring employers to announce a
plant closing to the work-force well in advance, which was implemented in 1988.
One aspect that has been extensively researched in the 1970’s and 1980’s is losses
from displacement, where losses have to be seen as private losses if one considers the
income loss through the loss of speciﬁc investment, and the loss of rents. A survey of
the displacement literature of that time can be found in Hamermesh (1989b). Finally,
in the 1990s the availability of administrative data allowed for investigations that were
not dependent on survey data. The survey by Fallick (1996) covers the more recent
literature on displacement. And unlike Hamermesh (1989b), he includes some of the
case- and industry-studies.
Displacement studies were mainly interested in the magnitude of lost earnings for
those workers who become displaced relative to the income gained in their previous
employment. Second, in addition to the impact of displacement on unemployment, the
search for new jobs is often investigated. This was also a result of the understanding that
the earnings losses of re-employed (displaced) workers alone understates the magnitude
of wage losses. On the aggregate and policy level the question of who bears the costs
of structural adjustment is the key issue in the displacement literature. They were
probably also the reason to commence with the Displaced Worker Supplement to the
Current Populations Survey (CPS), one of the ‘work horses’ that empirical investigators
use in displacement research in the United States.
While the initial interest in displacement through technological change in the early
20th century could also be found in Europe (see e.g. K¨ aler (1933)), the displacement
literature and its empirical investigation did not take place until recently. The availabil-
1See for a detailed discussion Ehrenberg and Jakubson (1988).
14ity of administrative data and the methodological approach of Jacobson, LaLonde and
Sullivan (1993) spurred some further research into displacement losses in Europe.
There are considerable diﬀerences in the deﬁnition of ‘displaced workers’ over the
studies in this literature. The deﬁnitions vary from general lay-oﬀs (including ‘ﬁring
for cause’) to large scale lay-oﬀs due to plant closure or reorganization only. All survey
papers touch upon this issue, as it is crucial to the understanding and interpretation of
the results generated. Fallick (1996, p. 5) notes that: “[t]here is considerable disagree-
ment in the literature about how to formally deﬁne ‘displaced workers.’ The question
of deﬁnition is not merely academic. Government programs are often justiﬁed on the
grounds that society should compensate the losers for structural changes that beneﬁt us
on aggregate, especially if those changes are due to a change in government policy.”
Based on a deﬁnition of the Ministry of Labor, in the time before the Displaced Worker
Supplement to the CPS, displaced workers were often identiﬁed as those workers being
ﬁred or unemployed in declining industries, local labor markets, or occupations. This
is, however quite a broad category. With the introduction of the Displaced Worker
Supplement, the questioning used to identify displaced workers in the survey became
a focal point of a deﬁnition. According to the Displaced Worker Supplement a worker
is considered displaced if he ﬁlled in that he lost his job due to “a plant closing, an
employer going out of business, a layoﬀ without recall, or some similar reason.”2 This
is close to the general deﬁnition which Kletzer (1998, p. 116) suggests: “The deﬁnition
of a displaced (or dislocated) worker in the survey attempts to implement the common
understanding of this term. Displaced workers are understood to be individuals with
established work histories, involuntarily separated from their jobs by mass layoﬀ or plant
closure (rather than because of individual job performance), who have little chance of
being recalled to jobs with their old employer.” However, slight diﬀerences in other
surveys exist and can result in diﬀerences in estimation outcomes.
The deﬁnition of a displaced worker is easier in case studies, as they are usually
based on plant closures, hence all workers are displaced. Similarly, administrative data,
observing workers attachment to plants can identify displacement as plant closure,3 or
based on a large-scale downsizing.4
2DWS, as it was quoted in Seitchik (1991, p. 51).
3However, the administrative data sometimes indicates ‘false plant deaths’, see Kuhn (2002, pp. 13-
14).
4A large-scale downsizing is often identiﬁed by a reduction in workforce of 30 percent or more. This
‘rule’ is introduced by Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1990) who pioneered the research of dis-
placement using administrative data. The deﬁnition per se is ad hoc, but they show some sensitivity
results using diﬀerent deﬁnitions. Over time, the 30 percent rule was adopted by other researchers
152 Literature
The strict deﬁnition of displaced workers will be used in the context of this thesis.
We will only use those workers that were laid oﬀ as the result of the bankruptcy and
subsequent plant closure.
In this chapter we will review the ﬁndings of earlier studies of displaced workers.
In the following section we will investigate the data (sets) used in empirical studies
of displacement. The second section will discuss the methodology used to investigate
displaced workers, while the third and ﬁnal section discusses the results of earlier studies
and open questions.
2.1 Empirical Studies of Displacement
The inﬂuence of displacement research and labor market data collection has always been
a reciprocal one. While in the early 20th century, researchers collected data on case
and industry studies as an indication of the importance of the displacement issues, the
discussion of economists already focusses on the possibility of collecting representative,
nationwide data in order to investigate the issue further.5 After World War II, due to
increased trade, a renewed policy interest in the ‘displaced’ workers losing from free
trade emerged.
2.1.1 Case Studies
The ﬁrst displacement studies were all based on case or industry studies. At those times
no representative (labor) panels existed.6 Economists who wanted to study the result
of worker displacement had to resort to primary data collection. There are many case
studies on plant closures and displacement, however most of them were only published
in policy reports or books and are therefore not easily available. I will review some
pre-World War II case studies, and touch upon the case studies around the closure of
the meat-packing plants in the 1950s and 1960s.
Durham hosiery workers
De Vyver (1940) examines the job search of the 381 displaced workers when the Durham
Hosiery mill was closed in December 1935. As this is the one of the earliest, detailed
working with administrative data.
5See for example Jerome (1932) for an early call to collect nationwide, plant level data for this purpose.
6However, Jerome (1932) suggest collecting data both on workers and on investments and mechaniza-
tions of ﬁrms to study the technology induced worker displacement.
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Table 2.1: Durham Workers: In and Out of Sample
number male female
Displaced workers (traced) 381 147 234
Transferred before closing 71 . .
Temporary or colored workers 22 . .
Total workers in September 1935 474
Notes: Based on De Vyver (1940, p. 106).
case study of a plant shut-down that is published in an economic journal, I will describe
it in more detail. The case at hand is also similar to the plant closure that is central to
this dissertation in that we use administrative data of the ﬁrm to ﬁnd workers, but also
as information in evaluating the survey results.
The company had decided to permanently discontinue the manufacturing of ‘ladies
seamless cotton hosiery’7, aﬀecting a chain of hosiery mills located in and around
Durham, North Carolina. De Vyver (1940, footnote 1 on page 105) notes with respect
to the general applicability of the results that “[t]he Durham hosiery workers, therefore,
became unemployed during a period when Durham’s other industries were experiencing
a general increase both in employment and in total wages paid. It is probable, therefore,
that the picture here presented is less drastic than a composite study of many shut-
downs would be.” However, he notes that the “ results of the investigation might well
be added to data gathered elsewhere in order to ascertain how long a time is likely to
elapse between technological unemployment and absorption into a new position.” His
interest was especially with respect to the newly introduced unemployment insurance
laws, which were supposed to support workers through such a transitory period. From
the pay-roll records of “one week in September, 1935, before the number of employees
had been reduced in anticipation of the shutdown”, names and addresses as well as other
useful information concerning the then 474 employees were copied. Two years after the
shutdown the 381 workers were traced and interviewed about their new job, how long
they had been employed, and how long they had been unemployed. The group of work-
ers was — compared to the average American workforce — somewhat younger and had
a higher percentage of female workers. Most workers found employment in the same or
similar occupations, however, not all in permanent positions. Some female workers left
the labor force whereas some men returned to work on their farm (cf. Table 2.2).
The incomes earned, two years later, were higher for the majority of workers. 50.75
7Hosiery are socks and stockings.
172 Literature
Table 2.2: New Jobs Two Years After Closing of the Durham Mills
Number Category perc. Total perc.
Regular Jobs
Textile operations or related trade 191 67.25% 50.13%
Other 35 12.32% 9.19%
Farmers 15 5.28% 3.94%
Housekeepers 43 15.14% 11.29%
Subtotal 284 100.00% 74.54%
Temporary Jobs
Textile operations or related trade 22 52.38% 5.77%
Other 10 23.81% 2.62%
Odd Jobs 10 23.81% 2.62%
Subtotal 42 100.00% 11.02%
Unknown 55 100.00% 14.44%
Total 381 100.00%
Notes: Based on De Vyver (1940, pp. 109-111).
percent claimed to have a higher income in the new job, 13.93 percent reported no
change, whereas 35.52 percent reported a decrease in earnings. This is based on a total
of 201 workers reporting their wages. Most of the new jobs were found in Durham
County, only 11 former workers had moved permanently out of the municipality. Male
workers searched for an average of ﬁve months while being unemployed, whereas woman
searched on average eight months. Older workers did not have more diﬃculties in ﬁnding
a job, with the exception of those older than 55 years.
Technological change in the printing industry
Baker (1930) describes in detail the process of increased mechanization in the print-
ing industry in the United States in the early years of the 20th century, to examine
how realistic the fear of technology induced displacement, or so called “technological
unemployment” is [p. 442]. She investigates the adoption of new machines and the con-
stellation of employment in 36 plants representative of the New York printing market.
This is done over a ﬁve year period spanning from 1924 to 1929. While she ﬁnds that
increased mechanization does not lead to a total decrease in employment in the ﬁrms,
the workers most aﬀected by the technological advancement, printing assistants, experi-
enced lower employment. In a follow-up study she compares the New York and Chicago
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situation of printing in the period from 1924-1930. Chicago was less unionized and
had bigger printing plants than New York, but was overall smaller in market-size. Baker
(1933) ﬁnds that the unionized plants in New York indeed retard mechanization slightly,
while the plants with low union-coverage in Chicago adopt the new technology faster,
hence displacing more printing assistants. However, the results of plant proﬁtability are
ambiguous and it is not certain which approach yields higher overall returns.
Shutdown of meatpacking plants
In the post World War II period, several meat-packing companies rationalized their op-
erations. Shultz and Weber (1966) and Bradburn (1964) examine the result of these
structural adjustments in the meat-packing industries. In Bradburn (1964) no attempt
was made to pin down speciﬁc wage losses, but rather a general discussion of the inci-
dence and the reactions to the job loss is given. Workers are followed in their decision to
relocate, or to stay within the same municipality. On an industry wide level Shultz and
Weber (1966) summarize the eﬀects of the meat-plant closings. They give an overview
of various instruments used to cushion workers from the eﬀects of displacement. They
advocate the use of local aid to worker placement within the municipalities and are
critical of any ‘preferred’ treatment of presumably disadvantaged groups.
Job search assistance
Steinberg and Montfort (1987) use data that were generated from experiments of job
search assistance and training at several plants of Michigan car suppliers. Of the closing
plants, two are randomly selected into an experiment of retraining and placement, while
two other plants serve as a control group. Two years after the plant closure a survey
is conducted to extract the labor market history of a sample of workers from all plants.
They examine outcomes in search time for the four plants.
They ﬁnd that tenure rather than age has a large impact on the duration of search.
They attribute this ﬁnding to the ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge embodied in workers with
longer tenure. Then, higher tenure increases the pre-displacement wages to a level
above outside oﬀers — due to the ﬁrm speciﬁc knowledge — and if reservation wages
are pegged to this wage, unemployment durations are likely to be longer (Steinberg




The mine closures in the Province of Limburg in the Netherlands from 1967-1974 also
resulted in an investigation into the social consequences of the closure on the mining
district (see (Mesing 1988)) This was based on aggregated data and expert interviews.
The initial downsizing of the workforce and the closure of several mines around 1967
went relatively smoothly through early retirement and placement into alternative jobs.
However, further restructuring that led to the ﬁnal closure of the last mines in December
of 1974 have had a signiﬁcant impact on the labor market in Southern Limburg. While
the government attempted to ‘reconstruct’ the industrial base in the area, the outcomes
were mixed and the unemployment in the region remained high for a prolonged period.
Fokker
While the mine closures encompassed probably the largest overall workforce reduction
in the Netherlands, this was done over almost a decade. The bankruptcy of Fokker
N.V. lead to what is probably the single largest displacement in the economic history of
the Netherlands. On the day of the bankruptcy, 5664 workers were employed in those
parts that were closing down. A study of the consequences of this displacement will be
presented in this thesis. It is based on 10 years of pre-displacement data, as well as three
years of post-displacement labor market information.
2.1.2 Socio-Economic Panels
All U.S. based displacement papers — with the exception of case or industry studies —
either use the Displaced Worker Study (DWS), the Current Population Survey (CPS),
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), or the National Longitudinal Study of
Income (NLS). One notable exception is the paper by Jacobson et al. (1993),8 which
uses unemployment insurance records. This paper has had its inﬂuence on the Euro-
pean literature, as it oﬀered an alternative route towards studying the displacement
question, especially if no suitable panel of income and displacement (as the DWS) is
available. It commenced the use of administrative data in this literature. We will ﬁrst
summarize the socio-economic panels used to study displacement and then investigate
the administrative data that have been used.9
8This study is described in more detail in Jacobson et al. (1990).
9Tables 2.3 and 2.4 summarize the US and European data, respectively.
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Table 2.3: U.S. Data-sets
Data-set Observation Time period
CPS 250,000 persons 1940-
Displaced Worker Supplement 250,000 persons 1984-
PSID 40,000 persons 1968-
NLS 5,000 persons per cohort 1966-
CPS and Displaced Worker Supplement
The Current Population Survey (CPS) collects since the 1940s monthly labor data of a
representative sample of 48,000 households. The main purpose of the survey is to collect
information on the employment situation, information on demographic characteristics
such as age, sex, race, marital status, educational attainment, family relationship, as
well as job related information such as occupation, and industry. The survey rotates and
refreshes the sample every other year, making it diﬃcult to use in longitudinal research.
In the supplement of displaced workers gathered in 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, workers
are asked about displacement experience in the previous ﬁve years, whereas from 1994
onwards, this recall period is shortened to a 3 year period.
One problem of the CPS supplement is that it only records one job-loss. If multiple
job losses occur, the respondent is asked about the job loss on the longest job held
(Farber 1999b, p. 61). Besides the change of recall period in the 1994 redesign, the
– for displacement research important – answer categories of reasons of job loss were
also altered. In the 1984-1992 DWS six responses were allowed (1) plant closing, (2)
slack work, (3) position / shift abolished, (4) seasonal job ended, (5) self-employment
ended, and (6) other. All workers that suﬀered a job loss were asked to ﬁll in the
supplement. From 1996 onwards, only those answering (1), (2) or (3), were asked the
supplement questions. Farber (1999b, p. 67) is especially concerned about the increase
in the “other” category (6), not being interviewed. A signiﬁcant amount of respondents
choose this answer and were not interviewed. Further, Topel (1990) showed, using both
the PSID and the CPS (1982, 1984) data that the Current Population Survey tends
to overestimate the wage losses. He attributes this to the recall bias of the (then ﬁve
year long) recall period: shorter and less severe displacements might already have been
forgotten when the CPS collects data. Therefore, only severe displacement experiences
enter the data. This is conﬁrmed by an extensive study of Evans and Leighton (1995),
who use the overlapping nature of the CPS supplement to investigate recall bias of
displacement at several points in time. They show that there is an underestimation of
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the displacement incidence by 30 to 40 percent, and that this is not randomly distributed
over population groups. Particularly those groups most aﬀected tend to underreport
displacement.
PSID
While the PSID was initiated in 1968 as a short term longitudinal poverty study (ﬁve
years), it was decided to use a nationwide probabilistic sample of the American popu-
lation.10 The focus of the survey was on income dynamics, initially including sociopsy-
chological measures as well as economic and demographic variables. Due to its success,
in 1972 it was decided to prolong the study. The study is household based, and started
out with a representative sample of 5000 households, which increased over the dura-
tion of the study, as it tried to follow all members of the household investigated. The
study collects data annually. There was a split sample to investigate poverty, sampling
2500 of the households to be at or below 150 percent of the poverty line, while the
other 2500 households were representative of the U.S. society as a whole.11 Currently,
nearly 8000 households are followed, yielding a total of 40000 persons followed, from
initially 18000 in 1968. From the mid-80s continuous employment and income histories
were compiled within the PSID, which increased its value for many economist interested
speciﬁcally in income and income dynamics. It has a long time series of income,12 work
and demographic information.
The length of the observation period and the speciﬁc question whether a job was lost
due to plant closures made the PSID an interesting data set for displacement research.
However, the major drawback of this data-set for displacement research is the small
number of displaced workers. Hamermesh (1987) and (1989a), Ruhm (1991), Berry,
Gottschalk and Wissoker (1998) and Magnani (2001) have all used the PSID in dis-
placement research.
NLS
The National longitudinal study is collected by the Census Bureau and the Center for
Human Resource Research (CHRR) at Ohio State University. The ﬁrst set of surveys,
initiated in 1966, consisted of four cohorts. They are referred to as the ‘older men’,
10The information on the PSID is based on a Brown, Duncan and Staﬀord (1996) and information on
the PSID web-site. See <http://www.isr.umich.edu/src/psid/overview.html> .
11Sampling weights are available to adjust for the over-representation of low income households.
12The income is a monthly time series sine the 1980s.
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Table 2.4: European Data-sets
Country Data-set Observation Time period
Belgium Social Security Administrative Data 3800 - 6471 1985-
Britain British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS)
8000 1991 -
Denmark Joint Governmental Database all residents 1980 -
France Annual Social Data Reports 1/25th of French population 1976-1996
Germany IAB 200,000 1975-1990
GSOEP 3600 households 1984-
Netherlands UI longitudinal data (UI) 209,478 1992-1993
Labour Force Survey (LFS) 4020 1985-1990
Firm Employment Data (FE) 26,000 1992-1996
‘mature women’, ‘young men’, and ‘young women’ cohorts of the NLS. Each of these
cohorts encompass about 5,000 persons. In 1979, a longitudinal study of a cohort of
young men and women aged 14 to 22 was initiated, the so called National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). In 1997, the NLS program was again expanded with
a new cohort of young people aged 12 to 16 as of December 31, 1996. This new cohort
is the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97).
Data about schooling, career, marriage and fertility, training investments, child-care
usage, as well as drug and alcohol use are gathered. The depth and breadth of each survey
allow for analysis of an extensive variety of topics such as the transition from school to
work, job mobility, youth unemployment, educational attainment and the returns to
education, welfare recipiency, the impact of training, and retirement decisions.
The eﬀect of displacement on older men is done by Shapiro and Sandell (1985) using
the fact that the NLS has a cohort of older workers. Maxwell and D’Amico (1986) use
the NLS to estimated displacement wage losses for men and women. Using the separate
data-sets for men and woman from the same cohort, they show that males have higher
chances of becoming displaced. However, once displaced, they also recover more quickly
towards their initial labor market situation. Krashinsky (2002) uses the NLSY data-set
to conﬁrm the adverse selection model of Gibbons and Katz (1991).
GSOEP
Since 1984, the German socio-economic panel (GSOEP) has been collected. It is similar
in content to the American PSID as it is a representative longitudinal study of private
households. It provides information on all household members, consisting of Germans
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living in the West- and since the reuniﬁcation together with an added sample for the
East-German states. Foreigners and recent immigrants to Germany are also included.
In 1998, there were more than 6,600 households, and more than 12,700 persons sam-
pled. Besides the administrative data of the German ‘Bundesanstalt f¨ ur Arbeit’, this
is the only data-set used for German displacement research. Couch (2001) uses this
data-set to investigate wage losses in Germany. Burda and Mertens (1998) combine
both the GSOEP and an early version of the IAB (Administrative) data to investigate
displacement wage losses in Germany. The GSOEP is used in their study to identify
displacement in the IAB data. Displacement is identiﬁed by a question on the reasons for
a job change or loss that was included in the GSOEP from 1992 onwards. A respondent
is assumed to be displaced if he indicated that he lost his job because “the company
closed down, was laid oﬀ” (Couch 2001, p. 562).13
BHPS
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is the U.K. socio-economic panel. It is
collected by the Institute for Social and Economic Research at the University of Essex.
Since 1991, a representative sample of 5,000 households is surveyed about demographic
and household characteristics, household organization, labor market, health, education,
housing and consumption, income, social and political values. Borland, Gregg, Knight
and Wadsworth (2002) use these data to estimate wage losses and incidence of displace-
ment for the United Kingdom.
CSB Belgium
The Belgian socio-economic panel is worked out by the Centre for Social Policy, Uni-
versity of Antwerp (UFSIA). Since 1985, a sample representative of Belgian households
and individuals is available. There were 6471 individuals in 1985, and 3800 in 1992 (in-
cluding a refreshed sample of 900 households). It collects demographic characteristics,
activity status, employment situation, monthly (net) income of all household members,
household wealth, housing situation, life-style indicators, subjective income evaluation.
Albæk, van Audenrode and Browning (2002) use this data-set to investigate displace-
ment eﬀects in Belgium.
13It is unclear, however, whether this means ‘laid oﬀ because of plant closure’, or ‘plant closure and/or
laid oﬀ’.
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Table 2.5: Displacement Deﬁnition in European Data-sets
Country Data-set Displacement Deﬁnition Income Deﬁnition
Belgium CSB All the workers who separate from
a ﬁrm where employment has been
reduced by 30% or more during the
reference year and which had more









Denmark Adm. Data All the workers who separate from
a plant where employment has been
reduced by 30% or more during the
reference year and which had more




France Ann. Soc. Data All workers leaving within one (two)






worked in the par-
ticular job
Germany IAB Identify plant closure: number of
employees drops to zero;
displaced workers are those leaving





ployed for at least
one week
GSOEP+IAB Involuntary separation is identiﬁed
directly in GSOEP (self reported),
and is interpreted as displacement;
In IAB identiﬁcation is through Pro-
bit prediction from GSOEP data




Netherlands OSA FE Separations labelled as layoﬀs and
separations from shrinking ﬁrms
n.a.
OSA LFS Layoﬀs for business and economic
reasons
hourly wage data
UI Data Unemployment insurance inﬂow





The OSA labor force panel (LFS), was ﬁrst conducted in 1985. It is a interviewer-
conducted, biannual panel survey among a representative sample of around 2000 house-
holds, yielding somewhat more than 4000 workers. Layoﬀs can only be identiﬁed for
business and economic reasons. In the data set hourly wage data is available. The bian-
nual OSA ﬁrm employment (FE) panel studies labor demand. It was ﬁrst conducted
in 1989, among approximately 2500 ﬁrms and institutions. The time period 1992–1996
encompasses some 26000 workers. Separations labelled as layoﬀs and separations from
shrinking ﬁrms. Abbring, van den Berg, Gautier, Gijsbert, van Lomwel, van Ours and
Ruhm (2002) use both panels and some administrative data from unemployment insur-
ance institutions to estimate wage losses, incidence and search duration of displacement.
2.1.3 Administrative Data
The use of administrative data was initiated in the realm of displacement research by a
seminal paper of Jacobson et al. (1993). They combined unemployment insurance (UI)
data with information from a survey to investigate the dynamics of wage changes before
and after displacement. This spurred research on similar data-sets both in the United
States and in Europe. It pushed government agencies to consider how to publish the
administrative data in such a way that they can be used for research while insuring the
protection of the individuals privacy.
Pennsylvania and California unemployment insurance data
Jacobson et al. (1993) combine information from the unemployment insurance data
with information from quarterly ﬁrm reports. These data give a complete and unbiased
picture of the earnings and employment situation of workers, and by identifying workers
of the same plant, they are able to reconstruct the evolution of employment and wages
by plant. They are able to observe up to six pre-separation years and up to seven post-
separation years. The use of unemployment insurance data allows the construction of
data-sets with huge sample sizes and includes workers that are not displaced as a control
group. The identiﬁcation of displacement is done through the deﬁnition of ‘mass layoﬀ’
separators, for which they choose a downsizing of the workforce by 30 percent or more.
This has to be done as no information on the reason for worker separation is given in
the data-set. There are, of course, also several shortcomings of the data. First of all, the
information on the worker and the ﬁrm is not detailed. Only crude demographic variables
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for the workers are known. Further, workers that leave the state of Pennsylvania can
also not be observed. Finally, the lack of information on the separation forces Jacobson
et al. (1993) to deﬁne displacement with a ‘mass-layoﬀ’ indicator. There are several
reasons why this could not be a displacement in the strict sense. Some laid-oﬀ workers
could be part of the ‘displacement sample’, biasing the results somewhat.
Schoeni, Dalia, McCarthy and Vernez (1996) construct a similar data-set for Cali-
fornia. They used wage ﬁles and unemployment income ﬁles provided by Californias
Employment Development Department covering six years during which the state suf-
fered the brunt of the defence downturn. These statistics allowed the tracking of wage,
employment, and demographic characteristics of each individual aerospace worker who
was employed in California in 1989. In total 517,000 aerospace workers were followed!
In a similar fashion a comparison group of 315,000 people who were employed in similar
durable goods manufacturing jobs in non-aerospace industries in California was con-
structed.
For each quarter they have information on each workers quarterly wages, industry
of employment, participation in unemployment insurance, and the number of weeks
he received unemployment insurance. Furthermore, only age, sex, and ethnicity are
available for workers who have ever received unemployment insurance.
European administrative data
Following the lead of Jacobson et al. (1993), several administrative data-sets were also
made available and used in European countries. In France there is a data-set of 1/25th
of the entire employed working population, which can be combined on the plant level.
Germany has the ‘IAB-Stichprobe’, which is based on the unemployment insurance
information and some information on the plants that employ workers. The public use
ﬁle has, however, only few (demographic) variables of a worker. Abbring et al. (2002)
also combined unemployment insurance information on a plant level for two years to
investigate displacement eﬀects. However, these data also suﬀer from limited information
on the worker. The most extensive administrative data-set is probably the administrative
data from Denmark. It follows the entire population. While the individual information
was limited at ﬁrst, information is subsequently added and information from several
surveys are linked to the administrative data.
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2.2 Methodology
There are three approaches to the question of worker displacement. The ‘old’ studies
of plant closures are of a case study character analyzing only a single plant closure, but
following the worker’s decisions in depth. They have the advantage of more detailed data,
clear identiﬁcation of the displaced workers, and the possibility to follow comparable
workers of a single plant. On the other hand, these studies are not representative for
the entire economy, but rather analyze the decline of a speciﬁc ﬁrm. To our knowledge
there is no comparable case-study approach comparable to the U.S. studies done in the
Netherlands nor in any other European country.
To get a broad, economy-wide picture there are two alternative data sources: employ-
ment panels and administrative data. For the U.S., the employment panels consist of
the well-known panels of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the Displaced
Worker Study (DWS). For Europe well-known panels are the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSOEP), the Dutch OSA-Panel and the British BHPS. The administrative data
usually consist of unemployment insurance or unemployment agency data. For the
American case a well known study is Jacobson et al. (1993) using unemployment in-
surance data from the State of Pennsylvania. In the European case, the German IAB
data-set of the German national labor oﬃce, in France the ﬁve percent sample of the
ﬁscal administrative data, in Belgium and in Holland the unemployment insurance data,
and in Denmark the ‘national’ database of all inhabitants were used.
Both the panel and the administrative data have advantages over the case-study ap-
proach in that they are representative of the economy as a whole, and they often consist
of both displaced and non-displaced workers, which facilitates the choice of a comparison
group. However, this representativeness usually comes at a cost. With the exception
of the displaced worker study, which was speciﬁcally geared to the question of displace-
ment, it is not easy to identify displaced workers. Either a self-assessed evaluation of
the reasons for discharge is asked to the respondent, or the category ‘displaced’ does
not exist and has to be estimated through other means. Secondly, and this is mostly
a problem with the administrative data, the information about the workers is often
sketchy, and crucial variables are not available. The shortcomings of data have always
lead to ingenious detours in order to overcome these defects. Hence there have been
many solutions to the shortcomings especially in the European research which lacks the
equivalent of the “Displaced Worker Study”. Burda and Mertens (1998) for example use
the German Socio-Economic Panel, which can categorize ﬁred workers into displaced
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and not displaced, to predict the occurrence of displacement in the IAB data given the
variables available in both data-sets. Abbring et al. (2002) use three data-sets for the
analysis of displacement: an administrative longitudinal unemployment insurance data
set to examine the unemployment spells and re-employment duration, a panel, Labor
Force Survey (OSA Panel) for the demographic information and wage drop estimation of
displaced workers, and the Firm Employment Data Set (again administrative records),
to estimate the incidence of displacement in the Netherlands. Administrative data for
Belgium and Denmark (Albæk et al. 2002) and France (Bender, Dustmann, Margolis
and Meghir 2002) have been used to reconstruct mass layoﬀs on the ﬁrm or plant level
by considering a worker to be displaced if the plant lays oﬀ 30% or more of its workforce.
2.2.1 Estimation Strategy
Early ‘case studies’
The early case studies mostly tabulated the unemployment experience of workers, chart-
ing the number of unemployed and the duration of unemployment. Some, e.g. De Vyver
(1940), even indicate the direction of wage losses. However, none of them use regression
methods. Many of the studies are more interested in the experience of unemployment
and the relocation or re-orientation of workers.
Wage loss regressions
Early displacement studies estimated wage loss regressions using basic Mincerian wage
equations (Mincer 1974):
ln Wi = β0 + β1Education + β2f(Tenure) + β3f(Experience) + β4X + υi
where wages are the returns to investment in human capital, both through schooling and
through learning on the job (captured by some function of tenure, usually quadratic)
and experience, and where other demographic and job related variables are collected
in X. Finally, υi is the individual error. Comparing wage equations before and after
displacement allowed to examine wage losses. This was extended to allow for selection
of workers that do not ﬁnd employment (Heckman 1979), correcting for workers that
were still unemployed at the date of the survey (Kletzer 1989). However, this approach
was criticized for neglecting the general wage development of workers had they not been
displaced. Hence, more recent studies included reference groups of employed workers,
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comparing the displacement experience to that of not-displaced workers with similar
characteristics. For example, the estimation strategy includes both displaced and the
‘control group’ of all other workers in an annual wage equation as in e.g. Ruhm (1991)
and Couch (2001) :






where ln Wit is the log of an individual wage, αi is an individual ﬁxed eﬀect, γtMt is a
set of time dummies, Xitβ is a set of coeﬃcients and variables describing the workers as
e.g. schooling, age, etcetera,
PK
k=b Dk
itδk is a set of dummy variables indicating the time
after displacement up until the end of the observation period. And υit is the individual
error.
Berry et al. (1998) estimate an error components model of displaced earnings. They
focus on large income losses. Based on their observation that “the empirical work shows
that during the period of displacement mean earnings decline and variance of earn-
ings increases sharply”, they suggest looking at the shape of the earnings distribution.
Speciﬁcally they propose that displaced workers may diﬀer in their ‘ability to adjust’.
Secondly, the variance of earnings may change as workers may accept greater instability
of earnings in order to maintain their prior mean level of earnings. Using PSID data
and non-displaced workers as a control group in which they estimate the following
ln Wit = Xitβ + µit
µit = δi + νit
νit = ρνit−1 + eit
where the second line speciﬁes the unobserved heterogeneity ‘individual eﬀect’ and the
third equation captures the time trend of the mean earnings. They estimate this using
time dummies to indicate the time before, during and following displacement, each with
separate variances. The variance of income is found to increase during a displacement
period, to level oﬀ towards the former pre-displacement levels two years after displace-
ment.
Carrington and Zaman (1994) extend the model by looking into the diﬀerences across
industries. They estimate the wage loss regressions separately for diﬀerent industries.
Neal (1995) extends this idea by looking at the transferability of knowledge of displaced
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workers. He uses tenure within the industry to measure industry speciﬁc knowledge and
establishes that part of the skills can be transferred within the same industry.
The ‘scarring’ or lasting eﬀect of displacement was introduced by Ruhm (1991). This
is extended by Stevens (1997) to a longer time period of six years. The explanation for
the persistent eﬀect can be found in the quality of jobs that are often temporary or even
part time.14 The types of jobs worker ﬁnd after displacement is examined in some recent
papers by McCall (1997) and Farber (1999a). McCall examines the choice between part-
time and full-time employment following displacement in Canada. Women are found to
have higher chances of part-time employment after displacement. Also, those workers
that ﬁnd work within a year of displacement have a higher proportion of part-time
employment. Farber (1999a) shows that job losers in the U.S. also use “alternative and
part-time” employment to cover the ﬁrst period after displacement. As time goes by,
the likelihood of holding these types of jobs diminishes.
Adverse Selection Model
Gibbons and Katz (1991) suggest an adverse selection model of ﬁrm hiring, in which
the lay-oﬀ of a single worker contains a negative signal about the quality of the worker.
This implies that lay-oﬀs which are not selective, should not encompass this signal.
Hence, displaced workers, being laid-oﬀ due to a plant closure (rather than for cause),
should suﬀer lower wage losses than workers that were laid-oﬀ without a plant closure.
They test their model using the Displaced Worker Supplement of the CPS (1984, 1986)
and ﬁnd that the displaced workers fare indeed better than workers who were simply
laid oﬀ. Doiron (1995) and Grund (1999) conﬁrm this result for Canada and Germany,
respectively. Krashinsky (2002) uses NLSY data and conﬁrms that displaced workers
have slightly lower losses. However, due to the small sample size of 167 displaced workers
versus 770 workers that were laid oﬀ, no signiﬁcant diﬀerences could be found.
2.3 Search Time and Wage Losses
While the investigation into the displacement wage losses contains by now an extensive
body of literature it mainly remains limited to investigations of displacement in the U.S.
labor market. Few studies formally investigate the duration of unemployment. While job
14Compare also to the introduction of the paper by Hall (1995) in which he predicts these problems as
a result of displacement.
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search and wage losses seem to be interrelated no attempt to simultaneously investigate
issues of search time and wage losses have been performed.
2.3.1 U.S. Studies
Duration of Job Search
One of the early studies that explicitly investigates the duration of displaced workers’ job
search are Kruse (1988), Podgursky and Swaim (1987), as well as Swaim and Podgursky
(1990, 1991). Kruse (1988) investigates the duration of joblessness of displaced workers.
He is especially interested in diﬀerences between import-competing versus non-import
competing industries. On average he ﬁnds that the estimated median unemployment
duration is between 38 and 41 weeks. A higher import share in the industry results
in a 1.25 week increase in median duration of unemployment. Podgursky and Swaim
(1987) examine the duration of joblessness for workers displaced from full-time non-
agricultural jobs between 1979 and 1981 in the United States. They ﬁnd that particularly
the blue collar workers with lower than average education search longest. Swaim and
Podgursky (1990) develop a ‘sequential-regimes job search model’ which allows for search
prior to displacement for workers with advance knowledge of layoﬀ, and with diﬀerent
search intensities before and after layoﬀ. This enables a thorough investigation into the
impact of advanced notice on the duration of job search for displaced workers. Advance
knowledge is found to signiﬁcantly shorten jobless duration for most labor force groups.
Swaim and Podgursky (1991) estimate that the median workers has a unemployment
duration of 25 to 30 weeks following layoﬀ.
In the attempt to examine the eﬀect of advanced notiﬁcation several studies com-
pare the duration of unemployment for displaced workers with or without advanced
notice. Ruhm (1992) examines how pre-notiﬁcation of displacement decreases the post-
displacement joblessness. While he ﬁnds a small increase in the chance of avoiding
unemployment, it does not reduce search duration signiﬁcantly. Ruhm (1994) shows
that the pre-notiﬁcation obtained by some displaced workers signiﬁcantly increases their
post-displacement earnings expectations. However, the qualiﬁcation is made that the
written notice is often given by those employers who also oﬀer other assistance. Friesen
(1997) exploits diﬀerences in the legislation on advanced notiﬁcation across provinces in
Canada. She examines the diﬀerences between jobless survival rates among displaced
workers to establish the impact of advanced notiﬁcation on jobless duration. She shows
that the existence rather than the duration of an advance notice aﬀects the subsequent
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chances of ﬁnding new employment quickly.
Wage Losses
The U.S. Studies of the 1970s and 1980s are summarized in Hamermesh (1989b). Ta-
ble 2.6 summarizes the ﬁndings. In general some wage losses were found by workers,
increasing with tenure and dependent on the occupation or industry.
A more recent survey of the U.S. displacement literature can be found in Fallick
(1996). A review of the ﬁndings and consequences of displacement based on the American
literature can be found in Kletzer (1998). In the recent literature it is noted that
the average earning losses hide the fact that the result of displacement can be quite
heterogeneous with respect to wage losses. As Kletzer (1998) concludes for the United
States:
“Over the period 1981-95 real weekly earnings were 13 percent lower than
pre-displacement earnings (Farber, 1997). This average masks considerable
heterogeneity: approximately one-third of workers report earnings losses of
25 percent or more, while 30-40 percent report earning more on their post-
displacement job than on their pre-displacement job.”
Hence, the more recent literature tries to attribute the wage losses found to worker or
search speciﬁc outcomes. One example is the investigation of (partial) transferability of
human capital: Neal (1995) estimates the losses of displaced workers, including a choice
of changing industries. He shows that changing industries increases wage losses. This
can be seen as the loss of industry speciﬁc human capital. Another example is Stevens
(1997) who shows that wage losses are often the result of repeated job losses after the
displacement. Looking over the entire duration of the PSID, she shows that the wage
losses are persistent over time, at about 9 percent below the expected level had the
worker not been displaced. She attributes those changes to repeated job losses after
displacement.
332 Literature
Table 2.6: Survey of Studies of Displacement




Social loss = $1,200 - $7,600 (in 1972 dollars)
Corson and Nicholson (1981)
Permanent layoﬀ, 1976,
interviewed in 1978-1979
Increased unemployment duration with tenure; earn-
ings loss = $ 9,000 (in 1978 dollars)
Addison and Portugal (1989)
DWS, 1979-1984, full-time
Greater wage loss with tenure, industry, or occupa-
tion change (but not location change); no age eﬀect;
negative unemployment duration dependence
Kletzer (1989)
DWS, only plant closing or posi-
tion abolished
Greater wage loss with tenure (but some eﬀect of





Increased unemployment duration with tenure, im-
port penetration, among blacks, less educated
Madden (1987)
DWS, 1983, displaced
Greater wage loss of women, greater tenure, less ed-
ucation, change industry, white
Podgursky and Swaim (1987)
DWS, displaced 1979-1982
Reduced unemployment duration if plant closing, if
nonunion; negative duration dependence
Hamermesh (1987)
PSID, 1977-1981, only plant clos-
ing
Lost job-speciﬁc capital = $7,000 (in 1980 dollars)
wage-tenure proﬁle unvarying before displacement
Ruhm (1991)
PSID, 1971-1981, job loss, others
No permanent unemployment eﬀect of job loss; no
eﬀect of age or tenure
Blau and Kahn (1981)
NLS young men, young woman,
1969-1972, permanent layoﬀs,
others
Greater wage loss among men, whites; lower reem-
ployment among blacks
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Table 2.6: Survey of Studies of Displacement (continued ...)
Study and Sample Results
Ruhm (1991)
DWS
Finds lasting eﬀect of displacement on income even
after several years. Wage loss is estimated to be 10-13
percent four years after displacement
Jacobson et al. (1993)
Pennsylvania UI
Losses amount to 25 percent of pre-displacement in-
comes.
Carrington (1993) Even in growing industries wage losses are signiﬁcant.
Using local controls wage losses average 2 percent for
professionals to a high of 35 percent in the mining
industries.
Carrington and Zaman (1994) Mean reduction over all industries is found to be
around 13 percent. Losses on pre-displacement tenure
are particularly strong in the primary metal industry,
and weak in the construction industry.
Neal (1995)
DWS 1984-1990
Per 10 years of experience with one employer; indus-
try switchers have 21% and stayers 11% higher wage
losses.
Stevens (1997) Persistent income losses. Six years after displace-
ment, workers earn 9 percent lower wages than their
expected non-displaced wages.
Chan and Stevens (1999)
HRS, older workers
Finds wage losses of 19 percent and decrase in assets
of 17,000 – 34,000 Dollars
Notes: This table is an extended and updated version of Hamermesh (1989b, Table 2,
page 57). DWS is the Current Populations Survey ‘Displaced Workers Supplement’. HRS
is the ‘Health and Retirement Study’.
2.3.2 European Studies
The European literature on displacement is not as extensive as the U.S. literature. Only
within recent decades several studies were published. One key contribution to the Euro-
pean displacement literature is a volume edited by Kuhn (2002), that reports empirical
studies on displaced workers in Europe and several other industrialized countries. Most
352 Literature
of the ﬁndings reported here for Europe are based on chapters from this volume.
Duration of Job Search
It is striking to see that a large proportion of the displaced workers move to a new
job (almost) immediately. Depending on the scale of the observation period (months,
quarter, year), some workers cannot be observed to be unemployed at all. Nevertheless,
we can observe positive unemployment spells for those workers who were not fortunate
enough to ﬁnd a new job immediately. Kuhn (2002) ﬁnds a wide variation of unemploy-
ment duration at all across countries. Abbring et al. (2002) report that only 30 percent
of displaced workers they observe in the Netherlands actually experience some jobless-
ness, compared with 85 percent in the US. Similar pictures are found among displaced
in Germany (39%) (Bender et al. 2002) and in plant closures or shrinkages in Denmark
(31%) (Albæk et al. 2002).
Wage Losses
There have not been many studies on displacement wage losses in Europe. Albæk et al.
(2002) found for Belgium a wage loss of 2.6 percent three years after the displacement.15
This should be compared to a wage gain of 6 percent for other job movers in the same
period. The average wage level showed a loss of 8.8 percent, and that of the other job
movers a loss of 3.7 percent. For Denmark, they found that annual earnings decreased
by 8.3 percent three years post displacement, while other job-movers fared slightly better
with a loss of 6.8 percent. The average wage level — however — increased slightly by
0.1 percent three years after displacement, whereas that of the other job-movers was 6.8
percent less compared to their previous pay.
Borland et al. (2002) calculates an earnings loss of 9.7 percent for all displaced work-
ers.16 However they also show that the job-to-job displaced have only slight losses, on
average 1.5 percent, whereas displaced workers who do not ﬁnd employment immediately
have losses of 14.6 percent on average.
Abbring et al. (2002) run wage regressions in which displacement is one of the ex-
planatory (dummy-)variables. The wage regression predicts a wage gain of 0.3 percent
for all displaced and of 4.9 percent for all displaced with a tenure of more than one year.
15This is conditional on ﬁnding new employment and based on annual employment, even if only partly
employed.
16Here the earnings loss is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between current job and the previous job, regardless
of any intervening spell of unemployment.
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Table 2.7: Earnings Losses in Europe
Displaced Comparison Group
Country Dataset Comparison Group ∆Wage (%) ∆Wage (%)
Belgium Soc. Sec. Data other job movers -2.6 6.0
Britain BHPS none -9.7
Denmark Gov. Data other job movers -8.3 -6.8
Germany IAB continuously employed -1.46 4.6
wage regression 1 year
after displacement
1.5 n.a.
wage regression 4 years
after displacement
± 0 n.a.
IAB+GSOEP compared to all employ-
ees
3 4.7
wage regression -3.64 n.a.
GSOEP -13.5 in 1st year
(’91-’96) -6.5 in 2nd year
Netherlands LFS wage regression 0.3 n.a.
Notes: All studies of the table work with a comparison group. Wage changes of displaced
workers (col. 4) are to be evaluated relative to the wage changes of the comparison group
(col. 5).
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Bender et al. (2002) found no wage loss for displaced workers that ﬁnd a job within two
years after displacement. However, they also found that workers who were displaced did
have pre-displacement wage drops compared to other workers. Those workers who did
not ﬁnd a job two years after displacement have an additional (post-)displacement wage
drop of 7.3 percent on average. For Germany they found a wage drop of 1.46 percent
for those displaced workers who were at least one week unemployed, i.e. excluding the
job-to-job displaced. This should be compared to a 4.6 percent increase in earnings
for those continuously employed over the same period. However, they also note that
the wage losses could be due to a composition eﬀect of the displaced workers, since
the eﬀect of displacement almost disappeared in a wage regression correcting for worker
characteristics. Only if the period of unemployment was longer than a year, a signiﬁcant
wage drop of 19 percent could be identiﬁed. These numbers can be compared to those
of Burda and Mertens (1998), who identiﬁed displacement through a probit regression
on the GSOEP, but used the same IAB data-set for the wage loss calculations. They
identify a wage growth of 3 percent for the displaced, which should be compared to
4.7 percent wage growth of the continuously employed. Using a wage regression their
dummy ‘displaced’ explains a wage loss of 3.64 percent. They also note that there are
some workers having positive wage growth post displacement. The 1st quartile of the
wage-region has positive wage growth if they get displaced, while all others have negative
wage growth.
Couch (2001) estimates annual wage losses and the annual number of unemployed
months based on the West-German GSOEP data from 1991-1996. The estimation strat-
egy includes both displaced and the ‘control group’ of all other workers in an annual
wage equation. Additionally a tobit estimation of the number of months unemployed was
used.17 Couch ﬁnds that the reduction in earnings in the year of displacement amounts
to 13.5 percent,18 which drops down to 6.5 percent of the pre-displacement earnings in
the subsequent year. The number of months unemployed also increases signiﬁcantly in
the year of displacement and the year following displacement, to level oﬀ afterwards.
2.3.3 Open Questions
What we can conclude from these studies is that the outcome of displaced workers varies
quite a lot between countries. However, these diﬀerences can be partly attributed to the
diﬀerences in set-up between the studies. In general we can ﬁnd some slight wage losses
17This is similar to Ruhm (1991).
18Only workers that eventually did ﬁnd employment were used.
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for displaced workers compared to the wage-development of workers who did not lose
their job. Compared to other job-movers the evidence is mixed, but if the comparison
is with other ‘ﬁred’ workers, usually the displaced workers fare better.
It seems also that the wage loss is signiﬁcantly higher for those workers who are unable
to ﬁnd a new job within a certain time period. The big losses are associated with those
who do not ﬁnd a job within the ﬁrst one to two years. However, estimation of wage
losses combined with the duration of unemployment are usually not performed. The
trade-oﬀ between searching longer or accepting wage losses at some earlier stage is thus
in need of investigation.
Furthermore, there is some evidence that average wage losses hide a signiﬁcant diver-
gence in the distribution of losses (and gains), which remains unexplained. So far the
transferability of ﬁrm or industry speciﬁc human capital has been established. However,
this had to be done using the tenure within the ﬁrm or industry as a proxy for embodied
human capital. Neal (1995)[pp. 669-670] already suggest to measure on the job level
rather than using industries: “[T]he results [...] reﬂect the importance of skills that
are not truly speciﬁc to given industries, but rather speciﬁc to a set of jobs that are
associated with the intersection of certain occupations and industries.”
Another area in which some insights have been won is the post-displacement employ-
ment relationships. Some of the wage losses can be attributed to inferior jobs or job
arrangements. Alternatively, the new jobs are not as stable as the pre-displacement job,
increasing the risk of subsequent unemployment.
There remains a large heterogeneity of wage losses and duration outcomes among
displaced workers. Existing variables that were used explain only some part of the
wage losses. In the chapters 7 and 8, we will use the detailed data on the career of the
workers in one ﬁrm and the detailed information on their post-displacement labor market
experience to shed some light on these open issues. In particular, the inﬂuence of a career
and the position upon displacement on subsequent wage losses can be examined. Part
of the returns to tenure are rewarded within a ﬁrm by a promotion to a higher position,
which we can observe in our data. Further, we have information on the breadth of a
workers positions, i.e. did a worker specialize or rotate over several diﬀerent departments.
Given that we are dealing with one ﬁrm and that all workers are displaced at the same
time ensures that no heterogeneity come forth from diﬀerences in ﬁrms or timing. Also,
we can establish how the interaction among workers inﬂuences their post-displacement
outcomes.
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Labor Markets
“[I]t can be said that the amount of mobility found, whether derived
from any of the three mobility measures developed or from the study of
life-time careers, was high. It was high in the sense that large numbers of
workers would, in reﬂection upon their careers, have asserted that they
had led successful, productive lives and reaped rewards in the form of
enhanced standards of living and, in many cases, enhanced status. [...]
It would be surprising, however, if there were not considerable intellectual
returns from focusing our attention upon the two most prevalent
characteristics of labor mobility, namely job changes within ﬁrms and the
relative reluctance of workers to be mobile between ﬁrms. ”
(Gitelman, 1966 , pp. 64-65 )3 Internal Labor Markets
3.1 Introduction
An important impulse for the development of an “internal labor market” (ILM) liter-
ature within the labor economics literature was Doeringer and Piore’s (1971) seminal
work. They emphasized the institutional character of employment relations arguing that
administrative rules and procedures, i.e. personnel policies, govern employment relation-
ships. As a result, the pricing and allocation of labor that contrast sharply with the
predictions of traditional labor economics. Part of this ILM literature has been devoted
to study the design and eﬀects of such personnel policies (e.g. Prendergast, 1993; Pren-
dergast and Topel, 1996; Milgrom and Roberts, 1988), while a substantial body of the
theoretical literature focuses on job ladders, career movements, promotions, and their
relationship to compensation (e.g. Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Waldman, 1984; Gibbons
and Waldman, 1999a).1
Despite a growing empirical literature that studies ﬁrm personnel records, theories
of the internal workings of ﬁrms are still based on the little empirical evidence derived
from personnel data available that record job positions and compensation in ﬁrms. Early
exceptions include Osterman (1979), Medoﬀ and Abraham (1980), Lazear (1992) and
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a and 1994b). The most detailed empirical study
of wage and career dynamics in internal labor markets so far is that of Baker, Gibbs
and Holmstrom (1994a, b), who analyze a yearly panel of personnel data of management
employees from a large U.S. company, which expands over the observation period. Many
of their ﬁndings – including that career paths are important for the allocation of workers
to jobs, that there is a substantial amount of wage variation within job levels in spite of
the strong relation between hierarchical levels and compensation, and that there is no
evidence of distinct ports of entry and exit as predicted by Doeringer and Piore (1971)
– are conﬁrmed by contemporary studies (e.g. Ariga et al., 1999; Seltzer and Merrett,
2000; Lima, 2000; Gibbs and Hendricks, 2001; Treble et al., 2001).
We complement this literature by analyzing ten years of personnel records from the
Dutch aircraft manufacturer Fokker in order to assess whether these empirical “facts”
are valid for a diﬀerent ﬁrm, in a diﬀerent industry, over a diﬀerent period, and in a
diﬀerent economy. While doing so, we provide answers to a number of questions that
were advocated by Gibbons (1997) to facilitate the composition of a broader picture of
internal labor markets for which individual studies provide pieces of a puzzle based on
ﬁrm-level data which are often collected in diﬀerent ways and measure diﬀerent variables.
1See Gibbons and Waldman (1999b) for a recent survey of this literature.
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We shed light on issues that have not been addressed in this literature so far: The
exceptional feature that the data set covers an episode of corporate growth as well as an
episode of corporate decline allows us to explore how personnel decisions of the ﬁrm diﬀer
between periods of growth and decline. We investigate the consequences of a changing
corporate environment for promotion dynamics and organizational stability. We can
distinguish between production workers on the one hand and managers and engineers
on the other hand. We can thus examine whether the internal workings of the ﬁrm diﬀer
with respect to worker type. In addition, we can study whether such diﬀerences exist
across diﬀerent ﬁelds of activity within the ﬁrm, as for instance Production, R&D, Sales
& Customer Relations or Administration. Finally, in contrast to existing studies, which
commonly rely on year-end panel data, we analyze event history data which record the
exact timing of all events related to wage or position changes. The knowledge of the exact
timing of all events not only allows us to explore whether wage and position changes occur
simultaneously, but it allows us also to look at all events that happen, including those
that would remain hidden between two cross-sections of personnel records. Information
that would be lost in yearly cross-sections turns out to be substantial, in particular with
respect to temporary worker re-allocation and downward mobility.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. Job mobility is substantial in our ﬁrm and an
important determinant of wages. Although we ﬁnd somewhat lower upward transition
rates than related studies, we do observe a substantial number of lateral transitions. Job
transitions are the major source for sustained wage growth as wages are strongly related
to job levels, even though wage changes do not always occur simultaneously with upward
job transitions. However, wages are not tied to jobs in a strict sense. Considerable wage
spread is found in all job levels, and wage distributions of adjacent job levels overlap.
We also ﬁnd that downward mobility almost never results in nominal wage cuts, yet it
frequently coincides with degradation in wage scales and hence a reduced prospect of
future wage growth. Real wage decreases, on the other hand, are common, especially
during downsizing when nominal wages are not changed for most workers for more than
two years.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the ﬁrm and its personnel
data. Section 3.3 depicts the hierarchical structure of the ﬁrm and the procedure used
to identify those hierarchical levels. Section 3.4 analyzes the job mobility pattern. It
portrays entry and exit as well as job transitions within the ﬁrm. Section 3.5 examines
the relationship between wages and hierarchical job positions. Section 3.6 takes a closer
look at wage growth and its relation to job transitions. Section 3.7 investigates career
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paths within the ﬁrm and shows that both careers across hierarchies as well as within
hierarchical positions exists. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 The Firm and its Personnel Data
3.2.1 The Firm
We have personnel data from the Dutch national aircraft builder N.V. Fokker over the
period from January 1, 1987, when the ﬁrm introduced its electronic personnel system,
until March 15, 1996, when the ﬁrm was oﬃcially declared bankrupt.2 N.V. Koninklijke
Nederlandse Vliegtuigenfabriek Fokker was structured in an administration unit (Fokker
Administration B.V.), an aircraft production unit (Fokker Aircraft B.V.) with plants in
three diﬀerent locations as well as four other subsidiaries at diﬀerent locations. The
majority of the workforce was aﬀected by the bankruptcy of the holding company, the
production unit, and the administration unit, which formed the core business of aircraft
manufacturing. The other viable parts of the ﬁrm did not enter the bankruptcy proce-
dure and were eventually sold. Most of the organizational structure remained unchanged
until the day of the bankruptcy, except for one division, Fokker Space, that was spun
oﬀ in December 1995.3
We analyze the data until the bankruptcy date. This might prompt the criticism
that the ﬁrm is not a representative example of a downsizing ﬁrm as it fails eventually.
This could be problematic if the demise was expected and if behavior was brought into
line with the anticipation of the failure. However, there is reason to believe that the
bankruptcy came suddenly and unexpectedly for most of the employees.4
3.2.2 The Data
We use information on each employee’s job, compensation, and demographics. The job
position ﬁle records every worker’s job code, job title, organization code, organization
2The data were made available to us for academic purposes by the company’s bankruptcy trustees.
The report of the bankruptcy trustees is publicly available (see Deterink et al., 1997).
3Workers employed at this division leave our data ﬁles on that date.
4Most analysts expected even in September 1995 that Fokker would survive when the majority share-
holders, the Dutch government and Deutsche Aerospace AG (DASA), started negotiating a bailout
plan. A comment in the Wall-Street Journal on September 4, 1995, describes the market sentiment:
“Few, however, expect DASA, the aerospace arm of German industrial giant Daimler-Benz AG, will
let Fokker go bust. The Dutch company [...] ﬁlls a key niche in a market segment expected to show
strong growth in the next few years.” (du Bois, 1995)
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name, the activity his job belongs to, the plant name, as well as the starting and end
date of all his job positions within the company during the observation period. The
wage ﬁles contain information on the salary grade, the nominal wage rate, the start and
ending date of the wage contract, the reason for a change in the wage contract, and
a performance measure that refers to performance in the previous year. In addition,
we know the schooling and the vocational degree of most employees. The ﬁle of demo-
graphic characteristics has the date of birth, gender, marital status, and the hiring date
for every employee. We merged these raw data ﬁles into one event history data ﬁle.
Since we know the exact timing of job changes and wage changes, we can detect whether
job changes and wage changes occur simultaneously. Another advantage of our data
structure is that we do not lose information about events that happen in the time-span
between two cross-sections of panel data.
3.2.3 Development of the Workforce
The time period spanned by the data can be divided into a period of workforce expansion
and one of workforce reduction. The number of employed workers with permanent
contracts rises from 10275 in January 1987 to 12852 at the peak in February 1991. During
the subsequent period, which is marked by a series of reorganizations with employment
reductions and mass layoﬀs, the number of employed workers falls to 7141 on the day
before the bankruptcy.
Figure 3.1 plots the number of workers employed at the beginning of each month from
January 1987 until March 1996 stacked by ten broad activities into which jobs are cat-
egorized. Most workers are employed in one of the ﬁve production activities: Assembly
(F), Support & Supplies (G), Production Preparation (D), Planning & Coordination
(E), and Quality (M). Employment changes in production activities increasing steadily
from 6684 workers in January 1987 to a peak of 8838 workers in June 1991, and then
falling to 4651 workers on the day before the bankruptcy account for the largest part of
the workforce expansion and the subsequent contraction. Employment in the three ad-
ministrative activities Finances and Administration (K), Human Resources & Support
(H), and Management & Information Processing (S) rises from 1966 workers in January
1987 to 2252 workers in February 1991 and falls subsequently to 1113 workers in March
1996. Employment in R&D (C) and in Sales & Customer Relations (B), on the other
hand, grows for a prolonged period (peaking not until the second quarter 1993), and
declines only moderately until the end of 1995. As a result, the employment share of
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Figure 3.1: Development and Composition of the Workforce by Activities
year
     
     













Notes: The ﬁgure plots the number of workers with a permanent contract employed at the beginning
of each month from January 1987 until March 1996 stacked by the diﬀerent job activities deﬁned in the
data. Job activities comprise: Sales & Customer Relations (B), R&D (C), Management & Information
Processing (S), Human Resources & Support (H), Finances and Administration (K), Support & Supplies
(G), Quality (M), Planning & Coordination (E), Production Preparation (D), and Assembly (F). Labels
are in parentheses. The distance to the next lower line represents the number of workers in a particular
job activity. Total employment at the ﬁrm is, therefore, characterized by the top line, labelled as ”F”.
production related activities falls during the episode of downsizing from a peak of 68.8%
in mid 1991 to 62.3% in December 1995 and that of administrative activities falls from
17.1% in mid 1991 to 15.9% by the end of 1995.
3.3 The Corporate Hierarchy
3.3.1 Identiﬁcation of Levels
We relied on job transitions, job titles, reporting relations and team composition — but
we did not use information from the wage ﬁles — in order to identify the hierarchical job
structure of the ﬁrm.5 There are 6085 diﬀerent job codes and 6318 diﬀerent job names
in the data.6 Fortunately, the number of levels could be inferred easily from transitions
5The methodology of assigning job codes is in line with that of Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a).
6Some codes correspond to more than one name, which sometimes reﬂects typos, abbreviations in
names, or a change from a Dutch to an English name. On the other hand, some job names are not
unique to a single job code which often reﬂects the fact that codes have changed over time, while the
463.3 The Corporate Hierarchy
between a few important job titles that account for a large portion of the workforce.7 We
identiﬁed 10 hierarchical levels. Production workers, supporting workers (e.g. cleaning,
catering or transportation staﬀ), and lower-level clerical workers are organized in the
bottom three levels. We refer to this group of workers as blue-collar workers. Higher level
clerical workers form level 4 of the hierarchy. Management and the remaining white-
collar workforce are organized in six management levels (levels 5-10).8 The ‘Executive
Board’, which consisted of a group of 3 managers most of the time, forms the top
of the hierarchy (level 10). Directors of subdivisions and plants are in level 9. For
conﬁdentiality reasons, we lack salary information for those employees in levels 9 and
10.9 Consequently, analyses involving compensation are only for the bottom 8 levels of
the corporate hierarchy. Moreover, due to the small number of employees in the top 3
levels, we group these levels together in our job transition analyses. Level 8 comprises
heads of departments. Levels 5, 6, and 7 comprise managers who report to those in level
8 and head or work in lower level departments of the ﬁrm. Besides, a large fraction of
employees in levels 4 to 6 are engineers or specialists.
Suggestive job titles conﬁrmed the hierarchical structure inferred from job transitions.
For example, “Assemblers” or “Lathe Operators” are organized in level 1 in production,
whereas team leaders (e.g. “Team Leader Assembly” or “Team Leader Lathe Opera-
tion”) are in level 2, and group chiefs (e.g. “Group Chief Assembly” or “Group Chief
Lathe Operation”) in level 3. Similarly, job titles conﬁrmed our assignment of job codes
to higher hierarchical levels. For example, we observe transitions from “Specialist” to
“Senior Specialist”, or from “Engineer” to “Senior Engineer”. These suggestive job
titles also facilitated the assignment of minor job codes comprising only one or very
few persons, who sometimes had no transition to or from another job code during the
observation period. Finally, we exploited information about the composition of teams
or subdivisions to assert that the hierarchical structure inferred from job transitions is
consistent with the organization of teams in the sense that a team leader is assigned to
a higher hierarchical level than the team members reporting to him.
job itself remained unchanged.
7The largest 30 job codes comprise 35% of the workforce, and the largest 130 job codes encompass
50% of the workforce.
8Additional information on the ﬁrm’s organizational structure of management — which is provided
by Deterink et al. (1997) — conﬁrmed that we inferred the correct number of levels for white-collar
employees from job transitions.
9Wages for level 8 employees that exceed 200,000 guilders annually are also not recorded.
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Table 3.1: Hierarchical Composition, 1987-1996
Year
Level 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1 51.3 52.9 53.7 54.1 53.0 52.3 50.4 45.2 42.3 43.9
2 16.2 15.6 15.4 14.8 14.6 14.4 14.4 15.6 15.7 16.0
3 9.0 8.6 8.6 7.9 8.3 8.5 8.7 9.2 9.7 9.8
4 11.1 10.9 10.6 11.4 11.9 11.8 12.6 13.4 13.4 12.9
5 6.2 6.0 5.8 5.9 6.2 6.6 7.2 8.3 9.1 8.2
6 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.7 4.0 5.2 6.2 5.6
7 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.9 1.7
8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.6
9-10 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: The table shows for each year the percentage of employees in each of the 10 hierarchical job
levels on March 14 of every year. Levels 9 and 10 are combined for conﬁdentiality reasons.
3.3.2 Structural Stability and the Size of Levels
Table 3.1 reveals the pyramid structure of the hierarchy with “sub-pyramids” for blue-
collar and white-collar job levels. We ﬁnd that many features of this hierarchical job
structure are remarkably stable over the entire period. The number of levels in the
hierarchy is unchanged and the main job titles in each level in 1987 remain in the
respective levels until the bankruptcy.10 Corresponding with Baker et al. (1994a), who
report stable relative sizes of hierarchical levels for an expanding ﬁrm, we also ﬁnd that
the relative size of levels is largely unaﬀected by the workforce expansion from 1987
until 1991 (see Table 3.1). However, relative level sizes change markedly during the
period of employment reduction from 1991 until 1996, when the blue-collar share of
total employment (levels 1-3) declines from 75.9% in 1991 to 67.7% in 1995.
3.4 Mobility
3.4.1 Entry and Exit
Turnover is comparatively low during the ﬁrst ﬁve years of our observation period so
that we can conﬁdently speak of an internal labor market: The average annual exit rate
equals 7.1% from January 1987 until March 1991, whereas Baker et al. (1994a) ﬁnd exit
10It is noteworthy, however, that the ﬁrm apparently reorganized certain divisions during downsizing.
For example, diﬀerent engineering jobs are summarized in one job code in 1992.
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Table 3.2: Entry into Hierarchical Levels, 1987-1996
Year
Level 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1 76.8 76.6 70.9 70.3 72.0 55.5 24.3 45.2 44.1 45.8
2 6.1 8.5 7.8 6.9 7.1 5.8 15.9 5.5 13.6 12.5
3 2.9 2.9 3.6 5.1 4.1 7.3 11.2 11.0 5.9 8.3
4 10.1 7.3 12.1 12.2 10.8 20.6 19.6 11.0 8.5 8.3
5 2.4 2.6 3.7 4.2 3.8 8.2 15.9 9.6 16.1 0.0
6 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.9 0.8 1.1 5.6 6.8 6.8 16.7
7 0.5 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.6 4.7 4.1 2.5 4.2
8 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.9 4.1 1.7 4.2
9-10 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 1.9 2.7 0.8 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: The table shows for each year the percentage of just hired employees that entered into the
respective level. Levels 9 and 10 are combined for conﬁdentiality reasons.
rates of 10% and more when their ﬁrm grows at a similar rate as ours.
We do not ﬁnd evidence of a completely closed internal labor market. There is entry
into all levels in all years as Table 3.2 shows. Yet, entry is concentrated in the bottom
levels of blue-collar employment (level 1) and of white-collar employment (level 4) –
especially during the episode of corporate expansion when 70.3%-76.8% of all beginners,
or 85.5%-89.5% of all newly hired blue-collar workers enter level 1 and when 60.1%-
71.1% of all newly hired white-collar workers enter level 4 (see Table 3.2). Entry rates
into blue-collar ranks are markedly lower during downsizing and entry measured relative
to level size is generally less concentrated in bottom ranks from 1992 onwards, possibly
because hiring then takes place to staﬀ vacancies in existing slots that cannot be ﬁlled
from within, rather than to hire into slots that are newly created during expansion.
Hiring and ﬁring takes place at all times. Monthly inﬂow rates are higher and more
erratic (with peaks occurring commonly in May) than outﬂow rates during corporate
expansion, while the opposite holds for the episode of corporate downsizing (see Figure
3.2). Early during downsizing, in 1991 and 1992, the workforce reduction is mainly
accomplished by a fall in the inﬂow rate, while the outﬂow rate rises only slightly. The
dramatic decline in employment during 1993-1996, however, is brought about by a sub-
stantial increase in the outﬂow rate and a further drop of the inﬂow rate.11 Remarkable
11The total number of hirings in the period of downsizing is less than a third of the inﬂow during ex-
pansion. Hiring rates into white-collar ranks fall by less than hiring rates into blue-collar employment
(cf. lower part of Table 3.3).
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Figure 3.2: Inflow- Outflow and Employment Growth Rates
year
 Hiring as % of workforce  Separations as % of workforce
 Net change of workforce
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
−.075
.075
Notes: The ﬁgure plots the monthly hiring rate, the separation rate, and the net employment growth
rates.
are the enormous jumps in outﬂow in June 1993, June - August 1994, December 1994,
and December 1995, which follow downsizing announcements in April 1993, April 1994,
and January 1995, respectively.
Exit rates are highest out of level 1 in the period of downsizing (see Table 3.3).
Blue-collar workers, particularly those in level 1, separate ﬁrst during downsizing. Exit
rates from level 1 jump most during the 1993 downsizing episode, the ﬁrst with mainly
involuntary dismissals (see Table 3.3). Higher exit rates out of the bottom level of blue-
collar employment can partly be ascribed to higher turnover rates among workers with
short tenure who predominately entered in level 1 and separate before having made an
upward transition. But even controlling for tenure and other characteristics, Dohmen
and Pfann (2000) ﬁnd that corporate downsizing aﬀects exit rates of blue-collar and
white-collar workers diﬀerently. While job separations are, if anything, more frequent
for white-collar employees than for blue-collar workers during the period of corporate
expansion, workers in the lower ranks become more likely to separate during downsizing,
which is also revealed in Table 3.3. It is not until late 1995 that exit rates from the top 5
levels of the hierarchy increase markedly. This seems to indicate a shift in layoﬀ policy.
503.4 Mobility
Table 3.3: Exit from Hierarchical Levels, 1987-1996
Year
Level 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1 54.0 49.2 64.0 66.1 63.7 63.6 73.4 60.5 42.2 43.0
2 10.9 14.8 11.5 11.9 11.3 10.8 9.7 13.2 18.1 13.8
3 8.8 7.7 4.4 4.4 6.3 6.6 5.0 5.9 7.4 9.5
4 16.1 13.4 10.0 9.3 10.7 8.4 7.3 12.1 15.9 14.7
5 6.4 6.6 3.2 3.7 4.9 5.0 2.1 4.5 7.4 9.0
6 1.7 4.6 3.7 1.5 1.8 2.5 1.6 2.0 5.8 6.3
7 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.3 0.6 1.7 0.4 0.7 1.3 1.8
8 0.6 1.7 1.1 1.0 0.3 1.0 0.4 0.7 1.5 1.7
9-10 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: The table shows for each year the percentage of separating workers that exit the ﬁrm from a
given level. Levels 9 and 10 are combined for conﬁdentiality reasons.
3.4.2 Vertical Job Mobility
Since the relative sizes of hierarchical levels remain stable during the episode of workforce
expansion in spite of entry concentrated in the bottom levels of blue-collar and white-
collar employment but similar exit rates across levels, there must be transitions from
lower to higher ranks in the hierarchy. We record 5704 upward moves and 1627 downward
moves over the entire period which amounts to an average upward (downward) annual
mobility rate of 5.6% (1.6%) over the entire period.12 Of all the 17610 workers employed
at some time during the observation period, 4543 enjoy at least one upward hierarchical
transition, 1536 workers are demoted at least once, but a large fraction of them (1121)
are also promoted at some time during the observation period. We observe no vertical
transition in the hierarchy for 12652 workers, and 7584 of them – who are mostly in level
1 (70.4%) and rarely in levels 7-10 (1.7%) – have the same job code throughout while
they are in the sample.
Upward mobility in our ﬁrm is lower than in organizations analyzed in related studies,
despite the fact that these studies are commonly based on year-end data and, therefore,
miss oﬀsetting vertical moves of stayers as well as all job changes of separating workers
that take place during the year. Using year-end data (and including the cross-section the
day before the bankruptcy as 1996 year-end data), we would miss 18.7% of promotions
and 27.0% of demotions. Oﬀsetting vertical movements that occur within 365 days (but
12Summing up the length of all employment spells at the ﬁrm from January 1, 1987, until the bankruptcy
yields a total of 102,147 employment years.
51not necessarily in the same calendar year) account for 21.6% of all demotions. Such
temporary reassignments across job levels might either result from correcting previous
mis-assignments or might be due to interim assignments to ﬁll vacant positions tem-
porarily. It should be noted that 12.9% of demoted workers leave the ﬁrm within a year
after the demotion. Their demotions potentially remain unobserved when panel data at
yearly frequencies are examined.
The fact that related studies commonly consider only white-collar jobs partly explains
why upward mobility is lower in our ﬁrm as a whole: Job transition rates for white-collar
workers are also higher in our ﬁrm in both periods. The average annual promotion
(demotion) rate for white-collar workers is 7.7% (2.7%) during expansion and 6.4%
(2.6%) during contraction, but 6.4% (1.0%) during expansion and 3.9% (1.4%) during
downsizing for blue-collar workers.
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 summarize the vertical job transition pattern for diﬀerent groups
of workers for the episodes of workforce expansion and downsizing by comparing their
hierarchical position at the beginning of the period to that at the end.13 The tables are
divided into four blocks. The upper two blocks contain transition patterns of workers
who were employed at the beginning of the period as shares of incumbent workers, while
the lower two describe transition patterns of all workers entering during the period as
shares of all new entrants at given entry levels during the respective period. The rows of
the blocks depict what shares of workers assigned to a given level at the beginning of the
period (upper blocks) – or the beginning of the employment relation for new entrants
(lower blocks) – are employed in diﬀerent levels at the end of the period (left blocks)
and what shares left after having reached a particular level (right blocks). For example,
65.1% of all workers who were employed at level 1 on January 1, 1987, are still employed
at level 1 on March 1, 1991; 11.1% have advanced to level 2, 2.6% to level 3, and 0.6% to
level 4; 20.6% separated during the period and the vast majority of them had not been
promoted. Only 1% of all workers employed at level 1 at the beginning of the period
had been promoted prior to their separation.
A comparison of Tables 3.4 and 3.5 reveals important facts: Firstly, a larger fraction
of workers who separate in the second period had progressed to higher levels before their
employment relation ends. Secondly, upward mobility is lower in the period of down-
sizing so that substantially fewer workers staying with the ﬁrm are promoted to higher
levels. An obvious explanation is that less slots become vacant in higher positions when
13Clearly, this only gives an incomplete picture on total vertical mobility as it ignores oﬀsetting vertical
movements which occur when a worker is promoted and demoted within the period.Table 3.4: Transition Matrix 1987 - 1991
Incumbents on January 1, 1987
End-of-period level of workers remaining with the ﬁrm Exit level of workers leaving the ﬁrm 1987-1991
Levels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 - 10 Subtot. Levels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 - 10 Subtot.
1 65.1 11.1 2.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 79.4 1 19.6 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.6
2 4.4 50.5 17.7 9.1 1.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 82.7 2 0.9 15.0 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.3
3 0.8 3.1 45.2 23.6 6.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 79.7 3 0.3 0.7 16.6 2.2 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.3
4 0.1 0.5 1.6 47.6 19.4 5.5 0.3 0.2 0.0 75.2 4 0.1 0.3 0.5 22.3 1.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.8
5 0.0 0.0 0.2 4.0 45.5 21.1 3.6 1.9 0.0 76.2 5 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.5 21.2 1.4 0.2 0.3 0.0 23.8
6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 2.8 53.8 13.1 5.1 0.3 75.5 6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 22.5 0.9 0.6 0.0 24.5
7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.8 5.3 43.2 19.7 0.0 69.7 7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 23.5 6.1 0.0 30.3
8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 4.1 53.1 7.1 67.3 8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 29.6 2.0 32.7
9-10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.0 45.2 47.6 9-10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.9 40.5 52.4
Entrants 1987-1991
End-of-period level of entrants remaining with the ﬁrm Exit level of entrants leaving the ﬁrm 1987-1991
Levels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 - 10 Subtot. Levels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 - 10 Subtot.
1 76.4 3.4 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 81.0 1 18.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.0
2 3.0 63.7 6.2 6.9 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 80.0 2 0.7 18.8 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0
3 0.0 0.9 67.5 16.5 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 88.2 3 0.0 0.5 11.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.8
4 0.3 0.3 0.8 79.2 5.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 86.7 4 0.2 0.2 0.0 12.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.3
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 83.6 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 91.0 5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 8.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.0
6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.4 75.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 88.6 6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.4
7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 69.2 3.8 0.0 76.9 7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.1 0.0 0.0 23.1
8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.9 76.5 0.0 82.4 8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.8 5.9 17.6
9-10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 9-10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Notes: The table summarizes the transition pattern between January 1, 1987, and March 1, 1991, for all workers employed at any time during
this period. The initial level at the beginning of the period (row) is either the job level of incumbent workers on January 1, 1987 (upper blocks),
or the entry level of beginners (lower blocks). The ﬁnal level (column) refers to the job level on March 1, 1991, for workers remaining with the
ﬁrm (left blocks) or to the exit level of workers separating during the period (right blocks). Rows sum to 100 as the numbers are calculated as
percentages of incumbent workers on January 1, 1987 (upper blocks), or new hirings (lower blocks) in respective levels.Table 3.5: Transition Matrix 1991 - 1996
Incumbents on March 1, 1991
End-of-period level of workers remaining with the ﬁrm Exit level of workers leaving the ﬁrm 1991-96
Levels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 - 10 Subtot. Levels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 - 10 Subtot.
1 40.7 5.0 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 46.6 1 50.5 2.4 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 53.4
2 9.6 36.0 8.7 4.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 58.6 2 3.4 32.1 4.0 1.9 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 41.4
3 2.6 6.6 36.8 12.9 1.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 60.7 3 0.9 1.9 30.1 5.1 1.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.3
4 0.1 0.3 2.4 36.5 12.3 3.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 54.9 4 0.0 0.4 0.7 33.9 8.3 1.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 45.1
5 0.0 0.0 0.5 3.9 33.9 12.8 1.7 1.0 0.0 53.8 5 0.0 0.1 0.1 2.1 33.7 8.7 1.2 0.1 0.0 46.2
6 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.7 4.5 42.1 7.4 3.1 0.0 57.9 6 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.7 1.8 35.6 2.5 0.9 0.0 42.1
7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2 30.7 11.8 0.7 52.3 7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 3.9 39.2 3.3 0.7 47.7
8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 6.3 47.2 0.8 57.5 8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 2.4 36.2 3.1 42.5
9-10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 41.9 41.9 9-10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 54.8 58.1
Entrants 1991-1996
End-of-period level of entrants remaining with the ﬁrm Exit level of entrants leaving the ﬁrm 1991-96
Levels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 - 10 Subtot. Levels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 - 10 Subtot.
1 15.2 1.7 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.5 1 81.5 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 82.5
2 0.8 29.2 5.8 4.2 0.8 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 42.5 2 0.0 49.2 6.7 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 57.5
3 0.0 0.9 34.0 16.0 0.9 5.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 57.5 3 0.0 0.0 36.8 4.7 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 42.5
4 0.4 0.4 0.8 30.4 7.6 2.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 42.0 4 0.0 0.0 0.8 48.4 7.2 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 58.0
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 41.9 1.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 46.8 5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 49.2 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 53.2
6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 52.8 5.6 5.6 0.0 66.7 6 0.0 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3
7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 57.9 0.0 0.0 63.2 7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 31.6 5.3 0.0 36.8
8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 55.0 0.0 55.0 8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 40.0 0.0 45.0
9-10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.4 36.4 9-10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 63.6 63.6
Notes: The table summarizes the transition pattern between March 1, 1991, and March 14, 1996, for all workers employed at any time during this
period. The initial level at the beginning of the period (row) is either the job level of incumbent workers on March 1, 1991 (upper blocks), or the
entry level of beginners (lower blocks). The ﬁnal level (column) refers to the job level on March 14, 1996, for workers remaining with the ﬁrm
(left blocks) or to the exit level of workers separating earlier during the period (right blocks). Rows sum to 100 as the numbers are calculated as
percentages of incumbent workers on March 1, 1991 (upper blocks), or new hirings (lower blocks) in respective levels.3.4 Mobility
the company reduces employment, especially as the employment reduction is not propor-
tional to level size. The fact that many workers who were promoted during downsizing
separate also suggests that “talented” workers leave the ﬁrm, possibly because of reduced
further career prospects in a downsizing ﬁrm. More evidence that promotion rates are
inversely related to exit rates comes from the fact that promotion rates fall, especially
for blue-collar workers who also experience a more severe increase in separation rates.
While 14.9% of all blue-collar workers and 20.0% of white-collar workers move upward
in the hierarchy between January 1987 and March 1991, only 11.6% blue-collar workers
and 21.1% of white-collar workers have proceeded to a higher hierarchical positions in
the longer period between March 1991 and the bankruptcy or their separation date.
Consequently, relative upward mobility falls for blue-collar worker during downsizing.14
Separating workers have lower upward mobility than remaining workers, but similar
downward mobility in both periods.15 Not correcting for the length of the employment
spell, upward mobility rates are smaller for beginners than for the incumbent workforce.
But workers who enter after January, 1987, and remain with the ﬁrm have higher upward
mobility rates than entrants who separate before the end of 1991. Tables 3.4 and 3.5
also show that more workers are demoted in the second period and that a substantial
fraction of them leave. Although the downward mobility rate remains higher in the
upper segment of the hierarchy downward moves become relatively more common for
blue-collar workers.
The mobility pattern indicates interrelations between vertical internal job mobility
and turnover rates. Upward mobility is lower during downsizing and seems to be re-
lated to the scale of workforce reductions (upward mobility falls most in blue-collar jobs
where exit is concentrated). Downward mobility is higher during periods of workforce
reductions and upward mobility is positively correlated with entry rates. Figure 3.3
plots the entry rate, exit rate, promotion rate and demotion rate. Not only are pro-
motion rates higher when entry is high, but promotion rates follow entry rates in the
sense that they rise when entry in the previous months had been unusually high as is
evident from the period from the second half of 1988 until the beginning of downsizing
in 1991. This implies that corporate expansion initiates a reassignment of workers to
jobs, consistent with the theory of internal labor markets where entry is concentrated
in some jobs, while the remaining jobs are predominately ﬁlled from within. Similarly,
14These percentages are calculated based on the absolute numbers of transitions underlying Tables 3.4
and 3.5, but cannot be readily inferred from the tables as these average percentages for the fraction
of all blue-collar workers and white-collar workers are weighted by the size of the levels.
15Note that they have less time for vertical moves.
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Figure 3.3: Monthly Mobility
year
 Promotion as % of workforce  Demotion as % of workforce
 Hiring as % of workforce  Separations as % of workforce





Notes: The ﬁgure plots monthly promotion and demotion rates – calculated as the number of transitions
relative to the number of incumbent workers – along with the hiring rate and the separation rate from
Figure 3.2.
the demotion rate usually peaks shortly before the exit rate. Finally, we notice that
promotion and demotion rates are positively correlated (correlation coeﬃcient of 0.48).
The graph suggests that this result is to some degree driven by the co-movement of the
promotion rate and demotion rate in periods with severe employment reductions, as is
reﬂected in the coincidence of local peaks in both rates in May 1988, January and June
1993, January, May and October 1994, and September 1995. This suggests that such
reorganizations trigger reassignments across job levels.
3.4.3 Lateral Job Mobility
We observe a substantial number (13636) of lateral job transitions, which we deﬁne as
changes in job codes of jobs belonging to the same hierarchical level. Admittedly, some
fraction of these are spurious job transitions due to the fact that codes might be changed
over time, while the content of the job remains the same. But the largest fraction of
these lateral transitions relates to changes in the job description. About one quarter of
all lateral job transitions involves a transition to a diﬀerent ﬁeld of activity within the
ﬁrm. Table 3.6 reports for each job level the shares of lateral transitions that involve a
job change to a diﬀerent ﬁeld of activity.
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Table 3.6: Lateral Job Transitions to a Different Field of Activity
Job Level
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9-10
Number 1515 426 336 525 227 159 62 83 19
Percent 23.1 23.1 30.1 26.4 22.1 23.6 32.0 40.3 46.3
Notes: This table reports for each job level the absolute number of lateral job transitions that involve
a job change to a diﬀerent ﬁeld of activity (row 2) and their percentage share (row 3) of all lateral
transitions at the respective level. Levels 9 and 10 are combined for conﬁdentiality reasons.
This suggests an interesting additional dimension in the analysis of job change, pro-
motion dynamics, and wage dynamics. Lateral transitions may occur across diﬀerent
ﬁelds of activities within the ﬁrm to prepare for subsequent upward mobility thereby in-
creasing career prospects. For instance, an assembly worker might be assigned to quality
assessment or to production preparation to widen his knowledge on the entire production
process, which is crucial in higher level jobs. Such reassignments are usually referred to
as job rotation. If the acquisition of a wider portfolio of skills that might be required in
higher level jobs is the motive, the probability of an upward move increases for workers
who have held diﬀerent jobs at the same level.16 On the other hand, job rotation might
be used to screen workers or learn about their optimal assignment (Ortega, 2001), in
which case lateral transitions do not entail a priori information on career perspectives.17
Besides, a lateral transition might entail a career step in itself, both in terms of wage
growth and in terms of characteristics of the job. Finally, workers might be transferred
laterally because they do not qualify for upward mobility.
An inspection of the job titles gives rise to the conjecture that such “ﬂatter” careers
exist since job titles often suggest diﬀerences in qualiﬁcation requirements or responsi-
bilities. Some apparent examples include movements from “Secretary of departmental
chef” to “Secretary of the Head of the Department”, from “Assembly Worker” to “Air-
craft Mechanic”, or from “Assembler Electrical Assembly A” to “Assembler Electrical
Assembly B”. These three examples all involve transitions to a job in which the median
wage scale is higher. 45.0% of lateral movements are to jobs with a higher median wage
scale, while 19.1% are to jobs with a lower median wage scale.
16Campion et al. (1994) study these aspects of job rotation empirically.
17Eriksson and Ortega (1994) ﬁnd limited support for the employer learning hypothesis, but no favorable
evidence for job rotation theories of employee learning and employee motivation in data from Danish
private sector ﬁrms.
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There is evidence that a fraction of lateral reassignments lasts only for a short time
– 31% of all lateral movements are not observed in a year-end panels. This possibly
results from temporarily staﬃng crucial vacancies, from intended job rotation in order
to learn about a worker’s performance at diﬀerent jobs or to stimulate the accumulation
of diﬀerent skills, or from correcting ‘mistakes’ in assignment, when an intended lateral
move turns out to have resulted in an ineﬃcient allocation.
3.5 Wages and the Hierarchy
Since internal labor markets are characterized by substantial ﬁxed costs of hiring, screen-
ing or training, which become sunk upon a separation, internal labor markets foster long-
term relations between workers and the ﬁrm. Wages no longer have to equal marginal
productivity at every moment during the employment relation in presence of such ﬁxed
costs, even with competitive labor markets (see Oi, 1962). Although external labor
market conditions potentially constrain the internal wage structure, for example, by af-
fecting hiring wages, competitive forces do not restrict wage determination to a unique
outcome in internal labor markets. Exploiting this indeterminacy of wages, the ﬁrm can
design the wage structure to encourage long-term relations, shield workers from external
conditions or accomplish other goals, as, for example, the provision of incentives to elicit
optimal eﬀort levels.
In the tournament model of Lazear and Rosen (1981), workers supply the optimal
level of eﬀort competing for a promotion which is associated with a suﬃciently higher
wage. This model, as well as the models by Rosen (1982) and Calvo and Wellisz (1979),
predicts that wage diﬀerences between hierarchical levels increase towards the top of the
hierarchy.18 These predictions concern the vertical wage structure, i.e. diﬀerences be-
tween wage rates among workers in diﬀerent job levels. Other theories make predictions
about the horizontal wage structure, i.e. about wage diﬀerentials for individuals in the
same job. Lazear (1979) illustrates, for example, how deferred compensation schemes
can provide non-shirking incentives. In that case, wages are not solely determined by
jobs, but depend on worker characteristics like age and tenure, too.
Formal rules and procedures might play an important role in wage determination.
Such rules might improve eﬃciency, for example, by solving hold-up problems, which
18Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a) ﬁnd evidence of a strong relation between wages and hierarchical
levels and a convex relationship between hierarchical levels and wages in their data set.
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arise when wages are set or renegotiated after ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments (e.g. including
ﬁrm-speciﬁc training or broadly deﬁned organization-speciﬁc capital, Prescott and Viss-
cher, 1980) have been made. A contractual arrangement which ﬁxes wages in advance
can serve as a commitment device and help resolve the hold-up problem (MacLeod and
Malcomson, 1993b). Moreover, the existence of favoritism (Prendergast and Topel, 1996)
would give rise to rules in the wage setting process to limit discretion. Consequently,
we should expect the wage structure to be governed by contractual arrangements and
administrative rules.
In the following paragraphs, we analyze the wage structure of the ﬁrm in some depth
to shed light on whether wage determination is governed by administrative rules and
whether theses rules are binding; whether the wage structure is stable; whether wages
are attached to jobs; and what the vertical and horizontal wage structure looks like.
3.5.1 Administrative Rules in Wage Setting
Doeringer and Piore (1971) argue that wages in internal labor markets are determined
by formal, impersonal administrative procedures. Strong evidence for such rules is the
existence of wage scales in our ﬁrm. There are 10 blue-collar scales (scales 2-11) and
8 white-collar scales (scales 12-19). A range of wages exists in each white-collar wage
scale. Minimum, maximum and mean wages are increasing in subsequent scales,19 but
wage ranges of subsequent scales overlap.
All blue-collar workers are covered by collective bargaining agreements (CAO) between
unions and employer federations.20 The collective bargaining agreement deﬁnes, among
other things, nominal wages for each of the (up to 9) wage grades within all blue-collar
wage scales.21 Firms can pay above these wages, and Fokker does so. The wage grades
can be interpreted as a contractual tenure-wage proﬁle since workers commonly climb
the within-scale wage ladder at distinct, mostly yearly, intervals. This structure of wage
grades and wage scales is usually not changed in yearly bargaining. Instead, a percentage
nominal wage increase, pertaining to all wages in blue-collar scales, is negotiated to
adjust wages for aggregate conditions (e.g. inﬂation, technological progress, etc.). Fokker
usually adjusts white-collar salaries by the same percentage, thereby shifting its entire
19An exception is scale 12 which absorbs all that have not been put into a particular scale – usually
recently recruited employees – so that the maximum wage in scale 13 might be lower than the
maximum wage in scale 12.
20There is a high degree of coordination between unions and employer federations in the Netherlands
(see Teulings and Hartog, 1998).
21Nominal contracts are characteristic for the Dutch labor market.
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wage frame keeping the wage structure stable.
As is common in the Netherlands (see Teulings and Hartog, 1998), wage increases can
be decomposed into three components: Firstly, a worker is usually awarded a yearly
raise according to the contractual experience-wage or tenure-wage proﬁles deﬁned in the
collective wage agreement until the highest wage in the scale is achieved. Secondly, con-
tractual initial increases adjust all wages to changes in aggregate conditions.22 Thirdly,
incidental wage increases relate to any other type of wage increase including promotions.
The latter type of wage contract changes might occur throughout the year, but the bulk
of wage changes, pertaining to collectively negotiated wage adjustments or contractual
periodical increases take place at the turn of the year and are usually administered in
our data set in the last week of December or the ﬁrst week of January.
3.5.2 Job Levels and Wages
The existence of a formal wage system provokes the question of whether formal bu-
reaucratic rules actually constrain individual compensation by attaching wages to jobs,
or whether they leave scope for suﬃcient managerial ﬂexibility in rewarding individual
worker characteristics. The correlation between job levels and salary scales (0.92 in the
entire sample, or 0.68 and 0.81 in the blue-collar and white-collar scales respectively)
indicates a strong relation between wages and jobs. This is conﬁrmed by Figure 3.4
which plots mean nominal, full-time equivalent within-job-level wages over time.23
The vertical wage structure is remarkably stable throughout in the sense that the
magnitude of diﬀerences in average wages between job levels persists. Only average
nominal wages in levels 1 and 4 rise somewhat faster during downsizing mainly because
of the entry and exit patterns that change the within-level wage distribution. Table 3.7
illustrates, for example, that new hires predominately start oﬀ in the lowest decile of
the within-level wage distribution.24 A considerable fraction of separating workers also
comes from the lower deciles of the wage distribution (see Table 3.8), so that average
within-level wages increase when the hiring rate falls and the separation rate rises.
Such changes in within-level wage distributions explain why average nominal job level
wages — especially in levels 1 and 4 (see Figure 3.4) where exit is concentrated and hiring
drops the most — rise after 1993 although it was agreed in collective bargaining not to
22The nature of wage determination and the existence of ﬁxed nominal wage contracts, which can be
adjusted to aggregate conditions, helps solving hold-up problems in the way described by Teulings
and Hartog (1998).
23Averages are taken over wage contracts active on March 14 of each year.
24Entry wages are much more variable in higher levels (levels 6 to 8), especially during downsizing.
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Table 3.7: Distribution of Pay for New Hires in Wage Deciles
1987-1991
Decile in Job Level Wage Distribution
Level N 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th Top All
1 4270 33.1 20.0 16.9 14.2 7.7 4.2 2.5 0.7 0.6 0.2 100.0
2 405 52.1 22.7 8.4 4.0 2.5 3.7 1.5 1.0 2.2 2.0 100.0
3 212 49.5 9.4 17.9 10.4 4.2 3.3 1.4 0.9 0.9 1.9 100.0
4 602 35.5 18.4 22.8 6.3 4.7 2.8 3.0 2.7 2.3 1.5 100.0
5 189 53.4 9.0 9.5 6.3 2.6 4.2 5.8 0.5 4.2 4.2 100.0
6 45 33.3 13.3 4.4 20.0 6.7 4.4 2.2 2.2 6.7 6.7 100.0
7 24 20.8 25.0 12.5 4.2 0.0 12.5 4.2 16.7 4.2 0.0 100.0
8 12 25.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 8.3 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 100.0
1991-1996
Decile in Job Level Wage Distribution
Level N 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th Top All
1 926 58.9 18.3 9.9 5.1 3.6 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.2 0.3 100.0
2 111 35.1 16.2 14.4 7.2 8.1 5.4 4.5 5.4 0.9 2.7 100.0
3 102 58.8 9.8 10.8 6.9 2.0 2.0 2.9 1.0 1.0 4.9 100.0
4 243 43.6 33.3 7.0 3.3 3.3 0.8 1.2 3.7 2.1 1.6 100.0
5 120 76.7 8.3 6.7 3.3 0.0 0.8 1.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 100.0
6 31 35.5 16.1 6.5 9.7 0.0 0.0 3.2 6.5 6.5 16.1 100.0
7 14 21.4 7.1 14.3 7.1 0.0 14.3 7.1 0.0 0.0 28.6 100.0
8 9 11.1 0.0 22.2 0.0 11.1 0.0 22.2 0.0 22.2 11.1 100.0
Notes: The two blocks of the table show for the periods from January 1, 1987, until March 1, 1991
(upper block), and from from March 1, 1991, until March 14, 1996 (lower block), the number of entrants
into each level (column 2). Columns 3-12 of the blocks show the percentage shares of workers entering in
a given job level whose starting wage is in a particular decile of the respective job level wage distribution.
Wage distributions are based on hourly wages for all workers employed in the relevant job level and
period and calculated dates following contract wage adjustments due to inﬂation compensation and
(semi-)annual raises. For privacy reasons, there is no salary information for levels 9 and 10 in the
personnel ﬁles.
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Table 3.8: Distribution of Pay for Separating Workers in Wage Deciles
1987-1991
Decile in Job Level Wage Distribution
Level N 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th Top All
1 1835 11.0 15.5 15.9 11.9 11.1 10.1 6.7 6.0 5.4 6.4 100.0
2 376 19.4 12.5 10.1 6.9 6.6 4.5 8.5 7.7 9.3 14.4 100.0
3 202 17.8 10.9 6.9 6.9 4.0 6.9 5.0 8.9 13.4 19.3 100.0
4 356 17.1 10.7 9.8 7.0 7.9 5.9 10.7 8.7 5.6 16.6 100.0
5 172 16.3 8.1 8.1 10.5 12.2 5.2 7.0 4.1 14.0 14.5 100.0
6 92 15.2 12.0 12.0 8.7 7.6 9.8 6.5 7.6 5.4 15.2 100.0
7 42 9.5 11.9 7.1 4.8 7.1 9.5 9.5 7.1 9.5 23.8 100.0
8 31 3.2 3.2 3.2 12.9 3.2 6.5 19.4 6.5 25.8 16.1 100.0
1991-1996
Decile in Job Level Wage Distribution
Level N 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th Top All
1 4271 16.1 13.6 13.0 11.9 10.0 8.7 7.0 4.6 8.2 7.0 100.0
2 865 13.8 11.4 10.8 9.7 7.3 8.6 9.8 6.0 9.2 13.4 100.0
3 484 14.5 11.0 8.1 8.7 9.3 3.1 10.5 14.0 5.6 15.3 100.0
4 765 12.9 13.5 10.6 8.5 7.2 6.1 10.7 8.8 3.8 17.9 100.0
5 502 14.1 13.3 10.0 8.0 11.2 8.4 6.0 2.2 15.9 11.0 100.0
6 287 11.5 12.2 8.7 11.5 7.7 1.0 10.5 9.8 10.5 16.7 100.0
7 92 12.0 10.9 12.0 3.3 20.7 5.4 6.5 1.1 7.6 20.7 100.0
8 66 7.6 10.6 6.1 6.1 12.1 6.1 13.6 3.0 28.8 6.1 100.0
Notes: The two blocks of the table show for the periods from January 1, 1987, until March 1, 1991 (upper
block), and from from March 1, 1991, until March 14, 1996 (lower block), the number of exits from
each level (column 2). Columns 3-12 of the blocks show the percentage shares of workers exiting from
a given job level whose ﬁnal wage is in a particular decile of the respective job level wage distribution.
Wage distributions are based on hourly wages for all workers employed in the relevant job level and
period and calculated dates following contract wage adjustments due to inﬂation compensation and
(semi-)annual raises. Only the ﬁrst accession to the ﬁrm of a worker is considered, so that re-hiring is
neglected. For privacy reasons, there are no salary information for levels 9 and 10 in the personnel ﬁles.
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Figure 3.4: Mean Wage
year
     














Notes: The ﬁgure plots average full-time equivalent nominal wages of incumbent workers in the hier-
archical job levels 1 through 8, which are labelled accordingly. The thick crossed line reﬂects average
full-time equivalent nominal wages at the ﬁrm-level. Means are calculated based on cross-sections taken
at the beginning of a year.
adjust wage scales at the ﬁrm for inﬂation because of the ﬁrm’s depressed economic
condition. Such inﬂation corrections persist since January 1, 1996.25 However, the rise
in average ﬁrm-level wages can be mainly attributed to the rise in the employment
share in higher hierarchical levels resulting from the relative lower separation rates of
high-wage workers discussed in section 3.4.1.
Separating Workers are more evenly distributed over the wage distribution than new
hires (compare Tables 3.7 and 3.8). A substantial fraction of workers moves up in the
job-level wage distribution before separating. This provokes the question of how big
the spread in job-level wage distributions is, i.e. how much wage growth is associated
with moving up a decile in the job-level wage distribution. Kernel density estimates of
the within-level wage distributions in Figure 3.5 reveal substantial wage variation. The
wage distributions in the ﬁgure refer to 1991, but their main features are the same in
all years26: Wages rise on average with job-levels, but wage distributions of successive
25This is the result of a collective bargaining outcome which underlines the importance of coordination
between unions and employer federations in the Netherlands.
26Diﬀerences pertain to the remarkable fact that the 5th percentile wage in level 3 exceeds the 5th
percentile wage in level 4 in every year until 1991, but never in later years. The substantial number
of new hired white-collar workers during expansion, who typically enter level 4 and earn starting wages
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Wage Distribution for Job Level on March 14th 1991
Hourly Wage in Dutch Guilders
     





Notes: The ﬁgure plots kernel density estimates of the within job-level distribution of hourly full-time
equivalent wages on March 14, 1991. Observed annual wages are truncated at 200,000 Dutch Guilders.
This truncation aﬀects only very few workers in level 8, but should not bias estimates of the wage
distribution in level 8 signiﬁcantly.
hierarchical levels overlap. Wages are deﬁnitely related to job levels as the correlation
between job levels and wage scales already suggested, but wages are not tied to jobs in
a strict sense as substantial within-job-level wage variation remains.
Within-level wage variation generally increases in hierarchical levels,27 but wage dis-
tributions for blue-collar job levels have a markedly smaller variance. This disparity
in the pay structure most likely results from more stringent formal rules in blue-collar
wage setting as a consequence of collective bargaining. The higher wage variation for
white-collar workers suggests that there is scope for individual negotiation in spite of
the formal wage system.
Still, the existence of pay ranges for jobs indicates that such scope is limited, certainly
for blue-collar workers. For example, 99% of assembly workers’ wage contracts (the
largest job code) are in wage scales 4-8 (95% are in 5-8). Within that pay range,
individual wages depend on experience and tenure. The tenure-wage proﬁle, however, is
in the bottom deciles of the within-level wage distribution, cause the left tail of the wage distribution
in level 4 to stretch out in these years. A similar pattern holds for level 1 wage distribution which is
also more skewed to the right during years of substantial entry.
27Note that we do not observe wages for those workers in level 8 whose annual wages exceed a 200,000
Dutch guilders, so that the observed wage distribution is truncated.
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again governed by the contractual wage system. The ﬁrm seems to have some discretion
to reward workers below the top of the within-job pay range with higher wage growth
by awarding more than 1 periodical increase at a time or granting a wage in a higher
wage scale. However, once the highest wage in the job has been reached, additional
wage growth – exceeding wage adjustments to aggregate conditions as ﬁxed in collective
bargaining agreements – can only result from job change.28
A transition to a higher paying job need not necessarily entail an upward transition
in the hierarchy, as wage ranges diﬀer for diﬀerent jobs at the same hierarchical level.
For example, catering staﬀ, assembly workers and quality controllers are all in level 1,
but the wage range is scales 3-4 (97%) for catering jobs, scales 4-8 for assembly workers,
and scales 5-9 (95%) for quality controllers. This explains some of the within-level wage
distribution depicted by Figure 3.5, but it also implies that lateral job mobility can be
a source of wage growth. Potentially “ﬂatter” career paths, which involve lateral job
transitions associated with upward wage-mobility, exist. Before we consider this issue
in section 3.6, we analyze the relation between wage growth and job transitions in more
depth.
3.6 Wage Growth and Job Transitions
3.6.1 How are Promotions and Demotions Deﬁned?
In the tournament model of Lazear and Rosen (1981), a promotion entails a transition to
a higher hierarchical level and is associated with a substantial wage increase. But what
a promotion really is, is not so clear. We have already seen that a transition to a job on
the same hierarchical level with a higher median wage is another source of wage growth.
Moreover, pure “wage-promotions” exist, when workers keep the same job, but progress
to a higher wage scale and enjoy a steeper within-job wage proﬁle than deﬁned by the
contractual tenure-wage proﬁle. Information on the reason for a wage contract change
reveals that contract changes are frequently coded as “promotion” when they coincide
with job transitions to a higher level. Similarly, movements down the hierarchical ladder
are often coded as demotions.29 Therefore, we refer to upward hierarchical transitions as
28In fact, a letter was sent to workers informing them once they had reached the highest wage in the
job. Unfortunately, we lack the information when and to whom such a letter was sent, but we can
infer such situations from the data.
29When such transitions occur on the date when contractual wage increases are awarded, a transition
may not be coded as a promotion, but instead as a “yearly increase” or “price compensation” since
only one reason for wage-contract change is recorded.
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promotions and to downward movements as demotions in the remainder of the chapter.
Still, it is not obvious that such promotions are associated with wage growth as many
theories predict, an issue to which we turn in the next section.
3.6.2 Wages and Promotions
Since wages are positively correlated with hierarchical levels, we expect wages to rise
upon a promotion. The large diﬀerence in mean job-level wages unveiled by Figure 3.4
might suggest that promoted workers enjoy substantial wage gains. On the other hand,
Figure 3.5 shows that wage distributions of successive levels overlap so that promotions
might not be associated with nominal wage increases at all. We ﬁnd that wage contracts
are changed simultaneously with upward transitions in 51.6% of the cases. Nominal
wages rise in these cases by an average of 5.2% and these upward job transition are
mostly (in 72% of the cases) associated with climbing at least one wage scale. Wages
change for the majority of the remaining 48.4% of upward movers occur within 3 months
after the upward job transition.30 However, fewer of them (29.9%) proceed to a higher
wage scale and average wages grow less (3.1%). Table 3.9 discloses that average wage
increases upon promotions are substantially lower than the gap between mean wages of
successive levels in both periods and for all levels.
This observation triggers the conjecture that workers only receive a new job title in
order to grant them additional wage growth when they have reached the upper range
of wages in their current job, which implies that workers are always promoted out of
the top decile of their job-level wage distribution. Table 3.10 shows for each level what
fraction of workers was promoted out of a given decile of that level’s wage distribution
and how promoted workers are distributed in the new level’s wage distribution.
The table illustrates that promotees were predominantly, but not exclusively, in the
upper deciles of their previous level wage distribution and mostly earn below median
wages in their new job-level. In a more detailed analysis than is documented in Table
3.10, we ﬁnd that workers promoted out of the bottom three deciles of their job level
wage distribution move predominately to the lowest decile of the wage distribution in
the new job, workers from the 4th and 5th decile move predominately to the 2nd decile,
from the 6th and 7th decile to the 3rd decile, and from the 8th, 9th, and 10th decile to
the 4th, 5th, and 6th decile respectively. The transitions in the wage distributions of
promoted workers are remarkably similar in both periods. We interpret this as evidence
30More than 80% have their wage contract changed within half a year after the upward transition.
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Table 3.9: Salary Premium of Promotion
1987-1991 1991-1996
Premium (%) % diﬀ. means Premium (%) % diﬀ. means
Level immediate later immediate later
1 - 2 4.7 2.7 24.4 4.4 2.9 20.4
(2.4) (2.1) (2.7) (1.9)
2 - 3 4.4 3.1 14.8 4.4 2.9 14.4
(2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (1.8)
3 - 4 5.4 3.1 10.7 4.9 3.7 12.1
(4.3) (3.0) (3.1) (2.4)
4 - 5 5.7 3.7 24.6 5.6 3.4 20.6
(3.1) (2.7) (3.5) (1.9)
5 - 6 5.6 3.2 23.0 6.3 3.4 24.4
(2.4) (2.3) (7.0) (2.2)
6 - 7 6.5 3.2 22.9 8.4 2.6 21.8
(4.2) (1.9) (10.9) (1.9)
7 - 8 8.3 1.8 15.9 8.5 2.9 18.5
(6.9) (1.8) (11.4) (1.9)
Total 5.2 3.1 19.5 5.2 3.2 18.9
(3.3) (2.5) (4.9) (2.1)
Notes: The table shows salary premiums as percentage gains relative to the wage before the promotion.
Workers either receive a wage increase on the day of promotion (immediate) or in the months following
the promotion (later). Average premiums are calculated for both groups separately and are reported
in the columns labelled “immediate” and “later”. The columns labelled “% diﬀ. means” reports the
percentage diﬀerence between the mean wage of adjacent job levels. Standard deviations are printed in
parentheses below the means. For privacy reasons, there are no salary information for levels 9 and 10
in the personnel ﬁles.
67Table 3.10: Distribution of Pay for Promotees in Salary Deciles Before and After Promotions
Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th Top All
Level 1 before Promotion 2.0 4.0 6.7 9.3 11.5 11.2 10.3 14.3 11.4 19.3 100.0
Level 2 after Promotion 27.7 19.7 16.3 12.1 9.9 6.5 3.2 2.5 1.4 0.7 100.0
Level 2 before Promotion 3.5 7.3 9.4 8.6 8.9 7.5 9.2 15.2 10.7 19.6 100.0
Level 3 after Promotion 18.4 17.8 15.6 18.0 11.6 8.4 4.5 2.6 2.1 1.2 100.0
Level 3 before Promotion 7.6 10.7 9.5 10.4 8.3 6.6 9.8 9.0 15.1 13.0 100.0
Level 4 after Promotion 10.5 15.4 15.6 17.6 16.6 9.7 7.9 3.6 1.8 1.4 100.0
Level 4 before Promotion 3.2 5.5 7.9 8.6 9.4 9.2 9.6 13.5 15.9 17.2 100.0
Level 5 after Promotion 17.6 21.4 17.7 16.4 12.3 7.5 2.7 1.6 1.9 1.0 100.0
Level 5 before Promotion 2.5 5.6 7.0 10.1 9.9 11.0 14.3 9.3 11.8 18.4 100.0
Level 6 after Promotion 29.2 25.3 16.8 8.9 8.1 2.3 3.5 3.1 1.9 1.0 100.0
Level 6 before Promotion 3.9 4.6 9.9 9.2 11.8 5.9 11.2 11.8 13.2 18.4 100.0
Level 7 after Promotion 36.2 23.7 9.2 7.2 13.2 5.9 0.0 2.6 0.7 1.3 100.0
Level 7 before Promotion 1.3 8.8 3.8 8.8 8.8 12.5 10.0 16.3 6.3 23.8 100.0
Level 8 after Promotion 16.3 21.3 13.8 7.5 18.8 10.0 7.5 2.5 1.3 1.3 100.0
Notes: The table shows percentage shares of promoted workers’ wages across deciles of the respective job level wage distribution before and after
their promotion. Wage distributions are based on hourly wages for all workers employed in the relevant job level and period. We calculated the
wage deciles of the current wage distribution on diﬀerent dates on which the bulk of wage contracts were adjusted, e.g. because of (semi-)annual
inﬂation compensation, during the period. The table only summarizes information of workers promoted to the next higher level. For privacy
reasons, there are no salary information for levels 9 and 10 in the personnel ﬁles.3.6 Wage Growth and Job Transitions
Table 3.11: Serial Correlation in Wage Growth
Dependent Variable: ∆ln(W)






Controls for Individual Characteristics No No Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 75772 75772 75772
R-squared 0.36 0.40 0.61
Notes: The dependent variable in all estimations is the log diﬀerences of annual hourly wages
(∆ln(W)). Reported coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory
variables. Standard errors are in parentheses. An asterisk denotes that the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at
the 1 percent level. Controls for individual characteristics include binary variables for nine education
categories, yearly age dummies, tenure, dummies for hierarchical levels, and binary variables for the
six performance evaluation scores.
that the principal reason for a vertical job transition is not to merely grant higher wages,
but to assign workers to more complex jobs with more responsibility or span of control.
In addition, our results concerning the relation between wages and upward job transi-
tions do not suggest that tournaments as described in Lazear and Rosen (1981) explain
promotions in levels 1-8 well. For one thing, Table 3.9 does not provide evidence of a
convex relation between the logarithm of wages and hierarchical levels. The percent-
age diﬀerences between mean wages of adjacent levels are similar across levels, and if
anything, slightly decreasing in job levels in both blue-collar and white-collar ranks.31
Unfortunately, we do not observe wages for workers in the two top levels where one
would expect tournaments more likely to be relevant. Although immediate wage in-
creases upon promotions are much smaller than tournament theory would predict, the
discounted value of expected future wages might rise substantially. A promotion entails
an improved perspective of future wage growth beyond the immediate wage rise enjoyed
upon the promotion, because those workers may climb the wage ladder in their new job.
31The diﬀerence in level 7 and level 8 mean wages is, of course, an underestimate of the true diﬀerence
since wages of some workers in level 8 are not reported as the distribution of reported wages is
truncated at 200,000 guilders.
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Table 3.12: Promotion and Wage Growth
Dependent Variable: Promotion




Controls for Individual Characteristics No No Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 39728 39728 39521
Notes: The dependent variable in all estimations is a binary variable indicating a promotion. ∆ln(W)
denotes the log diﬀerences of annual hourly wages. Reported coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects evaluated
at the mean of the explanatory variables. Standard errors are in parentheses. An asterisk denotes that
the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Controls for individual characteristics include binary
variables for nine education categories, yearly age dummies, tenure, and binary variables for the six
performance evaluation scores.
We ﬁnd evidence that wage growth rates are persistent. For every year, we calculated
the wage growth distribution separately. Workers with wage growth in the upper (lower)
quartile of the wage growth distribution are likely to be in the upper (lower) quartile
in subsequent years. Regression results reported in Table 3.11 show a positive eﬀect of
lagged wage growth on current wage growth (column 2) even if we control for recent
promotions (column 3). This strong eﬀect disappears if we control for the concavity of
the tenure-wage proﬁle, individual characteristics, such as age and education, and job
characteristics (column 4).32 These results raise the question of whether wage increases
predict promotions as workers who are candidates for higher level positions might already
be rewarded for better than average performance by higher than usual wage increases
in their current job. Moreover, if promotion fast-tracks (Rosenbaum 1984) exist and if
promotions are associated with wage growth (see previous section), past wage increases
should identify career movers and predict future promotions. In order to test the pre-
dictive power of previous wage increases for a promotion, we estimate probit models in
cross-sections of the data, in which promotions are explained by past wage growth, and
individual characteristics.
The results reported in Table 3.12 show that past wage growth has a positive eﬀect on
32These regression results portray the pattern of serial correlation in individual wage growth well.
Yet, we are aware that more sophisticated econometric techniques and estimators could improve the
results along various dimensions, e.g. increase eﬃciency, account for learning eﬀects (see Farber and
Gibbons, 1996), etc.
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the probability to be promoted (column 2 and 3), but that this eﬀect works through the
impact of individual characteristics on wage growth, as the direct eﬀect of wage growth
on promotion probability disappears if we include controls for tenure, age, education,
and performance evaluation (column 4).
3.6.3 Wages and Demotions
The logic of the previous section which established that promotions are associated with
nominal (and real) wage growth suggest wage cuts at demotions. However, nominal
wage cuts are extremely rare. Only 197 nominal hourly wage rate cuts are recorded,
which amounts to 0.1 percent of all wage contract changes.33 Ninety percent of those
experiencing nominal cuts remain in the same function. Moreover, most nominal wage
cuts (117 out of 197) occur between January 1993 and January 1995 and are concentrated
(105 out of 117) at a single plant (ELMO).34 The absolute number of observed wage
cuts would obviously be smaller if we had data at yearly frequency, due to attrition and
within-year contract changes.35 Real wage cuts become more frequent during downsizing.
In 1994 and 1995, 33.8 percent and 42.5 percent of employees, respectively, do not receive
nominal wage increases.36 Nominal wages are rarely cut (only 8 out of 1957 times) when
a worker is demoted. This partly results from rules in collective bargaining agreements
which prescribe that the nominal wages of workers demoted to a lower job level can
only be lowered after a period of advance notice which depends on the worker’s age and
tenure. But we observe that demoted workers are downgraded in the salary scales, which
reduces their prospect of future wage growth.
3.7 Careers
Careers are a crucial characteristic of internal labor markets. According to the theory
of internal labor markets careers help foster long-term employment relations and shield
workers from external labor market conditions. We saw already in section 3.4 that
most workers do not move up in the hierarchy during ﬁve-year periods, and that only
few workers move up more than 1 level. This triggers a number of questions. Are
331309 further contracts entail nominal wage cuts because of changes in working hours.
34Wage drops are due to fewer shifts at ELMO during downsizing, i.e. result from reduced working
hours.
35If we base our analysis on a yearly panel in which the cross-sections are taken on March 14 in each
year, we would observe only 134 nominal wage cuts.
36Nominal wage freezes are more frequent for workers aﬀected by collective bargaining agreements.
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Table 3.13: Age and Tenure: New Hires versus Promoted Incumbents
Age Tenure
1987-1991 1991-1996 1987-1991 1991-1996
Level Entree Promotee Entree Promotee Promotee
24.5 25.2 1
(6.8) (6.6)
26.4 30.3 28.2 31.3 7.2 8.3 2
(6.4) (7.2) (6.8) (7.1) (6.7) (6.9)
27.8 35.0 28.4 34.9 11.1 11.8 3
(6.0) (8.2) (7.4) (7.2) (9.1) (8.4)
27.5 35.4 26.7 34.9 10.5 10.6 4
(4.8) (8.6) (4.9) (7.2) (9.6) (8.8)
30.6 34.4 28.1 34.7 8.5 8.3 5
(6.7) (7.2) (4.4) (6.8) (8.0) (7.4)
33.5 38.1 35.1 36.9 10.8 10.4 6
(6.2) (7.5) (8.7) (6.4) (8.5) (8.0)
39.3 39.1 39.3 39.8 11.2 11.8 7
(6.6) (6.1) (6.1) (6.1) (6.8) (7.6)
44.6 42.5 40.9 41.4 14.0 13.0 8
(6.3) (7.1) (7.2) (5.4) (9.7) (7.0)
Notes: The table compares entry ages and ﬁrm tenure of promoted incumbents and workers hired into
the same level for the episodes of workforce expansion (1987-1991) and workforce contraction 1991-
1996). Columns 2-5 show the mean ages of workers respective levels and provide standard deviations in
parentheses below the respective means. Columns 6-7 report ﬁrm tenure of promoted workers. When
judging the magnitude of the standard deviations, it should be taken into account that the age and
tenure distributions are very skewed.
there career paths within job levels along which workers transfer to jobs on the same
hierarchical level? Are such jobs more attractive, both in terms of wages and the amount
of shielding from external conditions? We begin, however, by investigating whether ﬁrm-
speciﬁc capital is important in our ﬁrm by assessing whether workers hired from outside
into a job level diﬀer in their characteristics from workers who are promoted to the same
level from within.
3.7.1 New Hires versus Incumbents
To shed light on the question of whether speciﬁc-capital is important in our ﬁrm, we
compare age and education levels of new hires to a given level and workers promoted
from inside to the same level. Table 3.13 shows that new hires into levels 2 - 5 are on
average 4.5 to 7 years younger than incumbent workers who have been promoted to the
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same hierarchical level. Age diﬀerences are smaller in higher levels and almost negligible
in levels 7 and 8. The pattern does not diﬀer between periods. The two right-most
columns show that promoted workers have on average been employed in the ﬁrm for 7
to 12 years.37 If ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital is important in the ﬁrm, promoted workers should
have accumulated sizable levels of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital during their elapsed tenure and
new hires should compensate by either having more experience – which is unlikely given
that they are substantially younger on average – or higher levels of education. Table
3.14 reveals that new beginners indeed hold higher level general and vocational schooling
degrees than promoted incumbent workers. So new hires seem to make up for lower levels
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital with higher levels of general capital.
3.7.2 Job Ladders Across Hierarchical Levels
An important characteristic of our ﬁrm is the existence of diﬀerent career paths, which
sometimes span diﬀerent hierarchical levels. The distribution of workers across levels in
diﬀerent ﬁelds of activities provides evidence of such “pyramids within the hierarchical
pyramid”. For example, more than 80% of workers in “Production” (F) are in level 1
and 97.8% are blue-collar workers. This might be contrasted with “Sales” where 85% of
the employees are in management levels. Two classes of career tracks can be identiﬁed
in the white-collar ranks of “R&D”. The ﬁrst type is a classical engineering career
which involves concentration on technical aspects and specialization therein. These
careers typically span levels 4-6.38 Workers on this career track typically start as a staﬀ
member of engineering on level 4, then they may become a specialist or engineer on
level 5, and ﬁnally be promoted to a lead engineer or senior specialist (commonly in
aircraft design) on level 6. The second type of career is management career in which
workers concentrate on supervision handling of the day-to-day business. Positions in the
management career track include “Design Division Leader” on level 4, “Project Leader”
or “Chief of Engineering Group” on level 5, and “Head of Division” on level 6. Finally,
it should be mentioned that careers on lower ranks also exist in R&D. About 16% are
employed in these ranks, working predominately as designing engineers.
A typical career path in “Sales & Customer Relations” which may lead to a position
on level 8 as “Area Manager” or “Area Sales Manager” starts on level 4 as an “Air-
37Average tenure in the table escalates with level because the table reports average years of tenure
since accession to the ﬁrm and not the average years spent in the lower hierarchical level, which is
smaller for those who experience more than one promotion.
38Roughly 70% of the entire workforce in the activity ﬁeld “R&D” are employed in these levels. The
number varies somewhat over time.
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Table 3.14: Education Level: New Hires versus Promoted Incumbents
1987-1991
Education Level
Job Level lo lbo mavo llw havo mbo vwo hbo uni
Promotees 0.6 15.5 8.8 36.0 4.6 27.8 2.7 3.5 0.5 2
Entrees 0.0 4.1 8.8 5.0 9.1 42.0 6.3 20.8 3.8
Promotees 0.5 7.4 4.2 19.3 3.2 45.4 5.2 13.1 1.7 3
Entrees 0.0 0.6 5.4 2.4 4.2 16.7 6.5 44.0 20.2
Promotees 0.0 4.8 6.3 7.2 1.5 31.9 5.4 34.3 8.7 4
Entrees 0.0 0.2 1.2 0.4 3.3 2.7 14.7 39.0 38.4
Promotees 0.0 1.2 5.2 2.5 3.1 9.3 5.9 44.8 28.1 5
Entrees 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 1.3 1.3 17.0 19.0 60.8
Promotees 0.0 1.1 3.9 1.1 1.1 1.1 6.1 35.4 50.3 6
Entrees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 3.2 22.6 22.6 48.4
Promotees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 4.8 6.5 33.9 51.6 7
Entrees 0.0 0.0 4.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.6 31.8 50.0
Promotees 0.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 60.0 8
Entrees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0
1991-1996
Education Level
Job Level lo lbo mavo llw havo mbo vwo hbo uni
Promotees 0.4 10.4 10.9 33.0 4.9 35.4 2.1 2.7 0.2 2
Entrees 0.0 0.0 8.3 1.7 5.0 43.3 13.3 20.0 8.3
Promotees 0.7 5.8 5.1 20.7 5.1 49.5 0.4 10.5 2.2 3
Entrees 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 1.8 8.9 14.3 55.4 17.9
Promotees 0.0 5.0 3.1 10.0 4.6 36.4 2.3 28.7 10.0 4
Entrees 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.0 2.3 6.3 13.1 43.8 33.5
Promotees 0.0 1.3 2.5 2.3 1.5 12.4 7.9 44.4 27.7 5
Entrees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.2 13.1 14.3 70.2
Promotees 0.0 0.9 3.6 1.4 2.7 6.3 10.8 34.2 40.1 6
Entrees 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 0.0 0.0 6.3 31.3 56.3
Promotees 0.0 1.4 2.9 0.0 0.0 2.9 7.1 34.3 51.4 7
Entrees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.5 62.5
Promotees 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 3.0 9.1 9.1 21.2 54.5 8
Entrees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Notes: The table compares highest obtained schooling degrees of promoted and workers hired into the
same level for the episodes of workforce expansion (1987-1991, upper block) and workforce contraction
1991-1996, lower block). The cells show the percentages of promotees or entrants with a given schooling
degree so that rows sum to 100.
743.7 Careers
craft Analyst” or “Account Manager” and involves transitions to “Market Development
Engineer” (level 5), “Account Development Manager” (level 6), and “Sales Manager”
(level 7). Career tracks in lower levels also exist and are predominately followed by
higher-ranked blue-collar workers who transfer from production. In particular, “Basic
Instrument Experts” (level 2 in production) proceed to become “Instructors” (level 3)
in “Sales & Customer Relations” and may be promoted to become a “Technical Rep-
resentative” on level 4. (We also observe inﬂow into this job from level 3 - production
workers.) Workers on this career track proceed to “Resident Technical Representative”,
but most careers that we observe end there. Only one person goes on to level 6 as
“Customer Support Manager”. Two persons make further careers by entering diﬀerent
jobs after having been a “Technical Representative”.
A substantial fraction of the inﬂow into both activities described above – R&D and
Sales & Customer Relations – has experience elsewhere in the ﬁrm. Only 35.2% of
workers who enter “Sales & Customer Relations” from January 1987 until March 1991
are hired from outside. Those who enter from within the ﬁrm come predominately from
“R&D”. Similarly, only 56.2% of new entrants into “R&D” are new hires. Workers
who transfer from other activities come predominately from production (73.6%). This
ﬁnding underpins the importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge, not least knowledge of the
sophisticated product of the ﬁrm. The degree to which such ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge is
important varies between diﬀerent activities as one would expect. There is substantially
less inﬂow from within relative to inﬂow from outside in administrative activities (K,
H, S). Between 1987 and 1991, when all non-production activities of the ﬁrm (Admin-
istrative activities (K, H, S), R&D (C), and Sales & Customer Relations (B)) grew at
a similar rates (see Figure 3.1), 64.5% of all new entrants into administrative activities
were recruited from outside.
The existence of jobs that require knowledge acquired in other jobs in the ﬁrm im-
plies that careers are important in the ﬁrm’s internal labor market. This conjecture is
conﬁrmed when we examine job transitions across the ﬁve activities within production
(Assembly (F), Support & Supplies (G), Production Preparation (D), Planning & Co-
ordination (E), and Quality (M)). Of all 4184 workers who are hired into production
during expansion, 3062 enter into “Assembly”, a share that is substantially larger than
the relative size of “Assembly” within production at all times. Only 309 enter “Assem-
bly” from a job elsewhere in the ﬁrm, and only 140 of them enter into a job on level
1, where more than 80% of workers in this activity are employed. Many more workers
(818) leave “Assembly” for jobs in other activities of the ﬁrm during the same period,
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and most of them (578) change jobs to one of the other 4 production related activities.
In contrast, 362 workers are hired into “Production Preparation”, but 651 are trans-
ferred from within (267 of whom come from Assembly). “Quality” is the activity where
hiring from outside (122) relative to transfers from within (327) is lowest. Most of the
workers (208) who enter “Quality” worked in “Assembly” before and remain on the
same job level (189). But they usually climb a wage scale upon the transition. Hence,
these lateral transitions reﬂect careers within a job level. Other examples of such career
monkey bars are discussed in the next section.
28.8% of all job changes – and 24.5% of lateral transitions – involve transitions to
diﬀerent ﬁelds of activity. Yet, we observe that the inﬂow from outside diminishes with
further advancement in career tracks, implying that career decisions are for the most
part taken early on, and career changes become rarer later in the employment relation.
3.7.3 Monkey Bars Within Hierarchical Levels
Careers within hierarchical levels are important. In fact, wriggling the monkey bars of
a within-level career is a more common phenomenon than climbing the career ladder by
upward hierarchical job transitions. As already mentioned, examples include transitions
from assembly workers to quality controllers, but also exist within more narrowly deﬁned
ﬁelds of activities. One particular, but typical, example is the transition from “Assembler
Electrical Assembly A” to “Assembler Electrical Assembly B” which commonly does
result in an immediate advancement in wage scales, but does so eventually as the median
wage scale is higher for the latter job. Roughly two thirds of lateral movements are
transitions to jobs with a higher mean wage scale.39 More interesting, we observe 251
transitions from the ﬁrst to the latter job, but only one worker is hired from outside
to the latter job during the entire observation period. Jobs towards the higher end of
within-job career tracks are less frequently ﬁlled from outside.
Within-level careers are also typical for secretaries40 Lateral career movements fre-
quently involve a transition from secretary of a section chief to secretary of a depart-
ment head. For secretarial jobs, there is, however, substantially more entry from outside
into positions further down the career path than for jobs in production or quality con-
trol. An obvious explanation is the greater importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge in
the latter jobs. But still, even for secretaries we ﬁnd that positions for secretaries of
39As for vertical job mobility, lateral career paths are no one-way route and “demotions” occur.
40Secretaries account for 2.2% to 2.5% of the workforce at all times and 3.7% of all observed workers
have been a secretary at some point in time.
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department heads are most frequently ﬁlled by job transitions from within. Two other
features that seem to be important for careers in general can be illustrated with the
help of the ‘secretary example’: First, lateral movements are sometimes stepping stones
for upward transitions: either within the secretary career or to other jobs within the
ﬁrm. Secretaries can move upward to become the secretary of a division director or even
of the Executive Board. But we also observe transitions to supervisory jobs (mostly
in data processing) to higher-level administrative workers and eventually to lower level
managers (mostly with tasks related to human resource management).
3.8 Conclusion
Our analysis conﬁrms the existence of an internal labor market and the importance of
lateral and vertical job mobility therein. Since wages are related to job levels, transitions
are material for workers’ wage growth. Although immediate gains upon promotions are
small – often job transitions and wage changes do not even coincide – compared to the
average diﬀerence in wages for adjacent job levels, promoted workers can look forward
to a period of sustained wage growth as they move up in their new job level’s wage
distribution. The spread of these job-level wage distributions is substantial so that
wages in job levels overlap. Therefore, wages are not strictly tied to jobs as there
remains considerable scope to reward workers individually. Wriggling the monkey bars
in within-level careers is another valuable means for workers to secure wage growth.
Lateral job changes are a signiﬁcant phenomenon, which can be explained by ﬁrm-
speciﬁc capital requirements in particular jobs, involving more workers and more job
changes than vertical job transitions.
For the ﬁrm, the staﬃng of positions from within is essential especially in jobs which
require ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge. Such organizational or ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital seems cru-
cial in a number of jobs. Workers hired from outside must make up for the lack of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital by obtaining higher completed schooling degrees than workers pro-
moted from within. Even though entry occurs at all levels, entry rates are substantially
smaller in some career tracks for jobs further down the career path. We ﬁnd that the
ﬁrm’s hierarchy of job levels is relatively stable throughout periods of expansion and
contraction. The hierarchical job pyramid is neither augmented by job levels during ex-
pansion nor diminished during contraction. However, relative sizes of job levels change
during downsizing when the ﬁrm becomes top-heavy. This is most likely the result of
sizeable diﬀerences in adjustment costs for diﬀerent workers, particularly when ﬁrm-
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speciﬁc capital is substantial in jobs further down a career path and future growth is
expected as was the case at our ﬁrm. Changes in ﬁrm size in general and changes in
relative entry and exit rates have considerable impact on job transition rates. Promotion
rates fall and demotion rates rise the more the net employment growth rates fall.
784 Ranks, Organizational Change, and
Worker Heterogeneity
“The hierarchical decomposition principle can thus be stated as follows:
internal organization should be designed in such a way as to eﬀect
quasi-independence between parts, the high frequency dynamics
(operating activities) and the low frequency dynamics (strategic
planning) should be clearly distinguished, and incentives should be
aligned within and between components so as to promote both local and
global eﬀectiveness”
(Williamson, 1981, p. 1550)4 Ranks and Organizational Change
4.1 Introduction
One of the central roles of ﬁrms is monitoring employees, and the design of hierarchies
is reﬂected by the number of ranks and the associated span of control to do so eﬃ-
ciently1. Structural changes in information, communication and production technology
can prompt adaption in organizational design, especially when the adaption to shocks
require changes in specialization2.
Hierarchies in organizations have been found to be ﬁrm-speciﬁc, stable through time,
and seemingly independent of demand cycles3. Despite a long tradition of insightful
research on the economics of hierarchical structures, surprisingly little is known about
the role hierarchies play in the ﬁrm’s decision to restructure its workforce. Much of
what we learned about the relationship between individual workers’ characteristics and
mass layoﬀs in hierarchical organizations so far can be summarized simply through the
observation that fewer jobs are cut for high skilled and managerial employees.
This chapter investigates the role of organizational structure on workforce reorga-
nizations. The ﬁrm makes decisions under uncertainty and faces irreversible costs of
changing sizes of ranks. The menu costs model produces sharp predictions on how
ranks and worker characteristics produce diﬀerences in restructuring propensities across
ranks. These predictions are comparable to those derived from menu costs rules for
durable and investment goods.4 The empirical application uses data from the aircraft
industry. Speciﬁcally, we ask whether the decision makers responsible for the 1996 re-
organization of Fokker Aircraft in the Netherlands have been applying such rules when
deciding how to adjust the company’s organizational structure and which workers to
select to stay. The econometric — hierarchical elimination — model, that is derived for
testing the theory’s predictions, is based on an extreme value structure that generalizes
into a nested multinomial logit (NMNL) model. The NMNL model is consistent with
proﬁt maximization under uncertainty (McFadden 1984).
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model of down-
sizing under uncertainty. Section 3 presents the data and discusses the construction of
some of the variables used in the econometric analysis. Section 4 presents the econo-
metric model. Section 5 presents the estimation results and the tests of diﬀerent model
speciﬁcations. In Section 6, we show that a reorganization of the workforce that modiﬁes
1Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Calvo and Wellisz (1979), MacLeod and Malcomson (1988)
2Radner (1992), Garicano (2000), Carroll and Hannan (2000).
3Marschak and Radner (1972), Williamson (1973), Rosen (1982), Baker et al. (1994a).
4Eberly (1994), Caballero and Engel (1999).
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the composition of ranks within skills groups while input ratios remain constant, can
arouse increased wage inequality between skills groups. Section 7 concludes.
4.2 A theoretical model of hierarchical workforce
reorganization
A multi skill-level hierarchical ﬁrm produces output with a given production technology
Y = f(L1,..,LS), where Ls, s = 1,..,S is the input of workers with skill level s.




Lrs, where r = 1 refers to the lowest rank, and r = Rs corresponds to the





The number of ranks is ﬁxed, but for each skill group the composition between ranks
can change, e.g. as a result of a reorganization. The ﬁrm’s decision problem for every
level s and rank r is to select Nrs < Lrs workers as to maximize the discounted future
value proﬁts V (Πrs), i = 1,..,Nrs, with V (Πrs) being monotonous in rank-speciﬁc proﬁts
Πrs.
The ﬁrm invests Qrs in each rank. The investments produce rank-speciﬁc productivity
Y Q
rs in addition to the general productivity Y G
rs in absence of Qrs. The additional remu-
neration costs of this ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity is W Q
rs. The ﬁrm and the workers share
the rent of this speciﬁc investment, so that Y Q
rs > W Q
rs iﬀ Qrs > 0.5 Proﬁts obtained













rs ≥ 0 iﬀ Qrs > 0. The return is concave in the number of workers for which the
ﬁrm invested in ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity. Moreover, the speciﬁc proﬁt structure is such
that for each rank the returns per worker are maximized at some optimal investment
level Q∗
rs < ∞, so that ∂Π∗
rs/∂Q∗
rs ≥ 0 and ∂2Π∗
rs/∂(Q∗
rs)2 < 0. We assume that W Q
rs > 0










Diﬀusion of shocks — such as a shock in communication technology or skill biased
5The possibility to obtain stocks and bonds as part of the employment contract is not considered in
this model.
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innovations — renders proﬁts Πrs more uncertain the longer the time horizon is over
which the returns of the investments will be discounted. Let ΠL
rs be deﬁned as the ﬁrm’s














rs − ρFrs) (4.3)
where ρ is the real interest rate which we assume constant. W Q
rs is the rank-speciﬁc
rents from ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity. The higher W Q
rs, the lower the rents that ﬂow to
the ﬁrm. Frs represents ﬁring costs at skills level s in rank r. Firing costs are nonlinear
functions of the wage, the number of hours worked, and the age/tenure structure. We
expect the impact of ﬁring costs to diﬀer across ranks. The expected growth of rank-
speciﬁc proﬁts is denoted as µrs; λrs is a non-linear function of ρ, µrs, and the future
uncertainty of µrs, denoted as σµ
rs. With ρ > µrs; λrs < 0, and W Q
rs − ρFrs > 0, the
minimum proﬁt cut-oﬀ value ΠL
rs is always positive.





r−1,s for all 2 < r ≤ Rs, given s (4.4)
Equation 4.4 states that workers in higher ranks are more valuable to the ﬁrm (e.g.
Lazear and Rosen (1981)).
When a ﬁrm has reached a state of insolvency, the option to choose the optimal size
and time to reorganize has expired. The menu costs rules still apply, but the waiting
time is foregone. This provides the opportunity of studying the workings of the menu
costs rules by observing reorganization decisions. The ﬁrm’s reorganization policy can





P1 states that if µ increases the ﬁrm will restructure its workforce such that proﬁts
will be shifted from lower to higher ranks. For every skills type s the reorganizing ﬁrm
is more likely to retain workers in ranks with higher expected within-ﬁrm proﬁt growth.
Rank speciﬁcity can result in changes in the relative sizes of ranks, even in the case that






P2 shows that lower shares in the ﬁrm’s rents — higher W Q
rs — induces the ﬁrm to
6The derivation of this expression can be found in note called ”Random Proﬁt Maximization under






















824.3 Econometric speciﬁcation of the hierarchical decision model






Higher ﬁring costs reduce the risk of decreasing the size of the rank. Consequently,
workers employed in ranks that are characterized by a distribution reﬂecting relatively
high ﬁring costs are less likely to be displaced. The ﬁrst three predictions are rather






P4 states that ranks associated with more uncertainty about future proﬁt growth are
less likely to be reduced in size; in volatile parts of the production process the ﬁrm
prefers to hold a larger share of workers as it is reluctant to exercise the irreversible
decision (keeping the option open) and laying oﬀ workers that may be needed in the
near future.
4.3 Econometric speciﬁcation of the hierarchical
decision model
Figure 4.1 shows the tree structure and the ordering of the hierarchical restructuring
problem. It suggests that discrete choice analysis and more speciﬁcally the hierarchi-
cal elimination model based on a generalized extreme value structure that generalizes
into a nested multinomial logit (NMNL) model would be the natural candidate for its
econometric evaluation. The NMNL model is consistent with proﬁt maximization under
uncertainty (McFadden 1984).
In the hierarchical form, the ﬁrst decision represents the multinomial choice of input
ratios of workers with skills level s ∈ S. The labor input ratios, Ls/Ls+1, are deter-
mined by the production technology. The theory allows for reorganizations that aﬀect
the ratios. This would result, for example, from workforce adjustments to skill-biased
technological shocks. If the production technology remains unchanged then so will the
factor input ratios and the eventual skill groups’ sizes are implicitly pre-determined over-
all size the workforce reduction. In that situation the probability of choosing skill group
s is a given Pr(S = s), and labor input ratios are ﬁxed.7
The second decision is to determine the rank structure (span of control) for each skill
group s. This is an ordered choice problem. For the determination of restructured rank
sizes we need to evaluate the cut-oﬀ points ΠL
rs < ΠL
r+1,s. Rather than the non-linear
7In the case of perfect competition and for a Cobb-Douglas production technology with constant
returns to scale Pr(S = s) will be equal to the marginal productivity of skill group s.
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844.3 Econometric speciﬁcation of the hierarchical decision model
expression 4.4 for ΠL
rs for practical purposes we suggest to use a linearized decision rule.









s Frs +ηrs ≡ Zrsζs + ηrs
(+) (−) (−) (+) (−)
(4.5)
The signs below the equation in brackets are the theoretical predictions derived in
Section 2. It is quite plausible that unobserved preferences or characteristics will aﬀect
choices among alternative ranks in similar ways. Moreover, as the observed decision rules
are a discrete representation of the underlying continuous model presented in Section 2,
formally this implies that correlation among unobserved proﬁt components for alterna-
tive choices can arise from dependency among unobserved characteristics of several of
those choices.
The hierarchical ordering imposed by 4.4 requires that ΠL
1s < ΠL




js;∀k > j) for any given rank from the choice set j,k ∈ {Rs}. This imposes
an additional ordered structure that is uncommon to the standard NMNL model. Note
that the common ordering in the generalized nested logit model is Pr(Πks > Πjs;∀k 6= j).
It also varies from the ordered generalized extreme value model, introduced by Small
(1987), because our model does not have subsets of choices that overlap. If ηrs|Zrs ∼ Gs,
where Gs is a cumulative distribution function that is the same for all ranks, then the
probability of being in rank r of skill group s is an ordered probability function. The
conditional probabilities yield
Pr(Rank = r|s) = Pr(Π
L
rs ≤ Zrsζs + ηrs < Π
L
r+1,s|s), for r = 1,...,Rs − 1 (4.6)
Pr(Rank = Rs|s) = Pr(ZRssζs + ηRss > Π
L
Rss|s) (4.7)
If sizes of ranks have been determined, what remains is to decide which workers to
keep or to ﬁre. This is done on the basis of individual workers’ idiosyncratic proﬁts
πirs that are functions of worker’s personal characteristics. Would πirs be known for all
workers, then the ﬁrm could order all workers by the observed πirs and select those Nrs
workers with the largest expected value to the ﬁrm from the sorted (s ∗ r) arrays. But
πirs cannot be observed directly. Thus we add a third and ﬁnal sub-decision that is a
multivariate binary choice to decide which workers should stay or leave. We write the
latent idiosyncratic proﬁt function πirs as the sum of a vector of observable idiosyncratic
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Table 4.1: The Structure of Labor Input Before and After Restructuring
Workers Low Skill High Skill Total
Total 3594 .66 / 1.0 1875 .34 / 1.0 5469 1.0 / 1.0
Selected 767 .67 / .21 374 .33 / .20 1141 1.0 / .21
Displaced 2827 .65 / .79 1501 .35 / .80 4328 1.0 / .79
characteristics (xirs), unobserved ability (εw
irs), and a random component (uirs) as follows
πirs = xirsβrs + αrsε
w
irs + uirs (4.8)
The parameter αrs is the contribution of a worker’s idiosyncratic ability to the ﬁrm’s
value of future proﬁts . The vector βrs consists of constant parameters. In skill group
s workers in rank r are displaced if πirs ≤ 0 and retained if πirs > 0. The variable
1πirs(0,1) indexes this binary choice. The probability that worker i of skills level s in
rank r is retained can be written as the product of the three probabilities:
Pr(S = s) · Pr(Rank = r|s) · Pr(1πirs = 1|r,s).
4.4 Personnel data
To investigate this general model detailed ﬁrm-speciﬁc personnel data are needed. We
use data of all workers employed by the Dutch aircraft manufacturer, Fokker. The
company ﬁled for bankruptcy on Friday, March 15th, 1996. The trustees restructured
the company during the weekend immediately following the bankruptcy. Before the
bankruptcy, the company existed of six subsidiaries of which three were located at plants
in diﬀerent parts of Holland and were dedicated to aircraft design and construction,
whilst after the three plants were drastically reduced in size, the other three were left
practically unchanged. The newly created organization, comprising the three remaining
subsidiaries and the adjusted aircraft division, was later sold to another Dutch industrial
ﬁrm. The data set that we use here incorporates the records of all tenured workers on the
day of the bankruptcy.8 The ﬁrm employed two types of workers: production workers and
non-production workers (s = 2). Each skill group had its own level of entry (see Chapter
3). Table 4.1 presents the structure of the factor inputs before and after the adjustment
of the workforce. It shows that the factor input ratio of 2:1 between production and
non-production workers remained unchanged as a result of the reorganization.
8Except those of the ﬁrm’s management team (5 persons).
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Table 4.2: Organizational Change
Low Skill Workers
Hierarchical Level Before Reorganization After Reorganization
Size Span of Control Size Span of Control
1: Production Worker 2281 - 496 -
2: Team Leader 765 2.98 187 2.65
3: Head Production Team 548 1.40 84 2.23
High Skill Workers
Before Reorganization After Reorganization
Size Span of Control Size Span of Control
1 : Assistant Engineer 803 - 148 -
2 : Engineer 505 1.59 107 1.38
3 : Senior Engineer 360 1.40 65 1.65
4 : Manager 207 1.74 52 1.25
Table 4.2 shows the changes in the hierarchical organization of each skill group. Pro-
duction workers are organized in three hierarchical levels (production team workers,
production team leaders, and heads of production teams); the productivity of the non-
production workforce is organized in four ranks (assistant engineers, engineers, senior
engineers, and managers). After the reorganization control spans are higher for produc-
tion workers than for non-production workers at all ranks. Although the pyramid shapes
of the two skill groups are still present after the reorganization, the within group rank
sizes have changed markedly.
Table 4.3 shows summary statistics of variables explaining the ordered choices of
hierarchical ranks. We distinguish between three diﬀerent plants. Plant 1 operates
in Amsterdam and houses a high percentage of executives. It is the company’s main
location and also includes its headquarters. Plants 2 and 3 are production plants that
are located in other parts of the country. The hourly wage is measured for all workers
at the day of the bankruptcy. The wage growth (µrs) is computed for the three years
period characterizing the ﬁrms structural demise preceding its bankruptcy. The average
growth rate for production workers is 7.7 percent or 2.6 percent per year. For non-
production workers the average is 11.7 percent or 3.6 percent per year. The annual
diﬀerence between the two skill groups is one percentage point. The variation in µrs,
denoted as σµ
rs, is measured as the standard deviation of µrs among all workers with
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skills level s in rank r. The variation in wage growth tends to grow largest at the top
of the organization of each skill group. The variable W Q
rs represents workers’ rents from
rank-speciﬁc investments in ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity. Here it is measured as the returns
on investments in rank-speciﬁc skills. The ﬁrm invested in ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity in
the form of the provision of internal (ﬁrm-speciﬁc) as well as external (general) training
courses. The within rank distribution of W Q
rs is estimated as the training proﬁle in the
rank speciﬁc hourly wage distribution.
Firing costs, Frs, are associated with the period of notice of terminating a job contract.
Job contracts may be cancelled either by the employer or the employee. The employer’s
term of notice (ToN) is legally deﬁned in Articles 1639i and 1639j of the Netherlands
Civil Code and Article 40.3 of the Bankruptcy Act. The ToN is equal to the time that
passes between two consecutive earnings installments not extending beyond a period
of 6 weeks. The minimum ToN for tenured workers is the number of weeks equal to
the number of years the employee has worked full time for the same employer since
adulthood (18 years and older), not extending beyond a period of 13 weeks. The ToN is
extended with one week for every full year during which an employee has been employed
after 45 years of age, not exceeding a period of 13 weeks. The legal maximum ToN is
thus 26 weeks. Firing costs are large – on average 25 percent of annual earnings. They
are — not surprisingly — higher for non-production workers and increasing with each
hierarchical level.
Table 4.4 shows for each rank in both skill groups the variables explaining the binomial
layoﬀ decisions. The usual suspects explaining heterogeneous displacement character-
istics included in the vector xirs are age, tenure, education, a dummy for vocational
specialization, hours worked, gender, and marital status. Our data are from a typical
industrial ﬁrm (mostly full-time workers; predominantly male workers; a large propor-
tion had vocational specialization and is married). We have to bear that in mind when
drawing conclusions from the empirical model. Most notable outcomes are that the the
ratio of female workers decreases with each rank and tenure and age diﬀerences between
ranks are less than two years.
In addition we have information on all workers’ last annual performance evaluation
scores, numbers of internal as well as external training courses, commuting distances,
and percentages of those being disabled prior to the bankruptcy. We ﬁnd that production
workers in higher ranks have had more training courses, whereas non-production workers
had less; and disability decreases with rank in both skill groups.
Some workers are still more productive than their pay indicates, and when forced
88Table 4.3: Variables Describing Rank Speciﬁc Proﬁts
Low Skill Workers High Skill Workers
Rank 1 2 3 1 2 3 4
Total 2281 765 548 803 505 360 207
Plant 1 Proportion .48 .70 .79 .90 .93 .94 .95
Plant 2 of Rank .36 .20 .15 .06 .04 .03 .02
Plant 3 .16 .10 .06 .04 .03 .03 .03
Hourly Wage Levels 24.56 28.43 35.52 37.17 44.04 53.34 69.84
(in Dﬂ)1 (2.74) (2.86) (3.37) (4.59) (6.09) (7.18) (10.32)
Wage Growth in Levels 1.68 2.17 2.68 3.99 4.80 5.52 6.54
(1993-1996) Rate(µrs) .073 .082 .089 .118 .121 .117 .106
Wage Growth Variation2 σ
µ
rs ∗ 100 .204 .190 .241 .278 .341 .710 .648
Contribution of Training
to ln(Hourly Wage Proﬁle)
W
Q
rs .020 .013 .009 .003 .016 -.011 -.019
Firing Costs Frs ∗ 1,000 10.75 12.77 15.64 15.45 19.11 26.02 37.59
in 1000 Dﬂ (4.66) (5.26) (6.42) (7.61) (10.27) (12.13) (16.98)
1 Standard deviations are given between brackets
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Table 4.4: Variables Explaining Multivariate Binomial Layoﬀ Decisions
Low Skill Workers High Skill Workers
Rank 1 2 3 1 2 3 4
Selected Workers % 21.7 24.4 15.3 18.4 21.1 18.0 26.1
Age in Years 37.5 38.6 41.0 38.7 40.2 43.0 45.8
(8.7) (7.8) (7.7) (7.3) (7.4) (7.4) (6.8)
Tenure in Years 13.8 15.4 17.0 13.5 13.8 15.7 17.2
(7.0) (7.9) (8.8) (8.0) (8.4) (8.2) (8.3)
Training External .6 1.0 1.5 1.8 1.6 1.3 .9
Courses Internal 7.2 9.1 8.5 5.8 4.0 2.8 2.2
Performance Eval-
uation
1-10 6.8 6.7 8.5 5.8 6.3 6.3 6.5
Education 1-9 3.5 4.7 5.5 6.8 7.6 7.9 8.2
Vocational Special-
ization
yes=1 .72 .66 .69 .70 .65 .62 .57
Female yes=1 .12 .11 .06 .07 .06 .03 .02
Marital Status yes=1 .57 .61 .68 .59 .60 .74 .79
Commuting Dis-
tance
in km 19.4 21.5 20.7 25.5 25.5 25.4 18.3
Idiosyncratic Min -.56 -.25 -.24 -.30 -.30 -.28 -.30
Ability Max .20 .45 .34 .32 .42 .55 .30
1 Standard deviations are given between brackets
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to let people go, the ﬁrm keeps those workers. If that is the case, then the residual
of the hourly wage equation regressed on the usual suspects indicates worker-speciﬁc
proﬁts. The ﬁrm wants to preserve its best matches, and high wage residuals signals
good matches. In the model we added a variable εw
irs, being workers’ idiosyncratic ability
measured as the individual worker’s residual of a skills and rank speciﬁc hourly wage
regression that was also used to compute W Q
rs. The last row of Table 4.4 shows the
spread in εw
irs for each rank.
4.5 Estimating the hierarchical model and testing
hypotheses
In a model where the labor input ratios are ﬁxed, we can write the lay-oﬀ probability of
worker i in rank r of skills level s as:
Pr(1πirs = 1|r,s) = G(xirsβrs + αrsε
w
irs) (4.9)
Deﬁning the variable Jrs as the inclusive value summarizing the workers’ charac-
teristics in rank rs, for a multivariate binomial choice with a Type I extreme value







The size of each hierarchical level is represented by an ordered choice as:
Pr(Rank = r|s) = G(Zrsζs + Jrsκrs − γrs) − G(Zrsζs + Jrsκrs − γr−1,s) (4.11)
with γ0,s = −∞; and γRs,s = +∞. For the threshold parameters it holds that γr−1,s <
γrs, reﬂecting the fact that ΠL
r−1,s < ΠL
rs. The parameter κrs is often referred to as
the parameter measuring the independence of alternatives within sub-ranks. McFadden
(1984) noted that 0 < κrs < 1 must hold for the hierarchy to be correctly speciﬁed.
If κrs is outside the unit interval, this may indicate that the assumed proﬁt ordering
ΠL
r−1,s < ΠL
rs does not hold. Note that the independence parameter κrs and the threshold
parameter γrs are not identiﬁed separately. The identifying restriction Jrsκrs − γrs = 0,
or κrs = γrs/Jrs can be used as a model speciﬁcation test, for r = 1,..,Rs − 1.
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Table 4.5: Parameter Estimates
Low skilled workers
ˆ γ11 = 3.76 ˆ J11 = 7.65 ˆ κ11 = 0.56
(s.e. =0.20) (s.e. =0.03)
ˆ γ21 = 5.44 ˆ J21 = 6.70 ˆ κ21 = 0.81
(s.e. = 0.22) (s.e. =0.03)
High skilled workers
ˆ γ12 = 4.40 ˆ J12 = 6.73 ˆ κ12 = 0.65
(s.e. =0.25) (s.e. =0.04)
ˆ γ22 = 6.07 ˆ J22 = 6.36 ˆ κ22 = 0.96
(s.e. =0.27) (s.e. =0.04)
ˆ γ32 = 8.27 ˆ J32 = 6.00 ˆ κ32 = 1.38
(s.e. =0.31) (s.e. =0.05)
In the empirical model there are two skill levels (low and high skill workers; s = 1,2).
Low skilled work is organized in three ranks (R1 = 3). High skilled work is organized in
four ranks (R2 = 4). The estimates for the threshold parameters, the inclusive values,
and the independence parameters are given in Table 4.5.
Only ˆ κ32 lies outside the unit interval. This suggests that the hierarchical composition
of proﬁts at the two highest levels of the organization are not as clear-cut as in the lower
regions of the organization. There can be several reasons for this. Although explaining
these results is beyond the scope of this chapter, we can give two ideas. One is that
the theoretical model does incorporate the possibility for workers to receive stocks and
bonds as part of the employment contract. Secondly, ΠL
rs is in essence an equilibrium
outcome. A possible way to extend the model is to incorporate that explicitly adding
an equilibrium search framework.
The parameter estimates for the multivariate binomial layoﬀ decisions are in line with
what is found elsewhere in the literature. Low skill workers with lower displacement
probabilities are younger males with a general rather than a technical educational de-
gree, who have better job performance evaluations; they followed fewer internal training
courses, and have higher worker speciﬁc proﬁts (unobserved heterogeneity). High skilled
workers with lower displacement probabilities are younger married employees with higher
tenure; they have higher job performance evaluations; they followed fewer external train-
ing courses, and they live further away from work. Speciﬁc proﬁts (idiosyncratic ability)
do not contribute to a signiﬁcant decrease in the likelihood of getting displaced for high
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skilled workers.
The goal of this chapter has been to present and test a theory of organizational change
in the case of workforce restructuring. In section 2 four predictions were derived, which
can be tested with our data. The results of the estimation results on the predictions
(P1) to (P4) are shown in Figures 4.5 to 4.5. The eﬀects shown are all highly signiﬁcant.
Figure II-a shows the eﬀects proﬁt growth shocks — innovations, productivity-enhancing
technology shocks — may have on organizational changes. Theory predicts that Πµ
s < 0,
or if µ increases the ﬁrm will restructure its workforce so that proﬁts will be shifted from
low to high ranks. This is rational behavior of the ﬁrm because proﬁts in higher ranks
are higher. Figure II-a conﬁrms this prediction and also shows how the restructuring
takes place. If µ is small the hierarchical structures of both types of labor input will
be characterized by a broad lowest rank and very small middle and high ranks. When
µ gets larger, the ﬁrm will initially increase all higher hierarchical levels at the cost of
the lowest rank, with the largest increases in the middle ranks. After some point of
inﬂection the ﬁrm will start discarding all lower ranks in favor of the highest rank only.
Eventually a ﬂat hierarchy will remain with workers employed only in the upper ranks
of both skills groups.
Figure 4.5 shows the eﬀects of volatility shocks — increased uncertainty — on probable
changes in the hierarchical structures of the skill groups. Although theory predicts that
Πσ
s < 0, or ranks associated with more uncertainty about proﬁt growth are less likely
to be reduced in size, the empirical outcomes show diﬀerences across skill groups. For
low skill workers, increases in uncertainty do not change the hierarchical structure by
much. If σ
µ
s=1 increases, the hierarchy will change little, slightly broadening the lowest
rank. For high skill workers the change in the organizational structure is diﬀerent. An
increase in σ
µ
s=2 will rapidly crowd out all high ranks in favor of the bottom rank. This
is probably due to the fact that the lowest ranks are characterized by higher volatility.
These ranks are composed of young workers with less tenure and they are largest in size.
Low ranks thus embody the best promise to gain maximally from unexpected positive
surprises — while negative surprises can always be dealt with through layoﬀs.
Figure 4.5 shows the eﬀects of shocks changing shared rents — skill-speciﬁc economy
wide labor demand shocks — on the ﬁrm’s inclination to adjust its composition between
ranks within skill groups. Theory predicts ΠW
s > 0. W Q is the share of rents that ﬂows
towards the workers. If W Q increases the per worker proﬁt for the ﬁrm decreases. When
that occurs, the ﬁrm will restructure its workforce so that proﬁts will be shifted from
higher to lower ranks in order to maximize proﬁts at the broadest ranks. This is shown
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1Figure 4.4: The Eﬀects of a Shock in Rent Shares on the Hierarchical Structure of the Workforce
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14.6 Restructuring and wage inequality within the ﬁrm
in Figure 4.5. How that reorganization takes place, however, varies between the two skill
groups. High skill work is reorganized gradually, shifting the hierarchical structure from
one with a high probability of top rank managers to one with only a few. For low skill
workers this process goes much more rapidly and is more pronounced.
Figure 4.5, ﬁnally, shows the eﬀects shocks that change ﬁring costs — e.g. UI policy
shocks — on the ﬁrm’s reorganization propensity. Theory predicts that ΠF
s < 0, or if F
increases the ﬁrm will restructure its workforce so that proﬁts will be shifted from low
to high ranks for the simple reason that ﬁring workers in higher ranks is more costly.
Figure II-d conﬁrms that prediction and also shows that the restructuring that will take
place is comparable to what could happen when changes occur in the expected proﬁt
growth (productivity enhancing technology shocks).
4.6 Restructuring and wage inequality within the ﬁrm
The econometric results allow us to investigate changing wage inequality between low
and high skilled workers within the ﬁrm resulting from workforce restructuring propen-
sities. Our analysis is based on a production technology of which factor input ratios
remain unchanged as a result of the reorganization. The results we ﬁnd are not due to
substitution eﬀects between skill groups, but rather they reﬂect changes due to restruc-
turing the composition of ranks within skill groups. We show that this can give rise to
changes in wage inequality between skill groups within the ﬁrm
The simulation exercise is conducted as follows. For all ranks we computed the average
hourly wage. The weights presented in Figure 4.5-4.5 then allow us to compute the
composite hourly wage for each skill group and how it changes subject to shocks in
proﬁt growth, volatility, rent shares, and ﬁring costs. Changes in wage inequality thus
originate from modifying compositions of ranks within skill groups. Assuming shocks
are similar in size across skill groups we can portray how inequality across skill groups
can change due to those shocks.
Results are given in Figure 4.6. The reported hourly wages are in 1996 Dutch guilders
(1 Dﬂ = 0.45 Euro). We ﬁnd that (i) positive proﬁt growth shocks — innovations,
productivity shocks — increase hourly wages for low and high skilled workers, but also
increase the wage inequality between both groups. The underlying mechanism that pro-
duces this result is that the highest ranks in both skill groups have the lowest probability
of being reduced in size, because compared to other ranks in the same skill group their
proﬁts are highest (Equation 4.4). Moreover, the wage inequality between the top ranks
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of the two skill groups is larger than that at the bottom of the hierarchical structure;
(ii) volatility shocks — increased uncertainty — decrease hourly wages as well as wage
inequality. The reason is that ranks with relatively little volatility will be reduced more.
These ranks are usually composed of older and more experienced workers; (iii) worker
rents increase labor market shocks — increased union power, increased aggregate de-
mand for speciﬁc skills — decrease proﬁts ﬂowing to the ﬁrm. This leads to lowering
wages and a decrease in wage inequality; (iv) ﬁring costs increase shocks — UI policy
shocks — boost hourly wages of all workers, and increase wage inequality between low
and high skill groups.
4.7 Conclusions
We have studied the role of a ﬁrm’s organizational structure on the decision to restructure
the ﬁrm’s workforce. We modeled a hierarchical ﬁrm’s optimal downsizing decisions. The
model’s predictions have been tested using personnel data of a single industrial ﬁrm. We
found that changes in the organizational structure can be described by a hierarchical
menu costs model. If the ﬁrm’s input of workers comprises diﬀerent skill groups, and
if the production of each of these skill groups is organized in ranks, then the ranks’
contributions to the future value of the ﬁrm determines their size. In the case of a
reorganization rank-speciﬁc cut-oﬀ values determine changes in the ﬁrm’s hierarchical
structure. Factors that explain the cut-oﬀ values are rank-speciﬁc expected future proﬁt
growth, the uncertainty surrounding that growth, rent-sharing rules, as well as ﬁring
costs. The theoretical predictions, that proﬁt growth and increases in ﬁring costs lead
to increases in higher ranks at the expense of lower ranks, and that increased uncertainty
and worker rents broaden the bottom ranks of the hierarchical structure, are supported
by the data.
We ﬁnd that reorganizations that modify the composition of ranks within skill groups
can give rise to increased wage inequality between skill groups. We have shown that
productivity-enhancing technology shocks as well as policy shocks that increase ﬁring
costs lead to increases in wage inequality between low and high skilled workers. Im-
portant to note is that this holds true while the company-wide input ratio of both skill
groups remains unchanged. We also found evidence of shocks that give rise to organiza-
tional change that will lead to decreasing wage inequality. Increased uncertainty about
future proﬁt growth increases the ﬁrm’s propensity to hold a larger share of workers in
ranks that contribute most to this uncertainty, because the ﬁrm is reluctant to exercise
1004.7 Conclusions
the irreversible decision (keeping the option open) of whether to lay oﬀ workers that
may be needed in the near future. Finally, shocks that increase the workers’ share of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc rents, such as increased union power or aggregate positive demand shocks,
will increase negotiation power of workers and decrease proﬁts ﬂowing to the ﬁrm. If
such shocks lead to reorganization of the workforce, the restructuring is such that it will
lead to a decrease in wage inequality between low and high skilled workers.
1015 Development and Conduct of the
‘Fokker Survey’
“Why should economics diﬀer from other sciences, where researchers
spend much of their time collecting data? It is not healthy for a science
to isolate itself from its subject of study, especially for a ﬁeld that is
highly contentious and where reality is constantly changing. In
economics, it is all too easy to believe what one wants to believe, since
theories become intertwined with political values and truly pertinent
information is hard to obtain.”
(Bewley, 1999, p. 15)
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When we obtained the personnel ﬁles from Fokker and the support of the bankruptcy
trustees for the conduct of a survey among the displaced workers, we were in the unique
position to examine a bankruptcy displacement among a speciﬁc group of workers from
whom we had already obtained speciﬁc (career) information before they were displaced.
The intention of the survey was to ﬁll the gap of information for the time that passed
between the lay-oﬀ and distributing the questionnaire. In essence, we ﬁlled three years of
labor market information from 1996 to 1999,which we deﬁned as the post displacement
years. In addition we wanted to ﬁnd out about the circumstances of the bankruptcy as
the respondents experienced it. This survey gave us the opportunity to combine a fairly
long duration of post-displacement observation (3 years), with unique data on the career
before displacement (10 years, as described in chapter 3).
This chapter will deal with all issues of developing, testing and conducting the survey.




Before constructing and conducting the survey we should consider the respondents’ sit-
uation. The target population of our survey had been employed by Fokker until the
bankruptcy. Most of them were not selected into ‘Fokker Aviation’, rendering them
jobless, searching for new employment. The bankruptcy came as a shock to most em-
ployees. While many were aware of the diﬃculties, which had also resulted in several
reorganizations within the last ten years, most workers hoped that Fokker would survive
and that their future lay within the ﬁrm. They were proud of the product they built
and about the fact that they worked for a company they identiﬁed with.
Following the time we conducted the survey, most respondents had subsequently found
new employment during the successive three years, but many would have still preferred
to work at Fokker and still have considered themselves to be part of the ‘Fokker family’
organizing themselves in several clubs of former Fokker employees.
We thus knew that the respondents had undergone drastic and dramatic changes in
their life. They were searching for explanations of whether the bankruptcy was really
necessary, and searching for the persons responsible that the company eventually went
bankrupt. We could not oﬀer them any direct beneﬁt for their economic nor work
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situation as a result of the study. It was also not the intention of the study to oﬀer any
explanation regarding the necessity of the bankruptcy or the reasons for it. The potential
beneﬁciaries of this study might be workers that would perhaps face a similar situation
some time in the future. As such the results of the study could help policy makers
to make informed decisions regarding the consequences of closing down a company like
Fokker. However, to only a limited extent we oﬀered the opportunity to vent frustrations
and explain the diﬃculties they encountered while adjusting to the new situation. The
only tacit incentive we oﬀered was a report of the results of the study.
In such a situation we had to be careful about questioning and had to make sure
that the information we asked was in line with the study’s goal. Otherwise respondents
would either refuse to answer the survey altogether or answer only part of it.1 We
asked the respondents to give detailed information about the economic impact that
the displacement had had on them. This is certainly relevant to the study, yet some
respondents suggested that the economic picture is only one part of story and that we
missed the more psychological problems of job-loss with our survey. Broadly speaking,
the survey showed two typical reactions to the situation that, surprisingly, were not
necessarily related to the economic outcome after displacement: many workers did not
want to be reminded too much about their time with Fokker. They dealt with the issue
by quickly trying to forget about the whole situation and by building up a new work
history in another ﬁrm. Others still felt part of the Fokker family. Hard feelings were
rather directed towards speciﬁc organizations or person that the respondent identiﬁed
as being responsible for closing down the ﬁrm they had worked for.2
Being aware of the respondents situation and possible feelings towards the bankruptcy
we tried to carefully craft the survey in such a way that the ‘research agenda’ of the
survey was clear. While we had and mentioned the support of the bankruptcy trustees,
we also stressed the fact that the survey was conducted and analyzed by independent
researchers for academic purposes. We allowed the respondents to tell their story –
limited to the economic outcome. We invited former employees at several stages to
comment on the research agenda and the developed survey before we conducted the full
survey.
1Nonresponse both of the full survey but also of speciﬁc items in the survey, will always take place.
However, the main goal is to minimize the non-response.
2Both of these reactions seem typical for such a situation. Sennett (1998) considers them diﬀerent
stages of the process of coping with job loss.
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Census versus Sample
At this early stage a decision had to be taken to use a full census and try to have all
workers that were laid-oﬀ in the bankruptcy respond, or rather draw a sample in such
a way that all our questions could be answered, and concentrate our eﬀort upon the
sampled population. Usually the latter is the preferred and advised method as sampling
economizes on cost, is faster and allows for more expensive modes of conduct (cf. Lohr
(1990, p. 258)). However, Kish (1965, p. 18) acknowledges that if data on small units
can be obtained it might be advantageous to take the full census.3 Given that we did not
have the information on the internal labor markets from chapter 3 and that we did not
have a priori information on which parts of the company might be important, we could
not have sampled while insuring suﬃcient inclusion of small units. Furthermore, we
could have used three modes of gathering the necessary data: Personal interviews with
the workers could have been conducted in which the interviewers visit the respondents
and posit questions verbally. Alternatively, a phone interview could be conducted, or
ﬁnally a written mail survey. All these modes have their speciﬁc pro’s and con’s. Usually,
the former two modes elicit higher response rates, however, well designed mail surveys
which are geared to a speciﬁc group can also match those expected response rates (e.g.
Dillman 2001, p. 29). Mail surveys also have the advantage that they allow people to
respond in their own time, they can look up or check some answers or simply can take
longer to think about the right answers. It seems that sensitive issues are also more
readily answered with written surveys as compared to phone or personal interviews.4
Given the sensitive nature of some of the questions and the non-intrusiveness of mail
surveys, we decided that for this research project the preferred mode was the mail survey.
This also made our decision to use a sample or the full census of our research population
easier. Given the many diﬀerent functions and groups at Fokker, we decided to include
all workers. At the time of survey development, our experience with all aspects of the
internal labor market data was, however, not as far advanced as to make good and
precise predictions into which groups would turn out to be the crucial ones for further
study. We were in the luxurious position to take the full census and thus keep all options
open without having to compromise on any follow-ups that we intended to do.
3He does this, notably in his classic text on survey sampling.
4NORC at the University of Chicago uses written or computer assisted self-administered surveys for
sensitive issues as e.g. sexual behaviour in their National Health Survey to allow for the respondents
privacy and to insure unbiased answers.
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Table 5.1: Composition of Fokker Workforce and Survey Population at the Time of the
Bankruptcy
N %
Displaced Workers 3991 70.71
Bankruptcy trustees 700 12.40
Fokker Aviation B.V. 953 16.89
Total 5644 100.00
Pilot 100 .
Other Workers involved in the 38 .
development of the Survey
Survey Population 5506 .
Coverage
The ‘Fokker Survey’ covers all 5644 employees who were employed by the parent com-
pany and subsidiaries on the date of bankruptcy including the 953 workers that were
oﬀered a position at Fokker Aviation B.V. after bankruptcy.5 These workers had ﬁrst
received a letter of dismissal immediately followed by a letter containing a job oﬀer at
the bankruptcy spin-oﬀ Fokker Aviation B.V. The survey also includes those employees
that were temporarily employed by the Bankruptcy Trustees to participate in the so-
called dismantling scheme. Table 5.1 summarizes the composition of the former Fokker
N.V. work force.
All former employees (both working and unemployed) were selected to participate in
the survey. Current addresses of the respondents were obtained from the bankruptcy
trustees. Information from the Pension Fund was used to check for deceased employees
whose addresses were omitted from the address ﬁles. The ﬁnal inclusion in the research
population was done for us by an employee of the bankruptcy trustees, who – based
upon our criteria – delivered a list of names, addresses and phone numbers from the
V.I.P. ﬁles of Fokker and matched them to the ﬁles of the pension funds to eliminate
those workers that had passed away. The criteria used were that the employee had to be
employed at Fokker N.V. in the parts that fell under the bankruptcy procedure. We used
the day of the bankruptcy as the selection date, including both those workers that were
ﬁred and immediately re-hired and those that were displaced without being rehired by
the trustees. Due to the data-structure that was used in the V.I.P. ﬁles a small number
5These numbers are based upon the personnel data (these are called the V.I.P. within Fokker) from
the ﬁrm that we also used in the previous chapters, however here we focus only on those workers that
were recorded to be part of those organizations that fell under the bankruptcy.
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of workers were erroneously included in the ‘working population’ that were actually not
working with Fokker anymore. Especially workers who were disabled due to work or
early retired workers could have been (erroneously) included. However, the number of
those errors is negligible and could be identiﬁed ex-post.6
5.1.2 Instrument Development
Focus Groups
The ﬁrst step to familiarize ourselves with the bankruptcy process information was ob-
tained through interviewing. Interviews were conducted with key decision-makers com-
prising Fokker N.V. board members, the CEO of Stork B.V., the bankruptcy trustees,
external advisors, and personnel managers of Fokker N.V. before bankruptcy and per-
sonnel managers of Stork B.V.7 A total number of 20 persons who had been involved in
the bankruptcy reorganization and the dismantling of the Fokker workforce afterwards
participated in the preliminary interviewing sessions. A second step to familiarize our-
selves with the situation, feelings and language of the company was done by a focus
group meeting on April 8th, 1997 in Maastricht. We invited members of the unions
from Fokker as well as former members of the central workers council (COR) to discuss
with us on matters regarding the bankruptcy.
‘Concept’ survey
Armed with the knowledge of the interviews and the ﬁrst focus group meeting, we exam-
ined some surveys for question content and questioning procedure in order to develop the
‘Fokker Survey’. Especially the labor market surveys of Statistics Netherlands, ROA,
the NLSY,8 and the ‘Washington Survey of Displaced Workers’9 gave us material and
ideas to incorporate into the ﬁrst design of the survey instrument.
In designing a ﬁrst questionnaire several aspects with respect to the respondents as
well as the comparability of the questions (and hence the outcomes) have to be consid-
ered: Firstly, questions should be comparable. Comparability means that the questioning
6This was not at the time that we contacted the respondents. Thus, we also received some responses
which lead us to investigate this issue. Fortunately, the amount of erroneously included workers is
negligible and the problem only leads to a more inclusive population.
7This was done by Gerard Pfann at an early stage of the project.
8Chris Flinn provided us with a copy of the most recent survey instrument. Our questions on search
were based on this instrument
9This survey instrument was given to us by Bob Lalonde. It is a computer assisted telephone interview
conducted among displaced workers in Washington State.
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should – if possible – be as close to relevant questions in other labor market surveys in
order to insure that the outcomes of the speciﬁc question can be related to other data-
sets and results derived from those other data-sets. Survey research shows that question
wording, ordering of answers and also the use of categories can inﬂuence the outcome of
the survey (Bradburn and Sudman 1991). Therefore, we tried to use (adapted) versions
of questions that are also used in other labor surveys . Secondly, all questions were
evaluated in terms of interest, diﬃculty, and perceived relevance from the respondents
point of view. Research from survey specialists point to some avoidable pitfalls in ques-
tion wording (Sudman and Bradburn, 1983), the eﬀect of answer categories and changes
therein (e.g. Schwarz and Hippler, 1991), and the use of calenders to aid recovery of
past information. From the theoretical survey literature and the existing surveys a ﬁrst
working version of the ‘Fokker Survey’ was constructed.
5.1.3 Testing the Survey Instrument
Even though all survey specialists agree on the crucial importance of pre-testing it seems
that not all surveys actually follow a full pretest strategy. Dillman (2001) suggests a
four step approach
1. Review by colleagues and analysts
2. Interviews with Cognitive and Motivational Evaluation
3. Pilot
4. ‘Last check-up’
In essence, we followed this approach exactly. Our ﬁrst step, after the working ver-
sion of the ‘Fokker Survey’ was written, was to circulate it and updated versions among
colleagues both with and without survey experience, as well as labor and non-labor
economists who helped us to shape it into a polished survey that could be presented
to the target population. In this step, wording, spelling and directional errors could be
eliminated as well as comments on contents and the accessability of the survey instru-
ments incorporated.
Pre-testing using Focus Groups
In order to evaluate the impact and understandability of the instrument for our target
population we asked several employees with diverse backgrounds to meet us for a ‘focus
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group meeting’. This second focus-group meeting took place on the 21st December 1998
in Amsterdam. The aim of this meeting was to pre-test the questionnaire with six former
employees who had been employed in diﬀerent parts of Fokker N.V.
After a brief introduction outlining the aim of the Fokker project the respondents
were asked to ﬁll out a survey on the spot and report diﬃculties encountered. Addition-
ally, they were asked about the general understandability of the questions, to indicate
sensitive issues, discuss motivational issues and propose on how to approach these sen-
sitive issues, and how to clarify the survey. Furthermore, we tried to establish that
the respondents interpretation especially of those questions that we considered to be
diﬃcult, matched our intention. For this step we did not use cognitive interviewing (as
for example Forsyth and Lessler, 1991) but rather informal retrospective interviews and
discussions.
The Pilot
The last step prior to conducting the full survey was to perform a test run of the
questionnaire through 100 randomly selected respondents trying out the set up of the
questionnaire and giving a ﬁrst impression of the survey as a whole. The respondents
were asked to complete the questionnaires and to comment on any problems encoun-
tered during the process of ﬁlling them in. In addition to the 100 randomly selected
respondents, 38 questionnaires were sent to those persons who had contributed to the
development of the survey and to the initial set up of the questionnaire.10 The outcomes
of the test run of the questionnaire and the comments made by the respondents were
used to make minor last revisions to the questionnaire.
5.1.4 The ‘Fokker Survey’ Questionnaire
The questions asked were centered around a theme. Following the literature we intro-
duced the survey with a simple yet relevant question (cf. Bradburn and Sudman (1991))
setting the tone for the remainder of the questionnaire.11 As the survey was introduced
to examine the results of the bankruptcy, we decided to start with questions that had
to do with the time period around the bankruptcy and subsequently to continue into
10The reason for using this additional group is twofold. Those employees had commented and discussed
several aspects of the study extensively with us, so that their answering of the survey might have lead
to a bias comparable to an interviewer bias. On the other hand these were workers from diﬀerent
departments with Fokker, willing and enthusiastic to help us. Hence, we could and did get quite
detailed comments on the pilot together with the ﬁlled in questionnaire.
11The full survey can be found in the Appendix of this thesis.
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the post displacement search period. A second section deals with the (possible) employ-
ment history following the bankruptcy and any self-employment. The last section of the
questionnaire asks some demographic questions which might not have been considered
interesting hence leading to premature break-oﬀ and non-response.
Period Prior to Displacement
The ﬁrst part of the ﬁrst section (questions 1.1 to 1.5) centers around the period just
prior to, or at the moment of, displacement. Opening with an innocent yet relevant
question on the number of years of employment with Fokker. We then continue with
any work experience before a worker started with Fokker (1.2) as well as the function that
a worker performed (1.3), and the number of subordinates (1.3b). Now we considered
the stage suﬃciently set to introduce a question on the pre-displacement income with
Fokker. Questions on income are always considered ‘dangerous’ as they can lead to
break-oﬀ of the entire survey. However, we felt that given the nature of the research, the
respondents must be aware of the fact that salary is one of the crucial aspects. Hence
we could be considered to have valid reasons for asking the question. Furthermore,
questions (1.1) to (1.3b) lead naturally to the question of income. Question (1.5) asking
the respondent, whether he considered himself the ‘head of the household’ of the family,
completes this picture of having valid reasons for asking income questions.
Questions on Search
Questions (1.6) to (1.14) ask the respondent some questions on the period in which
he searched for new employment. Both the search intensity in terms of weekly hours
searched as well as letters written is asked. The number of letters written is set in a
framework of four weeks as this was the time period in which unemployment insurance
(UI) agencies require the worker to report on active measures taken to ﬁnd a job. A set
of questions (1.11.1 - 1.11.6) are asked on the number of rejected job oﬀers. If multiple
oﬀers existed some characteristics of the best rejected job oﬀer are asked. This part is
concluded by asking for the outcome of job search and the estimated cost of job search
– which can be deducted from taxable income in the Netherlands. Finally, a number
of questions (1.15-1.19) are asked on the usefulness of job search assistance that was
provided immediately after the bankruptcy.
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Employment Calendar
To introduce the post displacement labor market experience and to anchor and aid the
respondent in recollecting the exact timing of events, a calendar of labor market activities
was used (question 2.1). The respondent was asked to sort himself into one of six cate-
gories which best described his activities in a given month – starting in April 1996 and
ending in March 1999. The categories encompass regular employment, self-employment,
unemployment, voluntary (unpaid) work, education, and ‘other’. By circling the activ-
ity a respondent is forced to remember all his employments in the context of the entire
three year period. This helps to avoid tunnelling or telescoping.12 It is much harder for
a respondent to give exact dates without being forced to see the entire three year period
with the displacement from Fokker in 1996 as a natural reference point.
Employment Activities
Question (2.2) sorts the respondents into four categories. Workers that remained without
work for the entire period ‘skip’ to the third section. Respondents that were solely self-
employed are directed to that section, while workers that found one or more new jobs are
asked to ﬁll in detailed questions regarding the ﬁrst and last (or current) employment.
The questions for the ﬁrst (2.3 - 2.20) and last employment (2.22 - 2.39) are similar
and they ask the timing at which the employment was started, the name and address
of the ﬁrm, the function performed within that ﬁrm and the sector the ﬁrm is mainly
working in. In the pilot, we had tried closed questions for the sector, but it turned
out not to be useful as most employees were unable to properly assign the ﬁrm into
its sector. Hence an open question is asked which together with the name of the ﬁrm
allows the investigation of the core activity that this ﬁrm is engaged in. We also ask
about the size of the ﬁrm and the type of contract under which a worker is employed.
Furthermore, we ask the number of subordinates, and to give a subjective assessment
of their level of responsibility in comparison to their job at Fokker. We also ask about
necessary technical know-how and job experience as well as an estimate of the time (of
on the job training or schooling) needed for a worker with comparable education to take
over this position. Finally, we ask starting and ﬁnal (current) salary and the number of
hours worked. If a respondent indicates that he has stopped working for the employer
we ask the date that the employment was terminated and a reason for termination.
12Tunnelling and telescoping refer to remembering an event to be earlier or more recent depending on
the saliency of an event.
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Self Employment
Those workers that indicated that they were self-employed (possibly even besides other
employment) were asked a set of questions (2.40 - 2.46) on the type of company they own,
the income they earn from the company and how long they have been self-employed.
The last is important as the Dutch (UI) law allows workers to continue working in
self-employment up to the hours they have worked while they were employed without
deductions on UI beneﬁts.
Demographics
In the last section of the questionnaire we ask the respondent some demographic infor-
mation. This is usually considered to be somewhat boring or possibly irrelevant for the
purpose of the study by the respondents. Therefore, respondents might get discouraged
if these questions are asked up front and cease prematurely.
We ask questions on education levels obtained as well as possible additional training
followed by the respondent after the displacement (3.1 - 3.6). We also ask about possible
schooling measures provided by for example the unemployment agencies (3.7). Beyond
the education and training we ask about the number and age of children, the current
marital status (and the date of the last change), as well as the income of any partner (3.8
- 3.11). Furthermore we ask whether the respondent owns or rents his or her house (3.12).
Both this question and the information on the income of the partner can approximate
the wealth of the household.
Open or Remarks Section
At the end of the survey we allowed four lines as an open comments section which could
be ﬁlled in by the respondents to provide us with comments and further remarks. This
is usual practice as it helps the respondents in completing the survey to give the ‘full
picture’ hence it probably increases the response rate of otherwise discouraged respon-
dents who feel that we only asked the ‘wrong’ questions. It is astonishing how much and
how diverse the answers on this open part were. Ranging from short comments to full
stories that went well beyond the four lines provided. Unfortunately, these comments
could only be used incidentally for clariﬁcation and a wealth of information and emotion
remains hidden in the answers of this last question.
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5.2 Conduct
The ﬁnal questionnaire13 was sent in April 1999 to all 5506 former employees of Fokker
N.V. together with a letter of explanation and a pre-paid addressed return envelope
(ﬁrst round).14 In June 1999, a reminder letter was sent to those employees who had not
returned their completed questionnaires together with a copy of the questionnaire, and
a pre-paid addressed return envelope (second round). Completed questionnaires were
returned up till November 1999 and were processed in three batches: May, August and
December 1999. Data Entry was performed by a specialized company that coded all
closed and most of the open questions according to our criterion. A validity check was
performed for variables that could be pre-categorized (for example Age was only allowed
to range between 16 and 65).
Incentives
As mentioned before, we did not provide any up-front incentive nor did we oﬀer any
payment for the time it took the respondent to ﬁll in the survey. We did, however, oﬀer
the respondent a report on the results of the survey – if they indicated their interest to
receive it. The motivation to ﬁll in the survey hinged therefore on the sense of duty of
the individual respondent to ﬁll in and return the survey, appealing to his group feeling
toward their fellow Fokker employers. But also by being able to “tell ones story” to help
research in the ﬁeld of displacement in order to aid future victims of plant closures.
5.2.1 Response and Non-Response
For our research it is important to address the non-response issue in a way to ensure
that the results of the survey are reliable, veriﬁable, and representative of the whole
population. In case any of these prerequisites are at stake and to avoid the introduction
of bias, insight into non-response is very important. Non-response could be the result of
the contents of the questionnaire. In this case it would imply that the responses obtained
from those who did return completed questionnaires might not be representative of the
population as a whole. The worst case scenario for non-response bias would comprise
results that cannot be extrapolated to the full population. Another disturbing although
less notable eﬀect could be uncertainty about the precision of the results.
13The full questionnaire as well as the accompanying letter used in the ‘Fokker Survey’ can be found
in the Appendix.
14These were all workers of the bankruptcy, 5644, minus those of the pilot, 138.
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Non-response is the failure to solicit proper responses to the survey, or in the case of
item non-response to single questions. Given the fact that we have conducted a mail
survey we cannot distinguish between general classes of non-response, as for example
not-at-home, temporarily unavailable, refusal or unobtainable, incapacitated (due to for
example illness), not found, and lost as proposed by Kish (1965, p. 533-534). Most, if
not all of the above categories will be noted in a mail survey simply by the absence of
a response. We have only received a few return mails with wrong addresses, or outright
refusals. We therefore encompass all these categories in the broader category of non-
response.
Non-Response Bias
How does non-response inﬂuence the results? This can be seen by examining the eﬀect
of non-response on a simple statistic as for example the mean. Imagine the situation as
given in the table below:
Stratum Size Total Mean Variance
Respondents NR tR ˜ YRu s2
R
Non-respondents NM tM ˜ YMu s2
M
Entire Population N t ˜ Yu s2
The total population consists of NR – the ‘willing’ respondents – and NM the non-








and the estimated population mean based on the respondents only:
E[˜ yR] − ˜ yu =
NM
N
YMu(˜ YRu − ˜ YMu)
Hence the bias is small if
NM
N is small, that is if the non-response is small, or if the
diﬀerence between the mean of the respondents, i.e. ˜ YRu − ˜ YMu is small, so that both
groups are similar.
Factors Aﬀecting Non-Response
Lohr (1990) notes that the following factors can inﬂuence the response rate:
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• Survey content
• Time of survey




• Incentives and disincentives
• Follow-up
There are several theories and models that attempt to explain survey non-response.
Groves and Couper (1998) give an overview of both rational choice theory versus psycho-
logical explanations. One prominent theory is called the ‘opportunity cost hypothesis’.
It expects that, ceteris paribus, respondents with higher time valuation will be less
willing to contribute to a survey (Groves and Couper 1998, p.123-125). However, it is
unclear how respondents ‘value’ the participation in the survey in this model. Under
the heading of ‘exchange’ two extensions to the rational choice model of response are
made: The ﬁrst is based on social exchange theories, while the second is based on social
isolation. Social exchange deals with the value of long-term relations between persons
(c.f. (Blau 1964)). They are used as an explanation model why the building of a re-
lationship before the actual survey is important (pre-announcement, cover letter), and
why the eﬀort during the survey (re-mailings), have an eﬀect on the perceived duty of
the respondent to answer (the exchange). The theory of ‘social isolation’ postulates
that a “group feeling” of a respondent is necessary. Hence, respondents are likely to
respond to survey request which conform to their (perceived) group interests (Groves
and Couper 1998, p. 131).
We have tried to take all these insights into account and also tried to limit the survey
to 30 minutes. We introduced the study and the usefulness of the study with an intro-
ductory letter as well as a letter of support from the bankruptcy trustees. Furthermore,
we gained the support of the assocation of former Fokker employees who preannounced
our survey and stressed the usefulness. In the questionnaire design we made every at-
tempt to keep the subject matter clear, interesting and as unobstrusive as possible. Yet,
non-response remains an issue also in our study as we will see in the following section.
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5.2.2 Non-Response in the Fokker Survey
The best method to avoid the introduction of non-response bias is to avoid it altogether.
However, in most studies this is not feasible. The Fokker-Survey has a response rate of
41.5 %, a high rate considering the fact that this was a mailed survey with no monetary
incentives oﬀered to the respondents for a response. General settings and cultural visions
of surveyed populations play an important role in response behaviour. In the Netherlands
the response rates for surveys are traditionally low which require estimations of the
magnitude and direction of the non-response bias.
We employ two diﬀerent techniques for our investigation in the non-response of the
‘Fokker Survey’: a ﬁrst test is to ﬁnd predictors for non-response given the information
we have compiled on respondents and non-respondents together. A second test is to do
a follow-up among a sub-sample of the non-respondents. For this a follow-up telephone
survey was conducted among non-respondents with the aim to identify some key vari-
ables for this research and to ask “core questions”.
Testing for Non-Response
The ﬁrst test into non-response examines the eﬀects of known variables of both respon-
dents and non-respondents on the probability of response. Rubin (1987) categorizes
data to be missing completely at random (MCAR), missing at random (MAR) and non-
ignorable non-response (NIN). The diﬀerence between MCAR and MAR is that data is
missing depending on some external variables, or mathematically:
E(Y |X) = E(Y )
E(Y |X) = Prob(r = 1|X) · E(Yr=1) + (1 − Prob(r = 1|X) · E(Yr=0)
In the second equation the outcome variable Y is aﬀected by the non-response only
through the diﬀerence in composition (of the explanatory variable X) between the re-
sponse and non-response variables. Correcting for the diﬀerences in composition can
realign outcomes to those of surveys without non-response. We have used a simple
Probit including variables from the personnel ﬁles to examine in which variables the
respondents diﬀer from the non-respondents. Having predicted a probability of survey
response, it allowed us to post-stratify the sample outcomes with the inverse of the
individual’s response probability.
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In explaining non-response we included the following variables: age in seven cate-
gories, starting with a category of less than 30 years old to go in steps of ﬁve years to
the last category 55 and older. The base category left out is 35-39 years old, the biggest
category. Tenure at Fokker is also identiﬁed by a set of 8 categories allowing for possible
diﬀerences between diﬀerent workers vintages. Starting with 3 years or less, then 3-4
years of tenure, to then continue in steps of ﬁve years until 30 or more years of tenure.
Here the tenure category of 5 to 9 years is the predominant category, and is taken as the
baseline category. The education variable is identiﬁed in nine categories which represent
diﬀerent degrees. We distinguish between four degrees of general schooling, basic, inter-
mediate general (MAVO), higher-general (HAVO), and pre-university school (VWO), as
well as ﬁve specialized degrees, lower vocational (LBO/LTS), intermediate vocational
(MBO), higher vocational (HBO), technical university (TU) and non-technical univer-
sity (WO). We use the largest group, intermediate vocational degree (MBO), as reference
group. The data-set comprises workers from three plants: Schiphol, the largest plant and
head-oﬃce, Drechtsteden, and Ypenburg. We control for diﬀerences among plants and
possible regional diﬀerences by including dummy variables for Drechtsteden as well as
for Ypenburg. We also include the wage scale of a worker at the time of the bankruptcy.
Wage scales run from 2, the lowest level, to scale 19, the highest level. Production work-
ers are in the wage scales from 2 to 12, while engineers and management start around
scale 12 and go on up to scale 19.
From the personnel ﬁles an indication of the general work activity of a speciﬁc function
can be derived. Jobs in production, production planning and support, quality control,
R&D, as well as management and ﬁnance, sales, and administration are being distin-
guished. Careers can encompass several of the job activities. However, movements in
and out speciﬁc job activities are not so frequent. For this chapter we used dummies
to identify the last job activities an employee performed. The information carried by
the job activity variable allows us to distinguish between work that requires a relatively
large degree of ﬁrm speciﬁc knowledge – a good example is quality control or R&D who
are speciﬁc to the aircraft built but also to the aircraft industry as a whole — and work
that needs more general skills such as management tasks, administration and sales.
Job performance evaluation scores on a scale from one to six (one being unsatisfactory
and six being excellent) are also included as dummy variables in the following way: the
predominant group with a score three, ‘good’, are left out as the reference group. Workers
oﬀered a new job at Fokker Aviation were identiﬁed by a dummy. Two additional
dummies identify female and another, married workers.
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Table 5.2: Probit Non-Response
Non-Response=1 Coeﬀ. s.d. p
Age: ≥ 55 0.544 0.137 0.025
Tenure: 25-29 -0.262 0.087 0.003
Tenure: ≥30 -0.328 0.106 0.002
Evaluation: unsatisfactory 0.381 0.146 0.009
Married -0.145 0.040 0.000
Female -0.163 0.082 0.047
Job Activity: R&D 0.165 0.083 0.046
Job Activity: Production Planning 0.175 0.082 0.032
Salary-scale: 9 -0.151 0.073 0.040
Salary-scale: 10 -0.299 0.097 0.002
Salary-scale: 11 -0.300 0.121 0.013
Aviation 0.150 0.070 0.031
Observations 5316
Notes: Based on the ‘Fokker Survey’ and the Personnel Files. Probit estimates the probability
of non-response (1) versus response (0). We report only those variables that are signiﬁcant at
a minimum level of 95 percent level. We corrected for plants, blue collar, female, tenure and
age categories, education levels, evaluation scores, fte, travel distance, salary scales [2 (lowest)
- 19 (highest)] and area of job activity.
Table 5.2 shows only those variables that entered the probability model that are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Workers older than 55 have a higher propensity to not
respond; high tenure worker have a lower propensity; workers in salary scale 9 to 11 have
higher propensities to respond – those are predominantly production workers who are
either team or group leaders; married workers are more likely to respond; workers selected
for Aviation respond less; employees in research and development, and planning are less
likely to respond than respondents who worked in the administration (the reference
group); workers with the lowest evaluation scores have a smaller likelihood to respond,
whereas the highest scores have higher response propensities compared to the middle
reference group.
Weighting Methods for Nonresponse
As mentioned above, if we have MAR non-response, the bias is due to a compositional
eﬀect of the respondents. This composition of, X, can be reestablished by ﬁrst estimating
the inﬂuence of X on non-response and to then weight the respondents according to their
response probability. The probability of responding, θi is estimated for each unit in the
sample using auxiliary information known for all units in the sample. The weight of a
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response is then given by 1
ˆ θi. Weighting methods assume that the response probabilities
can be estimated from variables known for all units (cf. Oh and Scheuren, 1983; Holt
and Elliot, 1991).
As reported above, we predicted a probability of response to the survey and weighted
every observation of the survey with the inverse of their response probability. In essence
we post-stratiﬁed our respondents according to their response probability, hence respon-
dents with a low probability of response are weighted heavier since they represent a
‘larger’ group of non-respondents. We employed both weighted and unweighted sam-
ples to estimate simple wage loss regressions as in chapter 7. The weighted sample is
then weighted according to the inverse of the response-probability. Since the weighted
estimations do not diﬀer much from the unweighted estimations, and given the results
from the non-response follow up in the sections below, we ignore the non-response for
the remainder of the estimations in this thesis.
‘Core Question’ Follow Up
Follow up within the group of non-respondents is not a new concept. Hansen and
Hurwitz (1958) and Hansen et al (1953) suggested to complete two identical surveys
using diﬀerent modes. The idea of asking a limited number of core questions for a follow
up, is initially suggested by Bethlehem and Kersten (1986) as a method to distinguish
between the group of non-respondents who are simply unwilling to provide the detailed
answers asked for in general or speciﬁc surveys, and those unwilling to participate for
reasons related to the survey speciﬁcally.
To learn about possible non-random selection a limited number of core questions were
asked to initial non-respondents by means of telephone interviews. Those responses can
then be used to correct for selectivity bias when necessary. In our case it is unlikely that
we would have solicited co-operation from all individuals that had not responded so far.
But, given the information we already had about the respondents and non-respondents
the core questions should be suﬃcient for identifying non-response bias. The questions
are ranked in order of our expectation that a respondent will refuse to answer and the
signiﬁcance for the study at hand. We asked the following questions:
1. What is your current employment status?
2. For how many months have you been unemployed after the bankruptcy?
3. Is your current salary higher or lower than the income you earned at Fokker?
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4. Please specify by how much percent your current salary diﬀers from the last salary
you earned at Fokker?
The ﬁrst question allows us to derive response behavior and estimate the non-response
bias based on the current employment status of the non-respondent.15 The second
question relates to one of the main objectives of the study that is to capture losses
encountered by the displaced workers. The third and fourth question simply reﬁne
insights with respect to post-displacement earnings.
Follow-up Sampling
The follow-up part of the study was carried out among a randomly selected, stratiﬁed
sample of 200 non-respondents, 53 of whom were selected for Fokker Aviation or to
work for the trustees. Stratiﬁcation was done by age for former employees of Fokker
N.V. who were and were not selected for Fokker Aviation B.V. We have a small pro-
portion of workers who were known to have had a job-oﬀer from Fokker Aviation B.V.
or from the Bankruptcy Trustee for at least some pre-determined time following the
bankruptcy of Fokker N.V. We did not presume those selected workers to be compara-
ble to displaced workers in general since it can be expected that their post-bankruptcy
career development is diﬀerent from those who were ﬁred immediately after bankruptcy,
and faced at least initial unemployment.
In order to allow for an analysis according to age groups, we stratiﬁed age over four
categories. Under 30 years old, 30-39 years, 40-49, and 50+ years of age at the time of
the bankruptcy. The allocation of the population of 200 was then derived using optimal
allocation,16 in which the aim is to minimize the (expected) variance of the variable of
interest, which here is employment status. If we denote the age strata by h then the







Where N is the total population, S denotes the standard deviation, and W denotes
the weight of a stratum, which is deﬁned as Wh = Nh/N. All suﬃxes h denote that
15An aggregate outcome of the follow up was calculated given the original stratiﬁcation weights of the
population.
16The actual minimization was done over the workers that were displaced (147) since they always had
variation over the core variable, selected workers (53) were assigned proportionally to the displaced
group. We deﬁned employment status to be “working” (employed or self-employed) or “not-working”,
which was used as variable for the optimal allocation.
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the weight, standard deviation or population is over a speciﬁc age-stratum. Since the
standard deviation of the stratum is unknown, we use the standard deviation of the
stratum of the respondents. This is the best information available and commonly used
















These formulas are derived in Kish (1965, Chapters 3 and 4). Note though, that we
cannot get the optimal allocation directly, as the result to the optimal allocation problem
is usually not an integer. Therefore the values are simply rounded up or down.
Once this optimal allocation is done we have stratiﬁed once more, this time proportion-
ally over workers that were oﬀered a job in Fokker Aviation B.V. or were (temporarily)
employed by the bankruptcy trustees. This is done because we do not want to assume
a priori that the workers who were oﬀered a job will behave the same way to the mail
survey. One could argue that the employed respondents (and non-respondents) who
were displaced are similar in the response behavior to the Aviation workers. However,
it becomes less clear if we want to estimate the unemployment of the Aviation workers
— who initially got year contracts — given the response behavior of the unemployed
displaced workers.
We did not use the optimal allocation over the completely stratiﬁed sample for two
reasons: ﬁrst of all the estimation that we have of the standard deviation of the aviation
workers is based on the responses we had from that group. Within a stratiﬁcation over
age-groups some strata had no unemployed at all, hence the standard deviation is zero.
Optimal allocation would then assign too little observations to this stratum. Instead
we ﬁrst made strata according to the age-groups and simply use the overall standard
deviation per age strata to calculate the optimum allocation and subsequently the sample
size is split according to size of displaced workers to workers at Aviation representing
the relative proportion to each other.
Results of the Non-Respondents Follow-Up
We have been able to get a high rate of co-operation that can be seen in the high response
rate of almost 85% on average.17 This has been achieved with a minimum of three re-
calls at diﬀerent time periods if the respondent was not reached. We have also accepted
answers from the spouse of the respondents since they should also have the information
17Compare table 5.4 for a full overview of the response by stratum.
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Table 5.3: Employment Status in 1999 – Response vs. Non-Response





Notes: Based on the ‘Fokker Survey’ and Non-Response Study. Non-response results are
weighted (cf. table 5.7)
to answer the questions correctly.18 Only ﬁve percent of the respondents selected for the
follow up refused to co-operate altogether. This, together with diﬃculties in reaching
some respondents explains the remaining non-response in the follow-up study.
The percentage distribution of respondents over employment status can be found in
Table 5.3, and more detailed in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 for respectively the non-response
study and the ‘Fokker Survey’ respondents. Note though, that the non-response study
actually covers the labor market status in February 2000 rather than March 1999 which
the ‘Fokker Survey’ covers. Note also that the Categories ‘Disability’ and ‘Pension’
did not exist in the ‘Fokker Survey’, hence those categories should be in the “Other”
category. Examining the outcome by strata we can see that the non-response survey
and ‘Fokker Survey’ do not deviate too much. The only striking diﬀerences are a higher
unemployment percentage for the 40-49 year old displaced workers in the Non-Response
study versus the ‘Fokker Survey’ (8.11 percent versus 5.30 percent). Furthermore, the
category 50+ also has a much lower employment percentage, but that is due to a high
percentage of respondents in the “Pension” category.
An aggregate outcome of the follow up was calculated given the original weights of the
stratiﬁcation. As has been mentioned in the main text, the distribution over the main
categories; Employed, Unemployed, Self-Employed, and the remaining are encompassed
under “other” category. As can be seen in tables 5.3 and 5.7 the results from the
non-response follow-up show that the labor market status is comparable both for the
respondents and non-respondents.
5.3 Conclusion
After obtaining the personnel ﬁles and investigating the possibilities for a displacement
study based on both the internal ﬁrm data and the experiences of workers after the
18This is common practice in surveys.
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Table 5.4: Weights and response rate – Non-Response Study
Age-Group Strata-weight Response Allocated Response Rate
% N n %
< 30 9.37 10 13 76.92
30-39 31.46 38 42 90.48
40-49 22.35 37 45 82.22
50+ 12.73 35 47 74.47
< 30 & Aviation 2.54 4 5 80.00
30-39 & Aviation 11.54 13 15 86.67
40-49 & Aviation 7.99 16 16 100
50+ & Aviation 2.02 16 17 94.12
Total 100 169 200 84.50
Table 5.5: Percentages by Strata – Non-Response Study
Age-Group Employed Unemployed Disability Self-Empl. Pension Other
Displaced
< 30 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
30-39 94.74 0.00 2.63 2.63 0.00 0.00
40-49 75.68 8.11 8.11 5.41 0.00 2.70
50+ 37.14 14.29 2.86 2.86 40.00 2.86
Aviation
< 30 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
30-39 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
40-49 93.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.25
50+ 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 5.6: Percentages by Strata – Respondents ‘Fokker Survey’
Age-Group Employed Unemployed Disability Self-Empl. Pension Other
Displaced
< 30 95.88 2.06 . 1.55 . 0.52
30-39 94.07 0.94 . 3.37 . 1.62
40-49 88.92 5.30 . 3.37 . 2.41
50+ 63.03 27.49 . 1.90 . 7.58
Aviation
< 30 100.00 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00
30-39 99.45 0.00 . 0.55 . 0.00
40-49 97.86 0.00 . 1.43 . 0.71
50+ 94.44 2.78 . 2.78 . 0.00
bankruptcy, we developed a survey among those workers that were directly aﬀected by
the bankruptcy procedure.
While the ﬁnal questionnaire comprised 14 pages we were fortunate to get a high
response rate. Nevertheless, the possibility of non-response bias threatened to diminish
possibly interesting results from this study. Therefore, we went into detail in order to
examine any possible non-response bias. To summarize the non-response section for the
‘Fokker Survey’, we can state that we did not ﬁnd that response behavior is aﬀected by
age nor is it aﬀected by whether or not respondents continued employment with Fokker
Aviation B.V. The results from the follow-up also show that a possible eﬀect of non-
response bias in the ‘Fokker Survey’ is probably not associated with employment status
(cf. Table 5.3).
125Table 5.7: Outcomes – Non-response Study
Age-group Strata-weight Employed Unemployed Disability Self-Employed Retirement Other
Pension Pension2
Displaced workers
< 30 9.37 10 0 0 0 0 0
30-39 31.46 36 0 1 1 0 0
40-49 22.35 28 3 3 2 0 1
50+ 12.73 13 5 1 1 14 1
Fokker Aviation B.V.
< 30 2.54 4 0 0 0 0 0
30-39 11.54 13 0 0 0 0 0
40-49 7.99 15 0 0 0 0 1
50+ 2.02 16 0 0 0 0 0
Total (percentage) 100 80.84 4.54 3.86 3.08 6.19 1.49
: Notes: 1 Work disabled persons who receive a disability pension or beneﬁt (WAO)
2 Persons in the Netherlands can retire at the age of 65 years (AOW) or at a younger age using early retirement schemes(VUT).6 Some Results of the Fokker Survey
“Investeren in persoonlijke en bedrijf-gerelateerde netwerken leidt tot een
aanzienlijk beter perspectief op het vinden van een baan dan Centra voor
Werk en Inkomen kunnen bieden.”
(Fokker Employee)
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There are two basic questions answered within the displacement literature. First, how
long does it take to ﬁnd a new job, or which groups encounter diﬃculties in ﬁnding new
jobs. And second, what are the wages after displacement. Is there a break in the wage
development around displacement, what constitutes wage losses, and how long does it
take to catch up. A natural continuation is an investigation in what factors aﬀect both
of these outcomes. In this chapter we will look at the entire data from the survey, to
broadly examine the above two questions. The labor market status and developments in
employment of the respondents to the Fokker Survey are taken in to consideration at one,
two, and three years after the bankruptcy to examine the duration that the displacement
has on the workers with respect to their labor market status. Further, we also investigate
the average wage outcome for those that ﬁnd a job. We will compare unemployed and
employed respondents by age and education level. To relate the ﬁndings for the displaced
workers to the general situation on the Dutch labor market, comparisons are made with
a ‘matched’ sample from Socio-Economic Panel (SEP) data .
6.1 Labor Market Status
Method
The respondents are categorized by age and educational level. The study distinguishes
seven age groups: the ﬁrst includes all respondents under the age of 30 years. The
second through sixth group include ages at 5-year intervals: 30 - 35, 35 - 40, 40 - 45, 45
- 50, 50 - 55 years of age respectively. The seventh group includes all respondents over
the age of 55 years.
Educational levels are assorted by diﬀerentiating between general (secondary school)
education and vocational or professional training. The ﬁrst group includes lower and
higher general secondary school, and pre-university education: respectively MAVO —
including MULO and ULO —, HAVO — including MMS —, and VWO — including HBS
or gymnasium. The second group consists of those who have received lower general or
lower technical vocational training (LBO or LTS respectively), intermediate and higher
vocational training (MBO or HBO respectively), or university training (WO or TU).
The diﬀerentiation between WO and TU can be used as a proxy for a technical study,
since workers with a TU degree — having completed a degree at a technical university
— are more likely to also have followed a technical study than workers with a degree
from a non-technical university.
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Table 6.1: Education Levels - Fokker Survey vs. ‘matched’ SEP
Fokker Survey SEP
Education N % N %
Basis 26 1.14 . .
MAVO 156 6.85 156 7.11
HAVO 53 2.33 53 2.41
VWO 42 1.84 42 1.91
LBO/LTS 382 16.77 382 17.40
MBO 645 28.31 645 29.38
HBO 586 25.72 583 26.56
WO 124 5.44 303 13.80
TU 264 11.59 31 1.41
Total 2278 100.00 2195 100.00
The distribution of labor market statuses is compared to the ‘matched’ SEP data.
When comparing the consequences of displacement of former Fokker N.V. employees
it is necessary to place the outcomes of the survey in a broader perspective, thus, a
comparison needs to be made with a representative sample of the Dutch labor market
situation at approximately the time of bankruptcy. For this purpose the data of the
Socio-Economic Panel (SEP) of Statistics Netherlands (Central Bureau of Statistics,
CBS) were used. The SEP was initiated in 1984 to collect information on the well being
and income of individuals and households in the Netherlands. It includes variables on
demographics, education, work-situation, income, living, consumption and wealth. The
data are household based, representative of the Dutch population, and includes variables
comparable to those in the current study. For comparison a sub-sample of the latest
complete sample of SEP data from 1996 was used.
The SEP sample constitutes of the labor market participants, with an age range
between 20 and 65 years old. From this sample a smaller sub-sample was selected by
matching it according to the educational levels and age-categories of the former Fokker
employees whom had given their response to the survey questionnaire. By matching
we avoid any problems concerning composition eﬀects due to age or education when
comparing the results from the Fokker Survey to those of the matched sample of the
Socio-economic panel. This sub-sample, called the ‘matched’ SEP sample, was chosen
for optimal representation of the population of displaced Fokker workers. The ‘matched’
SEP sample shows the situation for the Dutch economy given that they have an age and
educational level distribution comparable to Fokker N.V. employees at the time of the
bankruptcy.
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Table 6.2: Age Categories – Fokker Survey vs. ‘matched’ SEP
Age Fokker Survey ‘matched’ SEP
Categories N % N %
< 30 year 240 10.53 262 11.94
30-34 year 449 19.70 416 18.95
35-39 year 494 21.68 457 20.82
40-44 year 406 17.81 397 18.09
45-49 year 384 16.85 384 17.49
50-54 year 252 11.06 226 10.30
55+ year 54 2.37 53 2.41
Total 2279 100.00 2195 100.00
Distributions of educational level and age in both among the respondents of the Fokker
Survey as well as the ‘matched’ SEP sample have been provided in Tables 6.1 and
6.2 respectively. It should be noted that the SEP data represents the status in the
Netherlands in 1996 while the Fokker Survey covers the years 1997, 1998, and 1999.
This means that the SEP data should actually be regarded as representative of workers
who were not displaced, hence giving a reference point in time. The former Fokker
employees who were surveyed were ﬁred in the large bankruptcy and will have to reorient
themselves on the labor market. This can be expected to take some time until a ‘normal’
situation is regained.
A second analysis is performed to examine the development with regard to labor
market status over time. Since there are three points of observation for the labor market
status (1997, 1998, and 1999) it is possible to study how the change between categories
is evolving over the three years. For example, it can be expected that immediately after
the bankruptcy many people were unemployed. Slowly but increasingly the majority of
former Fokker N.V. employees ﬁnd new jobs thus gradually changing the labor market
status from unemployed in 1997 to employed in 1999.
In the matching procedure for the SEP sample no distinction is made between WO
or TU university degree holders. TU degree holders are heavily represented among the
former employees of a ﬁrm such as Fokker N.V., but they are not so heavily represented
in the socio-economic panels of the Dutch economy as a whole.
Those employees who do not classify themselves as unemployed because they have ei-
ther started their own business (self-employment), are structurally involved in voluntary
activities or other types of unpaid work, receive work disability pensions or have retired
since bankruptcy are excluded from the analysis.
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Table 6.3: Labor Market Status — Aggregated
a. Fokker Survey Status
Status 1997 1998 1999
N % N % N %
Working 1758 77.1 1882 82.6 1934 84.9
Self-employed 43 1.9 51 2.2 57 2.5
Unemployed 226 9.9 142 6.2 97 4.3
Other 85 3.7 54 2.4 50 2.2
Missing 167 7.3 150 6.6 141 6.2
Total 2279 100.0 2279 100.0 2279 100.0
b. ‘matched’ SEP sample







Notes: Categories 1997, 1998, and 1999 are based on the status in April of that year. The
‘matched’ SEP sample contains the a sub-sample, randomly drawn from the labor force
sample of the 1996 SEP wave, matching the representation of the respondents of the “Fokker
Survey” with respect to age-categories and educational levels.
The data from the SEP sample distinguishes between four categories of employment
status: working, self-employed, unemployed, and other. The category “unemployed”
captures those workers who are not working. This group includes persons taking (full-
time) courses or persons on temporary (long-term) sickness leave. The Fokker Survey
includes a ﬁfth category “niet ingevuld” which denotes workers who ﬁlled in the survey
questionnaire but skipped this section for unknown reasons. As this does not necessarily
mean that they are not working or are engaged in activities as deﬁned as “other” they
cannot be included under “unemployed” or “other” so therefore they are considered as
a separate group.
Labor Market Status — The Aggregate View
An overview of the aggregate distribution over the diﬀerent labor market statuses of a
cross-section of former employees of Fokker N.V. at one, two and three years following
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the bankruptcy and of the SEP data are given in Table 6.3. The labor market situation
in the Netherlands in 1996 is reﬂected in the ‘matched’ SEP sample (Table 6.3.b). As
shown, approximately 86.1 percent of the labor force are employed, about 7.5 percent
are self-employed, and 5.5 percent are unemployed.
The situation in 1997 is that 77.1 percent is employed, 1.9 percent is self-employed,
while 9.9 percent are unemployed. 3.7 percent are in the category not employed, which
could mean that they e.g. follow courses (see above). Comparing this to the Dutch
situation, as described by the SEP data, one can conclude a much higher rate of un-
employment — almost double that of the SEP ﬁgure. Also the category “other” is
signiﬁcantly higher, 3.7 percent in the Fokker case versus 0.9 percent in the matched
SEP data. It is not surprising, though, that the rate of self-employed is much lower in
the case of former Fokker-employees. Most of the self-employed in the SEP data did also
not start a new business within the last year; they were already self-employed already for
many years. Fokker employees can only become full-time self-employed if they started
their private company after the bankruptcy.
If we look at the development in 1998 and 1999 we can see that the number of people
ﬁnding employment is increasing. There are also more people self-employed than in
1997. In percentages the employment rate increases to 84.9 percent in the year 1999,
and this is due to a ﬂow from people out of unemployment — which is reduced from 9.9
percent in 1997, through 6.2 percent in 1998, to a level of 4.3 percent in 1999. But also
the number of people of the category “not employed” is decreasing from 3.7 percent,
through 2.4 percent in 1998, to 2.2 percent in 1999. Note that these percentages are
again calculated taking into account that between 6.2 (in 1999) and 7.3 (in 1996) percent
of the respondents did not complete this part of the survey.
Labor Market Status by Age and Educational Levels
In this section the two groups of employed versus unemployed are examined more closely.
We diﬀerentiate by age-categories and by educational levels. As described in the methods
section, the age-categories will usually span a period of ﬁve years, and the educational
levels give the highest degree attained, either general (school) education or vocational
training and university degrees. As in the aggregate case there is also a comparison over
time, i.e. look at the situation one, two, and three years after the bankruptcy. There
is also a comparison to the ‘matched’ SEP sample representing the Dutch situation
matched for age and education composition.
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Educational Levels
The distribution of employed workers over the educational levels are presented in Figure
6.1 and Table 6.4. Tables 6.4 and 6.5 provided information on labor market status for
persons with diﬀerent educational backgrounds among the former Fokker N.V. employ-
ees as well as representatives in the ‘matched’ SEP sample. Figure 6.1 combines the
percentage distribution shown in Table 6.3 and the percentage distribution over edu-
cational levels of the respondents through consecutive years (1997, 1998, and 1999) as
given in Table 6.1.
In short, the ﬁrst bar — of sets of four — indicates the percentage of respondents
with speciﬁc educational background who have answered the survey — whether they
are employed or not — thus giving the distribution over the speciﬁed educational levels.
The following three bars show the percentage of all the employed workers during that
year given the speciﬁed educational level. For example, of workers with Basis, MAVO,
HAVO, VWO, LBO/LTS, MBO, HBO, WO, and TU educational background 1.14, 6.85,
2.33, 1.84, 16.77, 28.31, 25.72, 5.44, and 11.59 percent respectively returned a completed
questionnaire. The second bar shows that 0.85, 5.63, 2.22, 1.76, 15.30, 28.90, 27.02, 6.31,
and 12.00 percent respectively had found new employment in 1997. From the data in
Table 6.5 it is apparent that persons with only elementary education (“Basis”) as well
as those within the MAVO, HAVO, VWO and LBO/LTS category have reduced chances
or opportunity to ﬁnd new jobs compared to the average former Fokker N.V. employee.
Those with MBO, HBO, WO and TU have more opportunities on the labor market
compared to the average former Fokker N.V. employees as indicated by the increase in
height of their respective bars (as presented in Figure 6.1).
When compared to the SEP data the percentages for “employed” by education cate-
gory show the distribution of education degrees achieved over the employed labor force
in the Netherlands. Here the best comparison is the ‘matched’ SEP sample since we
would otherwise see only the diﬀerences between the educational levels of former Fokker
workers which is typically diﬀerent from the representative sample of the Dutch pop-
ulation. The ‘matched’ SEP sample also shows that the educational levels with lower
employment rates are in general those workers with degrees from general educational
levels (especially MAVO) and with lower vocational training such as LBO/LTS.
Table 6.5 gives the distribution of unemployed workers over educational levels. Due to
matching it is likely to ﬁnd the mirror image of the results from the distribution over the
employed workers. Figure 6.2 represents the percentage distribution of all unemployed
one, two, and three years after the bankruptcy. It should be noted the percentages are
135Table 6.4: Labor Market Status by Educational Levels — Employed
Highest educational level Survey 1997 1998 1999 ‘matched’ SEP
N % N % N % N % N %
Basis 26 1.14 15 0.85 10 0.53 11 0.57 . .
MAVO 156 6.85 99 5.63 116 6.16 121 6.26 118 6.24
HAVO 53 2.33 39 2.22 43 2.28 42 2.17 49 2.59
VWO 42 1.84 31 1.76 32 1.70 33 1.71 36 1.90
LBO/LTS 382 16.77 269 15.30 303 16.10 316 16.34 314 16.61
MBO 645 28.31 508 28.90 556 29.54 572 29.58 562 29.74
HBO 586 25.72 475 27.02 502 26.67 515 26.63 528 27.94
WO 124 5.44 111 6.31 107 5.69 106 5.48 256 13.54
TU 264 11.59 211 12.00 213 11.32 218 11.27 27 1.43
Total 2278 100.00 1758 100.00 1882 100.00 1934 100.00 1890 100.00Table 6.5: Labor Market Status by Education Levels — Unemployed
Highest educational level Survey 1997 1998 1999 ‘matched’ SEP
N % N % N % N % N %
Basis 26 1.14 6 2.67 10 7.09 6 6.25 . .
MAVO 156 6.85 21 9.33 13 9.22 7 7.29 23 19.01
HAVO 53 2.33 3 1.33 2 1.42 2 2.08 2 1.65
VWO 42 1.84 4 1.78 4 2.84 2 2.08 3 2.48
LBO/LTS 382 16.77 57 25.33 38 26.95 28 29.17 37 30.58
MBO 645 28.31 70 31.11 34 24.11 20 20.83 25 20.66
HBO 586 25.72 45 20.00 24 17.02 19 19.79 17 14.05
WO 124 5.44 4 1.78 6 4.26 4 4.17 13 10.74
TU 264 11.59 15 6.67 10 7.09 8 8.33 1 0.83
Total 2278 100.00 225 100.00 141 100.00 96 100.00 121 100.00Table 6.6: Number of Diﬀerent Employers by Education Level at 3 Years after the Bankruptcy
Education 1 2 3 4 >4 Total
N % N % N % N % N % N %
Basis 2 0.23 4 0.66 0 0.00 1 1.82 1 2.63 8 0.45
MAVO 54 6.10 31 5.12 9 4.59 8 14.55 3 7.89 105 5.90
HAVO 20 2.26 11 1.82 5 2.55 2 3.64 2 5.26 40 2.25
VWO 20 2.26 9 1.49 2 1.02 0 0.00 1 2.63 32 1.80
LBO/LTS 138 15.59 86 14.19 38 19.39 9 16.36 11 28.95 282 15.84
MBO 235 26.55 183 30.20 72 36.73 21 38.18 15 39.47 526 29.55
HBO 239 27.01 185 30.53 45 22.96 11 20.00 5 13.16 485 27.25
WO 68 7.68 26 4.29 8 4.08 0 0.00 0 0.00 102 5.73
TU 109 12.32 71 11.72 17 8.67 3 5.45 0 0.00 200 11.24
Total 885 100.0 606 100.0 196 100.0 55 100.0 38 100.0 1780 100.06.1 Labor Market Status
based on absolute numbers but these absolute numbers are decreasing over time (225
unemployed respondents in 1996 to 96 unemployed in 1999). Thus, the absolute number
of unemployed in 1999 is much smaller which means that the categories cells consist of
only few observations, which can lead to big percentage changes as the result of a single
switch between categories.
Table 6.6 gives the number of employers a worker had after displacement as a result
of the Fokker N.V. bankruptcy. Of interest are those workers that have paid working
positions three years after the bankruptcy. From the table it is apparent that so-called
“job-hopping” to ﬁnd new suitable work exists in all educational levels. This is not a
surprising ﬁnding since a displaced worker will aim to ﬁnd a new job, without necessarily
ﬁnding a good match initially. Alternatively, the available jobs are only temporary
positions. It is notable that workers with only school education (with the exception
of VWO) are more likely to go through several employers until they ﬁnd long-term
employment. This is also true for LBO/LTS, MBO. However, workers with HBO and
university degrees are more likely to have one, or at most two jobs post displacement,
indicating that they have fewer job changes.
Age Categories
A similar analysis can also be performed with age-categories. It could be expected that
the older displaced workers have more diﬃculties to ﬁnd new positions. Firms usually
prefer younger workers since they are cheaper in wages and stay longer with the hiring
ﬁrm. On the other hand, younger workers are more likely to change their employment
into a totally diﬀerent direction since they have not yet invested time in speciﬁc job
experience and skills.
From the results of the Fokker Survey it is apparent that these expectations can also
be found in the case of Fokker N.V: the higher age groups have more diﬃculties in
ﬁnding new jobs. In addition, the older workers have more time to search for suitable
employment since their unemployment beneﬁts are paid out over a longer period. We
compare the three annual observations to the general age distribution of the respondents
and also to the sample from the Socio-economic panel (SEP).
Both Figure 6.3 and Table 6.7 show clearly higher employment rates for younger
workers after the ﬁrst year following bankruptcy. This is true for all age-categories up
to 44 years old. Workers over 44 years of age are clearly underrepresented with regard
to employment relative to the distribution of the respondents: in the age category of
45-49 years, 11.06 percent of all respondents, 7.39 percent of the former Fokker N.V.
139Table 6.7: Age Categories — Employed Workers
Age Survey 1997 1998 1999 ‘matched’ SEP
N % N % N % N % N %
<30 years 240 10.53 215 12.23 225 11.96 226 11.69 225 11.90
30-34 years 449 19.70 381 21.67 405 21.52 411 21.25 370 19.58
35-39 years 494 21.68 433 24.63 448 23.80 453 23.42 399 21.11
40-44 years 406 17.81 312 17.75 350 18.60 357 18.46 332 17.57
45-49 years 384 16.85 267 15.19 307 16.31 322 16.65 336 17.78
50-54 years 252 11.06 130 7.39 130 6.91 148 7.65 183 9.68
55+ years 54 2.37 20 1.14 17 0.90 17 0.88 45 2.38
Total 2279 100.00 1758 100.00 1882 100.00 1934 100.00 1890 100.00Table 6.8: Age Categories — Unemployed Workers
Age Survey 1997 1998 1999 ‘matched’ SEP
N % N % N % N % N %
<30 years 240 10.53 8 3.54 1 0.70 3 3.09 16 13.22
30-34 years 449 19.70 18 7.96 5 3.52 2 2.06 18 14.88
35-39 years 494 21.68 18 7.96 11 7.75 4 4.12 29 23.97
40-44 years 406 17.81 42 18.58 19 13.38 12 12.37 21 17.36
45-49 years 384 16.85 59 26.11 30 21.13 18 18.56 19 15.70
50-54 years 252 11.06 73 32.30 68 47.89 48 49.48 18 14.88
55+ years 54 2.37 8 3.54 8 5.63 10 10.31 0 0.00
Total 2279 100.00 226 100.00 142 100.00 97 100.00 121 100.006 Some Results of the Fokker Survey
















employees are working one year after the bankruptcy. This clearly shows they are
underrepresented in the working population. This situation does not change much over
time: after three years former employees of Fokker N.V. in the age groups of 45 years
and older remain less represented among the former Fokker N.V. employees who do have
paid job. It is apparent that the older workers have more diﬃculties in ﬁnding new jobs
after displacement.
Similar ﬁndings come from comparison with the ‘matched’ SEP sample: the younger
former Fokker N.V. employees are over represented among those working while the older
are underrepresented. This does not imply that older workers become unemployed more
often but once unemployment is eminent it is much harder for persons within these age
groups (45 years and older) to ﬁnd new employment. This means that as a result of the
bankruptcy of Fokker N.V. the persons of 45 years and older have been hit much harder
than the younger workers.
142Table 6.9: Searching Time per Week — Employed in 1999
Education Hours searching per week
0 < 5 <10 <20 <40 40+ Total
N % N % N % N % N % N % N %
Basis 0 0.00 4 1.23 1 0.41 1 0.31 0 0.00 0 0.00 6 0.42
MAVO 13 5.96 23 7.06 24 9.84 17 5.26 13 4.53 0 0.00 90 6.37
HAVO 3 1.38 15 4.60 5 2.05 4 1.24 4 1.39 0 0.00 31 2.20
VWO 7 3.21 5 1.53 3 1.23 3 0.93 5 1.74 0 0.00 23 1.63
LBO/LTS 21 9.63 72 22.09 57 23.36 58 17.96 35 12.20 0 0.00 243 17.21
MBO 58 26.61 108 33.13 79 32.38 111 34.37 82 28.57 4 28.57 442 31.30
HBO 60 27.52 60 18.40 56 22.95 83 25.70 92 32.06 9 64.29 360 25.50
WO 17 7.80 16 4.91 5 2.05 16 4.95 13 4.53 0 0.00 67 4.75
TU 39 17.89 23 7.06 14 5.74 30 9.29 43 14.98 1 7.14 150 10.62
Total 218 100 326 100 244 100 323 100 287 100 14 100 1412 100Table 6.10: Searching Time per Week — Unemployed in 1999
Education Hours searching per week
0 < 5 <10 <20 <40 40+ Total
N % N % N % N % N % N % N %
Basis 0 0 1 4 1 4 2 8 1 9 0 0 5 6
MAVO 0 0 3 12 2 9 1 4 0 0 0 0 6 7
HAVO 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 1 9 0 0 2 2
VWO 1 100 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 2 2
LBO/LTS 0 0 10 38 8 35 7 27 2 18 0 0 27 31
MBO 0 0 4 15 6 26 7 27 2 18 0 0 19 22
HBO 0 0 5 19 3 13 4 15 3 27 1 100 16 18
WO 0 0 1 4 1 4 2 8 0 0 0 0 4 5
TU 0 0 2 8 1 4 2 8 2 18 0 0 7 8
Total 1 100 26 100 23 100 26 100 11 100 1 100 88 100Table 6.11: Number of Letters per Four Weeks — Employed in 1999
Number of application letters
0 1 <5 <10 <20 20+ Total
N % N % N % N % N % N % N %
Basis 1 0.40 0 0.00 2 0.45 4 1.09 2 0.87 2 0.39 11 0.58
MAVO 15 6.05 6 7.14 30 6.80 22 5.99 11 4.78 36 6.94 120 6.35
HAVO 3 1.21 2 2.38 13 2.95 5 1.36 5 2.17 12 2.31 40 2.12
VWO 6 2.42 1 1.19 9 2.04 3 0.82 3 1.30 11 2.12 33 1.75
LBO/LTS 28 11.29 12 14.29 91 20.63 80 21.80 29 12.61 71 13.68 311 16.46
MBO 65 26.21 25 29.76 139 31.52 132 35.97 67 29.13 129 24.86 557 29.49
HBO 69 27.82 24 28.57 96 21.77 85 23.16 75 32.61 150 28.90 499 26.42
WO 21 8.47 4 4.76 17 3.85 7 1.91 16 6.96 39 7.51 104 5.51
TU 40 16.13 10 11.90 44 9.98 29 7.90 22 9.57 69 13.29 214 11.33
Total 248 100.00 84 100.00 441 100.00 367 100.00 230 100.00 519 100.00 1889 100.00Table 6.12: Number of Letters per Four Weeks — Unemployed in 1999
Number of application letters
0 1 <5 <10 <20 20+ Total
N % N % N % N % N % N % N %
Basis 0 0.00 0 0.00 3 6.52 2 7.14 0 0.00 1 11.11 6 6.38
MAVO 0 0.00 0 0.00 4 8.70 2 7.14 0 0.00 1 11.11 7 7.45
HAVO 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 2.17 1 3.57 0 0.00 0 0.00 2 2.13
VWO 1 50.00 0 0.00 1 2.17 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 2 2.13
LBO/LTS 0 0.00 1 16.67 18 39.13 5 17.86 2 66.67 2 22.22 28 29.79
MBO 0 0.00 2 33.33 8 17.39 8 28.57 1 33.33 0 0.00 19 20.21
HBO 1 50.00 2 33.33 6 13.04 7 25.00 0 0.00 2 22.22 18 19.15
WO 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 2.17 2 7.14 0 0.00 1 11.11 4 4.26
TU 0 0.00 1 16.67 4 8.70 1 3.57 0 0.00 2 22.22 8 8.51
Total 2 100 6 100 46 100.0 28 100 3 100 9 100 94 1006.1 Labor Market Status
Searching for Work
The Fokker Survey included questions with regard to the amount of time per week spent
searching for a new position after bankruptcy, the number of letters written per month,
and the time period from bankruptcy until the ﬁrst job after displacement was accepted.
Table 6.9 gives an overview of searching time per educational level for persons employed
in 1999. The extreme value of “no hours” should be regarded with some caution as it may
indicate that the respondent got an immediate job oﬀer after displacement. Persons who
were deﬁnitely oﬀered a job immediately after bankruptcy are also part of this group.
From the table it is apparent that there is a slight tendency among respondents with
higher vocational training to spend more hours searching for new work. Persons with
lower vocational training and general school education are more evenly distributed over
the amount of time spent searching for a new job. Especially when comparing to the
group of workers who do not have a paid job three years after displacement (1999) no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence can be found. However, this last eﬀect can also be due to the small
cell-size of the latter group as there are only 352 unemployed respondents at that time
period which were distributed over 63 cells.
The other indicator of search input from the respondent is the number of letters
written per four weeks while unemployed. An overview of output has been given in
Table 6.11. Again, the category of “no letter” and “one letter” should be regarded
with some caution since these groups also represent persons who found employment
immediately upon their ﬁrst “job application interview”. Here, the number of letters
written increases with higher educational levels. This does not necessarily reﬂect a higher
search eﬀort of higher educational levels. It could also be an indication that this form
of written applications is more common among workers with higher education.
Help with Finding a New Position
After bankruptcy Fokker N.V. employees were oﬀered short training sessions to help
them orient on the labor market. The Fokker Survey included questions about two spe-
ciﬁc kinds of help: (1) training for job-applications and (2) help to get into contact with
potential employees. The respondents were asked to rank the usefulness of these training
schemes from “very helpful” (“veel geholpen”), to “not helpful” (“niet geholpen”) on a
4 point Likert-Scale. The outcomes are shown in Tables 6.13 and 6.14 and a distinction
has been made for people who had found a job after one, two and three years after the
bankruptcy, for both training options.
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Table 6.13: Evaluation of Training for Job-applications
Application Training
1997 1998 1999
N % N % N %
Very helpful 124 26.50 138 25.79 141 25.27
Helpful 252 53.85 288 53.83 298 53.41
Slightly helpful 64 13.68 76 14.21 86 15.41
Not helpful 28 5.98 33 6.17 33 5.91
Total 468 100 535 100 558 100
Table 6.14: Evaluation of Help in Contacting Potential Employers
Aid Contacting Potential Employers
1997 1998 1999
N % N % N %
Very helpful 54 19.35 59 18.50 64 19.05
Helpful 85 30.47 94 29.47 97 28.87
Slightly helpful 79 28.32 86 26.96 92 27.38
Not helpful 61 21.86 80 25.08 83 24.70
Total 279 100 319 100 336 100
148Table 6.15: Participation in (Re-)Training by Education Levels, Employed in 1997, 1998, 1999
Highest 1997 1998 1999
Education Yes No Yes No Yes No
N % N % N % N % N % N %
Basis 1 0.46 14 0.95 2 0.72 9 0.58 3 5.00 9 0.58
MAVO 11 5.09 84 5.71 16 5.76 98 6.30 3 5.00 98 6.30
HAVO 2 0.93 37 2.52 2 0.72 39 2.51 1 1.67 39 2.51
VWO 2 0.93 28 1.90 5 1.80 27 1.74 2 3.33 27 1.74
LBO/LTS 38 17.59 215 14.62 56 20.14 238 15.30 11 18.33 238 15.30
MBO 80 37.04 408 27.74 105 37.77 433 27.83 25 41.67 433 27.83
HBO 57 26.39 409 27.80 67 24.10 436 28.02 10 16.67 436 28.02
WO 5 2.31 104 7.07 5 1.80 99 6.36 2 3.33 99 6.36
TU 20 9.26 172 11.69 20 7.19 177 11.38 3 5.00 177 11.38
Total 216 100.00 1471 100.00 278 100.00 1556 100.00 60 100.00 1556 100.00Table 6.16: Participation in (Re-)Training by Education Levels — Unemployed in 1997, 1998, 1999
Highest 1997 1998 1999
Education Yes No Yes No Yes No
N % N % N % N % N % N %
Basis 3 5.00 3 1.90 2 6.67 7 6.67 1 10.00 5 6.17
MAVO 3 5.00 17 10.76 3 10.00 10 9.52 0 0.00 6 7.41
HAVO 1 1.67 2 1.27 1 3.33 1 0.95 0 0.00 2 2.47
VWO 2 3.33 2 1.27 0 0.00 4 3.81 0 0.00 2 2.47
LBO/LTS 11 18.33 44 27.85 5 16.67 32 30.48 1 10.00 26 32.10
MBO 25 41.67 43 27.22 9 30.00 23 21.90 3 30.00 16 19.75
HBO 10 16.67 34 21.52 6 20.00 17 16.19 4 40.00 14 17.28
WO 2 3.33 2 1.27 1 3.33 5 4.76 1 10.00 3 3.70
TU 3 5.00 11 6.96 3 10.00 6 5.71 0 0.00 7 8.64
Total 60 100.00 158 100.00 30 100.00 105 100.00 10 100.00 81 100.00Table 6.17: Participation in (Re-)Training by Age Levels — All Employed
1997 1998 1999
Age Yes No Yes No Yes No
N % N % N % N % N % N %
< 30 years 33 15.28 172 11.69 38 13.67 178 11.59 40 13.11 177 11.38
30-34 years 45 20.83 322 21.89 56 20.14 334 21.74 60 19.67 334 21.47
35-39 years 50 23.15 368 25.02 61 21.94 373 24.28 63 20.66 376 24.16
40-44 years 39 18.06 262 17.81 60 21.58 280 18.23 63 20.66 285 18.32
45-49 years 33 15.28 219 14.89 43 15.47 248 16.15 50 16.39 253 16.26
50-54 years 13 6.02 112 7.61 17 6.12 109 7.10 25 8.20 118 7.58
55+ years 3 1.39 16 1.09 3 1.08 14 0.91 4 1.31 13 0.84
Total 216 100.00 1471 100.00 278 100.00 1536 100.00 305 100.00 1556 100.00Table 6.18: Participation in (Re-)Training by Age Levels — All Unemployed
1997 1998 1999
Age Yes No Yes No Yes No
N % N % N % N % N % N %
< 30 years 3 5.00 5 3.14 0 0.00 1 0.94 0 0 3 4
30-34 years 5 8.33 11 6.92 2 6.67 3 2.83 0 0 2 2
35-39 years 7 11.67 11 6.92 3 10.00 8 7.55 0 0 4 5
40-44 years 13 21.67 28 17.61 4 13.33 13 12.26 2 20 8 10
45-49 years 14 23.33 42 26.42 7 23.33 22 20.75 3 30 14 17
50-54 years 15 25.00 57 35.85 12 40.00 53 50.00 3 30 43 52
55+ years 3 5.00 5 3.14 2 6.67 6 5.66 2 20 8 10
Total 60 100 159 100 30 100 106 100 10 100 82 1006.1 Labor Market Status
Table 6.19: Channels of Successful Job Search
Employment found in Year
1997 1998 1999
N % N % N %
Employment Oﬃce 89 5.9 104 6.4 111 6.6
Manpower Organization 186 12.2 219 13.4 235 14.0
Commercial Employment Oﬃces 49 3.2 53 3.2 55 3.3
Open solicitation 96 6.3 101 6.2 106 6.3
Speciﬁc solicitation 253 16.6 269 16.5 282 16.7
Former colleague from Fokker 151 9.9 160 9.8 162 9.6
Contacts from Fokker 199 13.1 199 12.2 205 12.2
Family 19 1.3 22 1.3 23 1.4
Friends 86 5.7 96 5.9 101 6.0
Other 392 25.8 412 25.2 404 24.0
Total 1520 100 1635 100 1684 100
The training for job-applications was valued higher than the help oﬀered with ﬁnding
new employers. One has to bear in mind that a positive evaluation of the worker does not
necessarily constitute an eﬀective training scheme. The positive experience may be the
result of feelings related to practical issues such as writing the curriculum vitae, letters
of application, and other application of the newly learned skills. Help in establishing
contact with potential employers, on the other hand, is usually evaluated in terms of
direct beneﬁt such as the oﬀer of a new job.
Another active labor market policy implemented for former employees of Fokker N.V.
is the training or retraining of the workers. The outcomes have been analyzed for work-
ing and unemployed respondents relative to educational levels (Tables 6.15 and 6.16) and
age-categories (Table 6.17 and 6.18) respectively. For both the employed and the unem-
ployed workers it is apparent that predominantly workers with LBO/LTS and MBO, and
to a lesser extend VWO degree received the additional training or retraining. Younger
employees (< 30 years old) in particular participated in retraining and additional train-
ing. But also the persons in the age group of 40-44 year old followed relatively more
training than the other age groups. This is also true for the workers who are unemployed
(Table 6.18). This means that up to the age of 44 years old relatively more workers use
training to increase their employment chances.
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Table 6.20: Search Cost by Education Level
Education Search Costs in HFL










Finding the First job
The entire chapter so far has dealt with the labor market status of former employees of
Fokker N.V. after the bankruptcy and the search behavior of the workers to ﬁnd new
jobs. A crucial issue is to ﬁnd that ﬁrst job and therefore the Fokker Survey included
a question as to which channels this ﬁrst job was found. Table 6.19 gives an overview
of the responses sub-divided by positions ﬁlled after one, two and three years. Informal
networks of families, former colleges, and friends, as well as contacts from the work
at Fokker play a very important role for former Fokker employees. These informal
networks fair even better than the specialized ‘formal institutions’ as the Employment
Oﬃce and the manpower agencies. Other important sources are direct applications on
job-advertisements and open applications.
Finally, attention is paid to the search-costs associated with ﬁnding the ﬁrst jobs.1
Table 6.20 gives the median search costs and their standard deviation by educational
level and age-categories. They seem to be increasing with educational level (both in
terms of general schooling and in terms of vocational training). With the exception
of the age group of 55 years and older it is also increasing in the age-categories (cf.
Table 6.21). The exception of the 55+ category can easily be explained by the fact that
they are not required to search for a new job (application obligations) to receive their
unemployment insurance payments (beneﬁts)
1These search costs are self-reported in the questionnaire, see question 1.14 in the questionnaire.
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Table 6.21: Search Cost by Age Level
Age Search Costs in HFL
Median Standard deviation
< 30 years 100 631
30-34 years 200 976
35-39 years 250 1257
40-44 years 400 1530
45-49 years 500 1647
50-54 years 500 1653
55+ years 100 190
Table 6.22: Size of the New Employer — Displaced Workers in Fokker Survey
Size Company 1st job Current Job SEP sample
N % N % N %
1-19 139 17.89 157 11.23 297 16.61
21-50 123 15.83 140 10.01 166 9.29
50-99 111 14.29 192 13.73 164 9.17
100+ 404 51.99 909 65.02 1161 64.93
Total 777 100.00 1398 100.00 1788 100.00
The Size of the Firms
Coming from a relatively large ﬁrm with more than 100 employees, the displaced em-
ployees of former Fokker N.V. ﬁnd employment in ﬁrms of all sizes. For comparison the
‘matched’ SEP sample provides an insight into the general distribution of the Dutch
workers over diﬀerent sized ﬁrms.
Table 6.22 gives an overview of the absolute number and the respective percentages
of ﬁrst and current jobs of former employees of Fokker N.V. as well as an overview of
the ‘matched’ SEP sample. Note that the current job can also be the ﬁrst job of the
respondent. Those respondents who had initially found employment with either the
bankruptcy trustee or with Fokker Aviation B.V. were excluded from this part of the
analysis.
As can be seen in Table 6.22 the initial employment positions following the bankruptcy
of Fokker N.V. were proportionally higher with smaller ﬁrms. This proportion has
dropped considerably for the current jobs of the respondents. Bigger ﬁrms (100+) are
underrepresented with regard to the ﬁrst job of the respondents. There may be two
explanations for this phenomenon. Firstly, those workers who initially get employed in
a bigger ﬁrm (100+) are not likely to leave this ﬁrm within three years while the smaller
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Table 6.23: Type of Employment Contract — Fokker Survey
Type of Contract 1st Job Current Job
N % N %
Call-to-Call basis 43 5.36 16 1.14
Temporary, no long-term perspective 302 37.66 101 7.18
Temporary, with long-term perspective 237 29.55 189 13.43
Trial Period 56 6.98 28 1.99
Contract 164 20.45 1073 76.26
Total 802 100.00 1407 100.00
ﬁrms are used as stepping stones for eventual moves to bigger ﬁrms. Secondly, smaller
ﬁrms are more likely to oﬀer temporary jobs due to an increased reluctance among these
sizes of ﬁrms to oﬀer long-term or indeﬁnite contracts. They typically oﬀer employment
for ﬁxed periods of time up to 5 years. When comparing the ﬁrst job ﬁrms size with the
‘matched’ SEP sample it is apparent that the bigger ﬁrms are underrepresented, while
this appears to even out over time there is no diﬀerence for the distribution of workers
over diﬀerent sizes of ﬁrms when looking at the current jobs.
In this context it is worthwhile to look into the types of contracts that were issued.
Table 6.23 gives an overview of the types of contracts issued to the former Fokker N.V.
employees for their ﬁrst and current jobs. Quite a high proportion of the jobs that
were initially accepted were of temporary nature, often even without the prospect to
subsequently gain either a full time or other more permanent type of contract. This
has changed signiﬁcantly looking at the current job situation three years after the
bankruptcy. Now more than 75 percent of the employed former Fokker N.V. workers
have obtained full time employment with indeﬁnite contracts.
Schooling, Experience and Responsibility
The level of a job, the required knowledge and skills, can roughly be characterized by
two indicators: (1) the minimum schooling needed to qualify for the job, and (2) the
number of years of working. The Fokker Survey focuses on these two indicators in the
questionnaire.
Table 6.24 and 6.25 give the results for both the required schooling and experience.
They point towards an increase in the number of higher level jobs, requiring higher edu-
cational levels, relative to the requirements for the ﬁrst job accepted after displacement.
The results in Table 6.25 show that particularly the combination of working experience
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Table 6.24: Schooling Requirements for Acquiring a Job
Months of schooling 1st Job Current Job
necessary to ﬁll in job N % N %
None 49 10.23 70 8.09
1 month 73 15.24 80 9.25
1-3 months 87 18.16 175 20.23
3 - 6 months 97 20.25 210 24.28
6-12 months 84 17.54 170 19.65
1 - 2 years 45 9.39 83 9.60
2 - 3 years 18 3.76 22 2.54
3 - 4 years 18 3.76 29 3.35
More than 4 years 8 1.67 26 3.01
Total 479 100.00 865 100.00
Table 6.25: The Importance of Work Experience in Getting the New Job
Importance of previous 1st Job Current Job
work experience N % N %
Yes, especially the work experience 148 18.50 302 21.56
Yes, especially the technical experience 40 5.00 55 3.93
Yes, both work and technical experience 265 33.13 526 37.54
No, but helpful 172 21.50 303 21.63
No, not necessary 175 21.88 215 15.35
Total 800 100.00 1401 100.00
1576 Some Results of the Fokker Survey
and technical experience was referred to as essential in ﬁnding the new economic po-
sition. This was apparent for the current position held but of less importance for the
ﬁrst job. Technical experience by itself did not comply with the qualiﬁcations needed to
obtain a job, while working experience by itself did. From the results it is clear that the
prerequisites for the current job are on average higher. Often, a ﬁrst job was accepted
which did not demand or require speciﬁc job or technical experience. The current job
appears to be more demanding and required the experience of the employee. This in-
dicates that among the initial jobs accepted after the displacement, the knowledge and
skills acquired at Fokker N.V. were probably not taken into consideration. However, for
the current jobs it is apparent that knowledge and working experience were important
assets in acquiring the job.
In order to obtain insight into current job levels versus the former job levels at Fokker
N.V. prior to bankruptcy the Fokker Survey respondents were asked to evaluate their
current responsibility to the responsibilities at Fokker N.V. The responses were sub-
divided over three diﬀerent groups: (1) Bankruptcy Trustees, (2) Aviation, and (3) the
other displaced workers. Those workers who continued to work for either the Bankruptcy
Trustees or Fokker Aviation B.V. maintained their level of responsibilities. A small per-
centage of these workers perceived the newly acquired position as slightly more responsi-
ble. The picture looks quite diﬀerent for the displaced workers. In this group more than
forty percent initially accept employment with lower responsibilities compared to their
previous work at Fokker N.V. This phenomenon appears to have a temporary character,
as it becomes proportionally less with the current job. Less than twenty percent of
the respondents report current jobs with responsibility levels below their job at Fokker
N.V., while approximately 48 percent report higher responsibilities than in their job
with Fokker N.V. This is especially true for the workers recruited by Fokker Aviation
B.V. and, to a lesser extent, for the workers recruited by the Bankruptcy Trustees who
appear to have similar developments as the displaced workers. An overview of the results
has been given in Table 6.26.
6.2 Wages after the Bankruptcy
One of the key variables of paid work is salary. Wages often reﬂect the value of a worker
for a company, productivity, and indispensability. When displacement is eminent, the
loss of employment goes hand in hand with the shattering of career expectations within
the downsizing company, and subsequently a reorientation is needed in ﬁnding new
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Table 6.26: Current Responsibility Compared to Responsibilities at Fokker N.V.
a. 1st Job with Bankruptcy Trustees
Responsibility compared Bankruptcy Trustees Current Job
to the work at Fokker N % N %
Much more 16 8.29 36 15.00
More 55 28.50 81 33.75
Same 93 48.19 69 28.75
Less 19 9.84 40 16.67
Much Less 10 5.18 14 5.83
Total 193 100.00 240 100.00
b. 1st Job with Fokker Aviation
Responsibility compared Fokker Aviation Current Job
to the work at Fokker N % N %
Much more 12 8.51 66 21.22
More 39 27.66 99 31.83
Same 69 48.94 106 34.08
Less 18 12.77 33 10.61
Much Less 3 2.13 7 2.25
Total 141 100.00 311 100.00
c. 1st Job neither with Bankruptcy Trustees nor with Fokker Aviation
Responsibility compared 1st Job Current Job
to the work at Fokker N % N %
Much more 62 7.64 252 17.92
More 137 16.89 444 31.58
Same 257 31.69 441 31.37
Less 224 27.62 201 14.30
Much Less 131 16.16 68 4.84
Total 811 100.00 1406 100.00
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employment opportunities with comparable perspectives and wages. Of course, there
are other variables that explain the importance or value of one job compared to another.
There are numerous reasons why apparently similar jobs may diﬀer in remuneration.
This section of the study focuses on wage developments for workers who have served one
or more diﬀerent employers before accepting the current position. The question is how
the previous jobs may aﬀect the remuneration of the current job.
Furthermore, we can say that part of the loss that the workers incur after the bankruptcy
is the loss in terms of earnings forgone. They either had no job, or might have to accept
jobs with lower wages than what they had before. This is by no means a complete picture
of the loss. Many costs were not included and some are diﬃcult to quantify in monetary
terms. A number of costs not taken into account are costs of searching for a new job,
costs of relocation, costs due to the loss of vacation days, and non-wage extras paid in
one ﬁrm but not the other. In order to estimate the value of non-wage costs it is impor-
tant to realize that quite a number of workers are currently earning more in comparison
to their earnings at Fokker N.V before its bankruptcy. It is not clear why they refrained
from switching jobs at an earlier stage, but actually waited until the bankruptcy was
eminent and displacement inevitable. This could be an indication that they valued their
work at Fokker highly enough to make up for the diﬀerence in income they could have
earned in another ﬁrm. Many respondents of the Fokker Survey indicated that loosing
salary was only one part of the story. The other part of the explanation for their loyalty
towards Fokker N.V was that they enjoyed their work and that they were involved in
the building of a product to be proud of.
Aggregate View
Figure 6.4 shows the development of the aggregate wages of all respondents of the Fokker
Survey if they were employed. All respondents who were not employed were excluded
from the graph for the time of non-employment. The graph gives the average monthly
wage from month 0 - the last earned wages at Fokker N.V. - up to three years after the
bankruptcy, month 36.
Respondents who have a job do not — on average — suﬀer from a wage drop. On the
contrary, the wages are actually higher in the ﬁrst few months post displacement. This
may be due to the strict deﬁnition that was applied: only employed workers were used in
calculating average wages. Thus, the initial increase in average wages can be explained by
the fact that the displaced workers accepted relatively well paid jobs after the bankruptcy
of Fokker N.V. The decrease in average wages after several months following bankruptcy
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Figure 6.4: Wage Index - Fokker N.V. Versus All Industry


























































Source: Fokker Survey and CBS Labor Statistics 1997-1999
Table 6.27: Aggregate Income Post-Displacement
Mean Monthly Income in HFL
Year Mean St. Dev. Pos. Diﬀ. Neg. Diﬀ. Total
1997 6125 2993 553 702 1255
1998 6121 3105 658 714 1372
1999 6182 3237 791 776 1567
Notes: St. Dev. is the standard deviation of all incomes; Pos. Diﬀ. gives the number of
workers that gained in income compared to their salary before displacement, whereas Neg.
Diﬀ. counts those that lost or stayed the same.
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Figure 6.5: Index of Respondents’ Income Versus Industry wages





















































Source: Fokker Survey and CBS Labor Statistics 1997-1999
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Table 6.28: Aggregate Income Post-Displacement incl. Beneﬁts
Mean Monthly Income incl. Beneﬁts in HFL
Year Mean St. Dev. Pos. Diﬀ. Neg. Diﬀ. Total
1997 5626 3026 553 920 1473
1998 5759 3178 658 851 1509
1999 5922 3313 791 872 1663
indicates that an increasing number of former Fokker N.V. employees are being employed
and that the workers start to accept job oﬀers even though they may earn lower wage
premiums as compared to their income at Fokker N.V.
In the context of a displacement the income losses are most important and include
those workers who remain unemployed and depend on unemployment insurance pay-
ments or social security beneﬁts. Table 6.28 gives an overview of the average income of
all respondents including the wages from employment, unemployment insurance (WW)
for the time that workers are eligible for it, and social security beneﬁts if a worker is no
longer eligible for the unemployment beneﬁts. A decrease in average income is apparent,
with a minimum occurring at around two to three months after the bankruptcy. This
is due to the fact that some workers receive their wages from Fokker N.V. for up to
19 weeks post displacement, depending on their age and tenure. The recovery of the
average income for all respondents is slow, and only after 30 months the mean income
level, equalling the former mean income level at Fokker N.V. is reached. However, no
corrections were made for inﬂation or wage increases in comparable industries. Thus,
after three years the former level of average income is reached. This outcome however
does not discriminate between diﬀerences in income between employed and unemployed
former Fokker N.V. workers. Some of these workers have actually found employment
that pays much more than their previous wages while others have not (yet) found suit-
able employment since the bankruptcy of the Dutch aeroplane manufacturer and remain
dependant upon unemployment insurance or social security beneﬁts only.
To allow for comparison an index of the industry wages from 1996 to 1999 was used in
which the quarterly increases over the entire year were smoothed. This comparable wage
increase across the entire industry can be set against the wage development of the Fokker
N.V. workers post displacement. A clear eﬀect is shown on the costs of displacement
for those workers who did not ﬁnd employment immediately after bankruptcy. The
index of displaced Fokker N.V. workers, including the social security beneﬁts and the
unemployment insurance payments, remains well below the index of industry wages and
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does not show recovery (Figure 6.5). When looking at the wages of currently employed
persons it is clear that the ones having found a new job quickly after bankruptcy have
higher wage increases compared to the average industry wage developments. For them
the displacement provided the opportunity which allowed them to move on to better
paid positions. However, as soon as the vast majority of the workers ﬁnds employment
the index is pulled down by the wages of those workers who have had to accept lower
paid jobs.
Tables 6.27 and 6.28 give the mean wages for all workers and all respondents re-
spectively at one, two, and three years after the bankruptcy. The tables also give the
standard deviation of the wages. Bigger standard deviations show an increase in the
spread of wages, and a similar indication can be taken from the number of workers with
a positive wage (income) diﬀerence versus the workers with a negative wage (income)
diﬀerence. Here, the absolute wage diﬀerence at the speciﬁc time period was calculated.
All positive salaries indicate increases in wages while negative salaries indicate loss of
income. A number of 553 workers have positive wage increases 12 months after the
bankruptcy while 702 workers have a negative wage diﬀerence.
What can be seen in both ﬁgures is that one has to be careful in the deﬁnition of what
one considers a wage loss. In a strict sense one should make a distinction between income
and wages. Where income includes also transfer payments as unemployment beneﬁts,
whereas wages purely give the income through employment. In Table 6.27 the number of
workers with positive wage development shows an increase indicating that an increasing
number of workers are able to regain or surpass the level of salary formerly received from
Fokker N.V. However, the standard deviation, indicating the spread of incomes, is also
increasing over the three-year period. If we compare this to the Table 6.28, we can see
that the lower mean salary is due to the inclusion of the transfer payment recipients.
Again, we can see that the spread of income is increasing over the three year period,
even though the number of workers with positive wage diﬀerence is increasing while the
number of workers with negative diﬀerence is decreasing.
Education Levels
One of the explanations for the diﬀerences in wages may be found in the diﬀerent chances
an employee has in ﬁnding a new job. Two indicators explaining the diﬀerent chances
in ﬁnding a new job are educational levels achieved and age. Wage developments are
analyzed over the diﬀerent educational levels.
Incomes appear to increase with the level of educational degrees, both for the general
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Table 6.29: Income by Education Levels
Mean Income
Year Education Mean St. Dev. Pos. Diﬀ. Neg. Diﬀ. Total
Basis 3491 233 1 4 5
MAVO 4578 1785 23 38 61
HAVO 4843 1671 12 16 28
VWO 8940 6945 14 8 22
1997 LBO/LTS 3969 802 47 136 183
MBO 4874 1479 136 227 363
HBO 7129 2753 178 177 355
WO 9123 3287 53 31 84
TU 8241 3483 89 65 154
Basis 4452 1384 3 3 6
MAVO 4772 2520 29 43 72
HAVO 4853 1646 16 15 31
VWO 8567 7453 16 9 25
1998 LBO/LTS 4012 848 67 149 216
MBO 4872 1485 161 239 400
HBO 7252 2993 206 176 382
WO 9071 2812 61 23 84
TU 8453 3819 99 57 156
Basis 3964 1329 3 4 7
MAVO 4725 2262 40 52 92
HAVO 5106 1664 19 16 35
VWO 9001 7832 18 12 30
1999 LBO/LTS 4038 828 80 168 248
MBO 4932 1478 211 251 462
HBO 7353 3018 244 188 432
WO 9456 3439 63 25 88
TU 8610 4194 113 60 173
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Table 6.30: Income by Education Levels incl. Beneﬁts
Mean Income
Year Education Mean St. Dev. Pos. Diﬀ. Neg. Diﬀ. Total
Basis 2686 848 1 10 11
MAVO 4038 1853 23 59 82
HAVO 4599 1769 12 19 31
VWO 7925 6831 14 12 26
1997 LBO/LTS 3683 935 47 191 238
MBO 4579 1566 136 293 429
HBO 6690 2909 178 221 399
WO 8815 3521 53 35 88
TU 7717 3742 89 79 168
Basis 2721 1611 3 12 15
MAVO 4349 2541 29 56 85
HAVO 4656 1778 16 17 33
VWO 7672 7273 16 13 29
1998 LBO/LTS 3754 1052 67 186 253
MBO 4685 1591 161 271 432
HBO 6971 3129 206 199 405
WO 8606 3243 61 29 90
TU 8061 4018 99 67 166
Basis 2873 1545 3 10 13
MAVO 4504 2324 40 59 99
HAVO 4917 1806 19 18 37
VWO 8539 7791 18 14 32
1999 LBO/LTS 3797 1069 80 195 275
MBO 4802 1582 211 271 482
HBO 7117 3164 244 207 451
WO 9114 3728 63 29 92
TU 8306 4339 113 68 181
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and specialized educational degrees. This was also the case for the time they were
employed by Fokker N.V. Income ranking, according to educational degree level, appears
to be of importance in ﬁnding jobs that pay similar wages as those previously earned.
Again, a higher proportion of workers with a lower educational degree have to accept
income cuts in comparison to their pre-displacement income level, while the higher
educated are more likely to ﬁnd better paid jobs than the ones they had at Fokker N.V.
prior to bankruptcy. This holds true even after three years of the bankruptcy. The
results are summarized in Table 6.27.
If income from transfer payments is included (Table 6.28), a similar picture emerges.
Average income rises with educational level. This can be expected since both pre-
and post-displacement earnings are shown to increase with educational level, and — at
least the unemployment beneﬁts — are based upon pre-displacement wage level. Again,
higher educational levels seem helpful in ﬁnding new, better paid jobs more rapidly. Most
diﬃculties in ﬁnding new jobs with comparable wages are encountered in the groups with
LBO/LTS, MAVO and MBO degrees. In these categories there is a higher proportion of
workers who are unable to ﬁnd new jobs, or have to accept jobs with wages well below
those of their pre-displacement level.
Age Categories
Another category of interest in wage developments is age. The respondents have been
sub-divided into seven age categories, ranging from less than 30 years old (at the time of
the bankruptcy) to 55 years and older. Mean wage, its standard deviation, the number
of positive and negative wage diﬀerences for each age category at one, two and three
years following the bankruptcy are reported in Table 6.31.
In terms of age-categories the expectation is that with increasing age it becomes more
and more diﬃcult to ﬁnd a suitable job that pays a comparable salary as Fokker N.V.
did. Of particular interest is the point at which it seems to become more diﬃcult to ﬁnd
a new job. From the information in the tables, it appears that up to the age-category of
35-39 years old, the number of workers with positive wage diﬀerence and with negative
wage diﬀerence is about equal. However, beyond the age of 40 the outcomes become
increasingly tilted towards a negative wage diﬀerence. This eﬀect is further conﬁrmed
when including the transfer payments (Table 6.32). The number of workers with a
negative wage diﬀerence does not increase much for the lower age groups. Among the
younger workers only a few workers actually need to use the transfer payments. On the
other hand, workers of forty and older show an increased need for the use of transfer
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Table 6.31: Income by Age Categories
Mean Income
Year Age Mean St. Dev. Pos. Diﬀ. Neg. Diﬀ. Total
<30 4562 2419 81 52 133
30-34 5099 1787 128 140 268
35-40 6182 2317 150 165 315
1997 40-44 6391 3277 92 148 240
45-49 7115 3434 70 122 192
50-54 7844 4071 28 65 93
55+ 10031 4631 4 10 14
<30 4557 2362 96 52 148
30-34 5291 2516 161 128 289
35-40 6201 2252 175 158 333
1998 40-44 6458 3497 108 155 263
45-49 6858 3641 83 146 229
50-54 7632 3904 32 66 98
55+ 9623 3126 3 9 12
<30 4597 2240 123 54 177
30-34 5446 2660 185 132 317
35-40 6299 2692 205 175 380
1999 40-44 6496 3638 135 166 301
45-49 6929 3722 105 161 266
50-54 7418 3899 36 76 112
55+ 9003 3259 2 12 14
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Table 6.32: Income by Age Categories incl. Beneﬁts
Mean Income
Year Age Mean St. Dev. Pos. Diﬀ. Neg. Diﬀ. Total
<30 4396 2447 81 60 141
30-34 4887 1916 128 157 285
35-40 5969 2429 150 183 333
1997 40-44 5838 3320 92 189 281
45-49 6207 3458 70 178 248
50-54 5734 3928 28 135 163
55+ 7882 4677 4 18 22
<30 4537 2366 96 53 149
30-34 5228 2540 161 133 294
35-40 6054 2359 175 168 343
1998 40-44 6144 3577 108 174 282
45-49 6330 3738 83 175 258
50-54 5505 3994 32 131 163
55+ 7008 4130 3 17 20
<30 4548 2254 123 57 180
30-34 5422 2669 185 134 319
35-40 6250 2720 205 179 384
1999 40-44 6309 3689 135 178 313
45-49 6591 3829 105 179 284
50-54 5710 4194 36 123 159
55+ 6210 4232 2 22 24
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Table 6.33: Average Monthly Income by Plants
Mean Income
Year Plant Mean St. Dev. Pos. Diﬀ. Neg. Diﬀ. Total
FAC Amsterdam 6524 3132 455 527 982
1997 FAC Drechtsteden 4661 1699 66 126 192
FAC Ypenburg 4867 2123 32 49 81
FAC Amsterdam 6470 3233 535 550 1085
1998 FAC Drechtsteden 4701 1769 82 117 199
FAC Ypenburg 5116 2739 41 47 88
FAC Amsterdam 6532 3377 636 593 1229
1999 FAC Drechtsteden 4736 1777 106 131 237
FAC Ypenburg 5413 3117 49 52 101
payments. Note also that, including the transfer payments, the age groups of 50 years
and older seem not able to recover to their initial wage level — not even after three
years. All other age groups eventually recover although some groups take considerably
more time than others.
Diﬀerences over Plants
Fokker N.V. had its three main plants, Amsterdam (Schiphol), Drechtsteden and Ypen-
burg involved in the bankruptcy. Here we report on possible diﬀerences or similarities
between the three plants over a three-year period of time. The results have been sum-
marized in Tables 6.33 and 6.34. One of the most striking diﬀerences at ﬁrst sight is that
it appears that the employees of Schiphol, the largest plant, have the highest average
income. However, this is more a composition eﬀect rather then an indication of regional
diﬀerences. The workers from the Drechtsteden plant seem to have the most diﬃculties
in ﬁnding new employment with comparable salary levels, or any employment at all. The
workers from the Ypenburg plant seem to have the fastest wage development following
the displacement. This ﬁnding is associated with an increasing standard deviation, in-
dicating that this is due to a speciﬁc group of workers who enjoy a signiﬁcant increase
in wages post-displacement.
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Table 6.34: Average Monthly Income by Plants incl. Beneﬁts
Mean Income
Year Plant Mean St. Dev. Pos. Diﬀ. Neg. Diﬀ. Total
FAC Amsterdam 6027 3187 455 680 1135
1997 FAC Drechtsteden 4296 1747 66 168 234
FAC Ypenburg 4320 2165 32 72 104
FAC Amsterdam 6133 3320 535 640 1175
1998 FAC Drechtsteden 4351 1872 82 151 233
FAC Ypenburg 4763 2730 41 60 101
FAC Amsterdam 6275 3462 636 661 1297
1999 FAC Drechtsteden 4536 1871 106 149 255
FAC Ypenburg 5069 3168 49 62 111
Conclusion
The labor market status of the employees of former Fokker N.V. was - of course - severely
aﬀected by the displacement resulting from bankruptcy. Regaining a normal level of em-
ployment is one of the key issues after such a shock. From the information obtained from
the Fokker Survey it is apparent that some groups can quickly regain employment, while
others take a longer time period. Even after the three years following the bankruptcy, the
employment status shows the eﬀects of the displacement. Nevertheless it can be stated
that the main recovery has taken place within the time frame of three years. Workers
with only elementary schooling, lower general education (MAVO), or lower vocational
training (LBO/LTS) have a lesser chance of ﬁnding new employers. The same applies to
persons older than 45 years. This implies that lower educated workers as well as older
workers have reduced chances on the labor market.
For those employees who succeeded in ﬁnding a new job within the ﬁrst year after
displacement it is apparent that especially Fokker N.V. related contacts played a major
role. There is a tendency towards increased employment of the former Fokker N.V.
employees in bigger (100+) ﬁrms in comparison to the distribution of employment for the
whole Dutch economy. This is especially true for jobs held three years after bankruptcy.
However, among the initial jobs that were accepted after bankruptcy, the big ﬁrms were
notably underrepresented.
If previous work experience was considered an important factor in acquiring a new
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job it was in combination with technical experience rather than the technical skills and
work experience speciﬁcally. In fact, technical experience alone was in most cases not
suﬃcient for the acquisition of the new job. The results clearly show that the initial job
following the displacement involved in most cases fewer responsibilities than the current
job that a worker holds three years after the bankruptcy.
The groups of former employees suﬀering from wage losses are comparable to those
described as having more diﬃculties in ﬁnding a job: persons with lower educational
levels (Basis, MAVO, LBO/LTS and MBO) have on average higher wage losses, and
encounter more diﬃculties to recovering their former wage level. Also, the workers of
40 years or older have on average higher wage losses and are not at all able to recover
their former employment and wage level. This compared to the group of 30-40 years
old who have initial wage losses (1st year), but recover quickly and usually beyond their
former wage level. The age category of 55+ is a special category in the sense that the
workers are no longer required to search for a new job, hence it is to be expected that
they show lower average wages. It can be seen that among the workers of 55 years and
older diﬃculties arise in ﬁnding adequately paid jobs.
In the next chapter we will continue to investigate the question of the duration of job
search and also that of income losses. We will then try to determine the factors aﬀecting
these outcomes. As we concentrate on the ﬁrst job, we will conﬁne the investigation
to those workers that were actually displaced, i.e. did not get a job oﬀer from the
bankruptcy trustees of from Fokker Aviation at the displacement date.
1727 Heterogeneity among Displaced
Workers
“The peculiarities of labor in relation to readjustments form one of the
main sources of injustice and hardship in an individualist economy. The
risk of loss in the value of acquired knowledge and training means a
constantly impending threat of indigence. Laborers are attached to their
homes and even to their work by sentimental ties to which market facts
are ruthless.”
(Knight, 1921 , p. 346)
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7.1 Introduction
Displacement wage losses have been used to examine the transferability of human capital.
Losses of ﬁrm speciﬁc skills are estimated as the returns to tenure at the displacing ﬁrm.
The tenure variable is used as a proxy for the (speciﬁc) human capital that a worker
has accumulated while working at that ﬁrm (Becker (1962); Parsons (1972)).1 Addison
and Portugal (1989) criticize earlier speciﬁcations of displacement wage losses which
try to estimate loss of speciﬁc human capital through pre-displacement tenure in the
ﬁrm. They show that the previous tenure is ‘productive’ also in new jobs, implying a
partial transferability of human capital. Topel (1990) examines the losses associated
with changing employment after displacement. He ﬁnds that more senior workers suﬀer
from greater reductions in earnings compared to their junior counterparts. This suggests
that some human capital is built up during the career which is (partly) destroyed upon
displacement. Farber (1997) interprets this as economic redundancy of skills. In a later
paper Farber (1999b) ﬁnds that 30 percent of the return to tenure can be explained by
heterogeneity while the other 70 percent should be seen as returns to speciﬁc investments.
Neal (1995) examines the transferability of speciﬁc investments in human capital by
examining industry speciﬁc returns to tenure. He ﬁnds that some returns to tenure are
industry speciﬁc. Workers who continue their career after displacement within the same
industry face lower wage losses. Dustmann and Meghir (2001) ﬁnd positive returns to
experience and ﬁrm tenure for skilled, but not for unskilled workers in Germany. Postel-
Vinay and Robin (2002) also ﬁnd wage variation being explained by person-speciﬁc
eﬀects that vary across skill groups in France.
In this study, we analyze the eﬀects of displacement for workers from a single large ﬁrm
in the Netherlands. Because of the ﬁrm’s bankruptcy, all workers are oﬃcially informed
about their lay-oﬀ at the same date. The data we use contains detailed information
on the accumulated human capital in relation to the occupation held and the career
developed within the ﬁrm. Together with the workers’ hierarchical positions, their job
characteristics, job rotations, and promotions, we are able to thoroughly investigate the
composition of wage diﬀerences before and after the demise of the ﬁrm. Moreover, using
a post-displacement survey, we can combine workers’ pre-displacement occupational and
career characteristics with speciﬁc information on the search process and the eventual
new job characteristics.
We ﬁnd that wage losses are functions of characteristics of jobs before and after dis-
1This is diﬀerent from Chapter 4 in which we use training as indicator for speciﬁc capital. Here we
follow the general displacement literature.
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placement. Tenure with the ﬁrm, rank or job does not explain wage losses. Signiﬁ-
cant pre-displacement variables are the type of job, the number of job rotations in the
last rank, performance evaluation scores, as well as a measure of idiosyncratic ability.
Post-displacement co-variates explaining wage losses are industry-speciﬁc characteristics,
changes in responsibility on the job and carried over job-related know-how.
The combination of detailed pre- and post-displacement information of job character-
istics, wages, and search history also allows us to develop and estimate a simple model
of dynamic updating of idiosyncratic reservation wages. The updating is a product of
learning from information about successful matches obtained from former colleagues with
similar characteristics. The idea is based on the observation that after the bankruptcy
many former employees became members of clubs where people met regularly (see also
Rees (1966); Granovetter (1974)). The updating model is strongly supported by the
data.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section two we describe the data, including the
development of the post-displacement survey. In Section three we analyze variation in
search time needed to ﬁnd the ﬁrst job. Pre- and post-displacement earnings diﬀerences
are evaluated in Section four. In Section ﬁve, we propose a dynamic updating model to
perform an integrated analysis of search time and wage losses. Section six concludes.
7.2 The Displaced Worker Survey and Personnel Data
The displacement literature has long recognized the role of heterogeneity among workers
in understanding observed post-displacement search time and pre- and post-displacement
earnings diﬀerences among workers. Compared to regular lay-oﬀs displaced workers
should be able to distinguish themselves as they are not speciﬁcally selected into un-
employment but part of a ﬁrm that closed down. This should, according to Gibbons
and Katz (1991)), lead to better labor market prospects compared to the average un-
employed worker. The analysis of losses from displacement presented in this chapter
primarily focuses on worker-speciﬁc heterogeneity.
In the U.S. wage losses of 10 to 30% for displaced workers are reported (Ruhm (1991)
and Kletzer (1998)). Jacobson et al. (1993) use (unemployment insurance) adminis-
trative data to show that displaced workers do not only suﬀer from wage losses upon
displacement but also lag behind in average wage growth several years before being dis-
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Table 7.1: Composition of Fokker Workforce and Survey Population at the Time of the
Bankruptcy
N %
Displaced Workers 3991 70.71
Bankruptcy trustees 700 12.40
Fokker Aviation B.V. 953 16.89
Total 5644 100.00
Pilot 100 .
Other Workers involved in the 38 .
development of the Survey
Survey Population 5506 .
placed. For Europe the following picture emerges from the currently available literature:
Earnings losses range from nothing at all (Abbring et al. (2002), Bender et al. (2002)) to
somewhat less than 10% (Albæk et al. (2002); Borland et al. (2002); Burda and Mertens
(1998)).2 Several explanations for these diﬀerences have been oﬀered. An institutional
one is that European countries oﬀer generous social security payments which allow dis-
placed workers to search for new jobs using the social security cushion. Compared to
their American counterparts European workers are less likely to be forced into accepting
lower paid jobs. This increases the observed search time and the probability of ﬁnding a
better match. But the administrative data used in the European studies do not contain
information suﬃciently detailed to properly estimate the variation of displacement wage
losses across individuals, and how that variation depends on careers, job rotations, rank
tenure and other speciﬁcations of the jobs held before as well as after displacement.
The year 1996 marked the end of a proud history of more than 75 years of aircraft
production by the Dutch company Fokker. Founded by one of the pioneers of aviation
and aircraft design, Anthony Fokker, the company ﬁrst blossomed in the 1920s when it
became the world leader in aircraft construction, producing in both the Netherlands and
the United States. After the destruction of the production facilities during the Second
World War, Fokker remained one of the smaller players in the world aircraft industry,
producing predominantly civilian mid-range airplanes of 50 to 100 seats. In March 1996
it ﬁled for bankruptcy and 5644 workers lost their tenured jobs. The bankruptcy trustees
created a new company, called Fokker Aviation, which contained the viable remains of
the old ﬁrm. A total of 953 workers were simultaneously ﬁred from the bankrupt ﬁrm
2One recent exception is Couch (2001), who ﬁnds in the German GSOEP data that annual earning
(not wages) of displaced workers declined by 13.5 percent in the year following plant closure.
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and hired by Fokker Aviation. Another group of 700 workers was oﬀered a contract
to continue working for the trustees to ﬁnish building airplanes already sold to airline
companies; 3991 workers were permanently displaced (Table 7.1).3
We use data from two sources. Fokker’s electronic personnel data system provided in-
formation about workers’pre-displacement careers inside the ﬁrm. In 1999 post-displacement
information was gathered through a mail survey among all workers who were laid oﬀ
after the ﬁrm’s bankruptcy. Current addresses of the respondents were obtained from
the bankruptcy trustees. Information from the Fokker Pension Fund was used to check
upon deceased employees. The addresses of deceased former employees were omitted
from the address ﬁles used for the survey. The ‘Fokker Survey’ collected data on the
labor market experience for the three years following the workers’ displacement. This
survey data has been linked to the information from the personnel ﬁles.
7.2.1 The Personnel Data
From Fokker’s personnel ﬁles we obtained information on each employee’s type of job,
compensation, and demographics. Demographic characteristics include date of birth,
gender, education, marital status, and the hiring date of each employee. The average
tenure at the time of bankruptcy was 15 years. The ﬁrm’s hierarchy distinguishes 8
diﬀerent levels below top management. The highest observable step, the eighth level,
is just below the top management and the Board of Directors. For reasons of possible
identiﬁcation, the two upper levels (9 and 10) were left out of the data-set.
The hierarchical structure roughly reﬂects the division of unskilled versus skilled work-
ers as well as the organization of supervision. Production workers are located in levels 1
to 3. Managers, engineers, and aircraft designers belong to levels 4 to 8.4 Every position
is ‘allocated’ to a job activity. These activities are Administration, Sales, Management,
Human Resources, R&D as well as Production Preparation, Production Planning, Sup-
port, Production and Quality Control. Job rotation is deﬁned as the number of lateral
job changes within a given hierarchical level. The lateral job change is a movement
across job activities without changing the hierarchical position to a higher (or lower)
level job. In addition to the normal tenure variable, we observe tenure within the hier-
archy and tenure within a speciﬁc position (job). The latter two tenure variables were
measured in months rather than years for the last position held before lay-oﬀ.
3The bankruptcy trustees sold Fokker Aviation to STORK in 1997. For a complete description see
Trustee report (Deterink et al. 1997).
4For a detailed description of the company’s structure in 1987-1996 see Chapter 3.
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We have calculated the unemployment insurance beneﬁts paid to the worker, as well as
the duration for which they were eligible. These calculations were according to the Dutch
regulations: On the day of the bankruptcy every worker faces a six week ﬁring period
in which they receive their salary.5 Older workers are entitled to a longer ﬁring period.
The original six weeks are extended by one week per year of tenure while the worker was
older than 45 years. The maximum ﬁring period after a bankruptcy is 19 weeks. After
the ﬁring period workers receive unemployment insurance beneﬁts. The unemployment
insurance pays 70 percent of the former salary, with a maximum of 55000 Dutch guilders.
This implies a replacement ratio of 0.7 for all workers receiving less than 78752 Dutch
guilders annually. Sixteen percent of our sample received annual salaries above this
amount leading to lower replacement ratios for those workers. The length of the UI
payments depends on the labor market experience of the worker. A worker is entitled
to UI payments if he has worked 4 out of the 5 years prior to becoming unemployed.
Workers who worked for 4 years are entitled to 6 months of UI payments. After 5 years
worked, this rises to a total of 9 months, and to a total of 12 months after 10 years
worked. Beyond 10 years of labor market experience a workers’ entitlement increases by
an additional 6 month for every additional 5 years he worked. The maximum entitlement
is 60 months.
A Measure of Idiosyncratic Ability
Learning models (Farber and Gibbons (1996); Altonji and Pierret (2001)) suggest that
idiosyncratic worker ability is not readily observable and that the residual of an unre-
stricted regression of a wage equation is a martingale. In time-series representations of
wage equations that martingale is often found to be of order I(1) (see for example Pfann
and Palm (1993), for Dutch as well as UK wage models). This implies that the model’s
ﬁrst-order Koyck transformation – the wage growth – is stationary and that the residual
distribution of a regression – corrected for selective separations (quits and lay-oﬀs) –
measures the distribution of idiosyncratic worker ability revealed to the employer but
not to the econometrician.
We compare the 1993-1996 residuals of an unrestricted regression of the wage growth
during the last three years at the ﬁrm as a proxy of the distribution of idiosyncratic
worker ability at the time of the mass lay-oﬀ. If this measurement is indeed a good
proxy for unobserved ability we expect it to be negatively correlated with search time,
5The salary payments after a bankruptcy are paid out by the Dutch social security oﬃces. They are
guaranteed regardless of the expected bankruptcy outcome.
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uncorrelated with starting wages, and positively correlated with earnings three years
after displacement.
Alternatively, however, positive residual wage growth of the ﬁnal years at the ﬁrm could
also result from increased ‘risk’ premiums paid to some workers to entice them to stay
and ﬁght the ﬁrm’s demise. If such premiums are based on unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc
skills only, we should expect that the residual is uncorrelated with search time after
displacement and negatively correlated with the starting wage as well as with the wage
earned after three years.
7.2.2 The ‘Fokker Survey’
The mail-survey covers the labor market history of the three years after the displace-
ment. The questionnaire was sent out in April 1999 to all 5506 workers in the survey
population (see Table 7.1). In total, 2279 ex-Fokker workers returned completed ques-
tionnaires (response rate equals 41.4 percent.6) In chapter 5 we report results of the
non-response analysis. The survey results are of high quality for a self-administered
mail survey. We could validate some of the given information by comparing the re-
ported salary earned with Fokker to the information available from the administrative
ﬁles. Many respondents were able to ﬁll in the exact amount of gross monthly salary
which they earned three years prior to the survey. In a validation study for the PSID,
Bound, Brown, Duncan and Rodgers (1994) also ﬁnd reported wages to be rather accu-
rate on average. The mean error of log earnings found in Bound et al. (1994) is 0.007.
This is of the same magnitude as the mean error of 0.006 in our study. The standard
deviation of our sample is 0.34. This is only slightly higher than the standard deviation
of 0.32 reported by Bound et al. (1994).
The survey asked for information on the ﬁrst and the current job. Respondents re-
ported the date at which they started to work in the new position, their starting wage
and hours worked. Information was also collected on the type of ﬁrm. We categorize
new employers as belonging to the aircraft industry, other manufacturing industries, or
non-manufacturing. The respondents were asked to assess their responsibility in their
new job compared to that before displacement. On a ﬁve point scale, the middle cat-
6Surveys in the Netherlands have low response rates compared to the rest of Europe. Statistics
Netherlands report 50% and 60% response for the ‘Quality-of-Life’ and the ‘Labor Force Survey’
respectively. Labor Force Surveys in other European countries have response rates between 82 and
93% (cf. Geuzinge, van Rooijen and Bakker (2000)).
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egory reﬂecting a similar level of responsibility, they could indicate ‘more’, and ‘much
more’ responsibility on the one hand, or ‘less’ and ‘much less’ on the other hand. Fur-
thermore, we collected information on the prerequisites for the new job – as perceived
by the respondent –. Here the answer categories were: ‘both their work experience and
their technical knowledge obtained while working with Fokker was necessary to obtain
the new job’, ‘only the work experience’ or ‘only the technical knowledge’ was necessary,
a category in which neither their experience nor their technical knowledge was strictly
necessary, and ﬁnally as last category, neither work experience nor technical knowledge
was necessary at all.
7.3 Post Displacement Search Time
In the survey a question asking for the labor market status of every month until three
years after displacement was included. This information allows us to examine the time
needed to ﬁnd new employment. In the analysis presented we focus on the time it
takes to ﬁnd the ﬁrst job after displacement. Following Meyer (1990) we included the
remaining duration of unemployment beneﬁts. Theoretically, the remaining duration
of the unemployment beneﬁts should have an eﬀect on the duration of unemployment:
unemployment beneﬁts are the ‘returns’ during the search process. The higher they are
the longer one can sustain searching for a job while maintaining a high reservation wage.
Unemployment insurance covers some percentage of the former salary (the replacement
ratio). The duration of the payments depends in our data on the employment history.
Near the exhaustion point of the unemployment insurance payments, workers face the
prospect of lower beneﬁts. Hence, workers are more likely to accept any job oﬀered.
We include the remaining duration of the unemployment beneﬁts for each worker in the
form of splines. Note that the duration of beneﬁts are pre-determined and known to the
worker. In our sample the average duration of the beneﬁts is 88 weeks.
Other explanatory variables are education, age, tenure, type of job activity while work-
ing with Fokker, and the hierarchical level achieved before displacement. A career can be
identiﬁed by the hierarchical level achieved, but also within a hierarchy by the amount
of lateral movements – i.e. across departments. The latter reﬂects job rotation inten-
sity and can be interpreted as the workers’ breadth of job experience. To capture this
element we include the number of lateral movements within the last hierarchy achieved.
Workers who do not ﬁnd any employment in the period of 36 months are right censored.
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Table 7.2: Survival Analysis: Timing of First Employment after Displacement
Weibull Proportional Hazard
Coeﬀ. s.d. z p
Weeks of UI remaining: (0,4) 0.586 0.095 6.17 0.000
Weeks of UI remaining: [4,8) -0.307 0.160 -1.93 0.054
Weeks of UI remaining: [8,12) 0.089 0.130 0.69 0.490
Weeks of UI remaining: [12,26) 0.104 0.019 5.52 0.000
Weeks of UI remaining: [26,∞] 0.017 0.001 12.62 0.000
Firm Tenure -0.064 0.019 -3.41 0.001
Firm Tenure2 /1000 0.833 0.480 1.73 0.083
Hierarchy Tenure -0.001 0.001 -0.53 0.596
Hierarchy Tenure2 /1000 0.001 0.002 0.33 0.745
Job Tenure 0.000 0.001 0.31 0.760
Job Tenure2 /1000 0.000 0.002 0.20 0.843
Number of Internal Trainings -0.007 0.009 -0.79 0.429
Number of External Trainings -0.003 0.026 -0.11 0.913
Job Activity: Sales -0.321 0.176 -1.83 0.068
Job Activity: R & D -0.333 0.157 -2.12 0.034
Job Activity: Production Preparation -0.245 0.159 -1.54 0.124
Job Activity: Production Planning -0.128 0.169 -0.76 0.449
Job Activity: Production -0.054 0.153 -0.35 0.724
Job Activity: Support 0.041 0.199 0.21 0.837
Job Activity: Human Resources -0.075 0.212 -0.35 0.724
Job Activity: Quality Control -0.100 0.183 -0.05 0.956
Job Activity: Management -0.433 0.191 -2.27 0.023
Hierarchical Level 2 0.186 0.111 1.68 0.093
Hierarchical Level 3 0.437 0.133 3.28 0.001
Hierarchical Level 4 0.317 0.139 2.28 0.022
Hierarchical Level 5 0.516 0.160 3.23 0.001
Hierarchical Level 6 0.717 0.179 4.01 0.000
Hierarchical Level 7 0.817 0.263 2.38 0.017
Hierarchical Level 8 0.741 0.263 3.11 0.002
Idiosyncratic Ability 0.458 0.282 1.63 0.104
WAO-% -0.006 0.003 -1.96 0.050
1/lnα 0.604 0.033 18.59 0.000
1/lnυ -3.203 0.993 -3.22 0.001
Observations 1610
Notes: Weibull proportional hazard model with gamma frailty. The hazard is speciﬁed as
υ · αtα−1 exp(β0 + Xβ). Where υ is assumed to follow a gamma distribution and α is the
coeﬃcient of the Weibull distribution. Failure event is the timing of ﬁrst employment past
the bankruptcy for all displaced workers. We control also for plant location and evaluation
scores, age and education. Further we include dummies for gender and for marital status.
Hierarchical levels 1 to 3 are blue collar production workers, 4-8 are white collar workers.
Level 8 corresponds to a hierarchical level below the top-management.
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In the empirical analysis of the period of time it takes to ﬁnd the ﬁrst job, all workers
who were oﬀered a contract from the bankruptcy trustees are left out as they experience
no initial unemployment spell. Additionally, we exclude those employees who do not
classify themselves in the survey as unemployed because they have either started their
own business7 (self-employment, 2.5% of sample), are full-time involved in voluntary
activities or other types of unpaid work, receive disability pensions, or have retired since
bankruptcy (together 2.2% of the sample).
Table 7.2 presents the estimation results of a proportional hazard Weibull model with
gamma correction for unobserved heterogeneity. The data replicate the standard pat-
terns found in the empirical literature. In summary we ﬁnd the following results.8 Search
time increases with age. Younger workers ﬁnd new jobs faster. High-tenure worker also
have longer search periods. With the exception of a shorter search time for graduates
from technical universities, educational levels are insigniﬁcant. The hierarchical position
is found to explain some of the time needed to ﬁnd the ﬁrst new job after displacement.
Compared to the baseline category of the lowest hierarchy all (higher) hierarchical levels
show shorter search periods, other things equal.
The remaining duration of unemployment beneﬁts (in weeks) turns out to shorten the
search time around the expiration time (Table 7.2). It does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect
for the splines of 4-8, or 8-12 weeks. The splines capturing the eﬀects of UI beneﬁts for
periods longer than 12 weeks also indicate a shorter search time for longer remaining
beneﬁts. This last eﬀect shows that not only around the exhaustion point, but also
during the time in which beneﬁts do not (threaten to) run out, new jobs are accepted.
In our sample with high tenure workers and with a generous UI system many workers
simply do not come near the exhaustion point. The average UI entitlement in our sample
is 88 weeks which explains that many workers ﬁnd employment while the remaining UI
entitlement is still much longer than 12 weeks.
Search time is found to be inversely related to level of exit on the hierarchical ladder.
More pre-displacement job responsibility increases the probability of ﬁnding new work
after displacement. Workers higher in the hierarchy also found new jobs faster. Job
7Self-employment is one route out of unemployment. Given that the self-employment decision is
complex and given that the self-employment income seems to diﬀer signiﬁcantly from wage outcomes
of comparable employed individuals, we decided to exclude this group of workers. In fact Hamilton
(2000) concludes: “[...] self-employment oﬀers signiﬁcant nonpecuniary beneﬁts, such as ‘being your
own boss.’ Many entrepreneurs have not only lower initial earnings than employees with the same
observed characteristics but also lower earnings growth Hamilton (2000, page 628). In the speciﬁc
data-set we use the incidence rate into self-employment is far below the usual numbers. We will thus
disregard the small group of self-employed in this chapter.
8These estimates are not included in Table 7.2
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rotations do not show a signiﬁcant eﬀect with respect to the duration of subsequent
unemployment.
In the previous Section 7.2 we argued that idiosyncratic ability is either negatively
correlated with search time (general unobserved ability) or uncorrelated with search time
(ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk premiums). Table 7.2 reports insigniﬁcance of the ability measure.
This is evidence in favor of the idea that the ﬁrm in demise pays increasing risk premiums
to workers to entice them to stay.
7.4 Displacement Losses







i is the log monthly wage earned at the ﬁrst new job by worker i and W F
i is
the log of the last monthly wage earned before displacement. The wage diﬀerence can
be explained by observable characteristics Zi as follows.
∆Wi = Ziβ + u1i (7.2)
where β is a constant vector and u1i is the residual unexplained by Zi.
When post-displacement wages, W a
i , are not available or unobserved, ∆Wi cannot
be computed. The literature suggest to use as an upper bound of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human
capital that can be lost upon transition from one ﬁrm to another the Mincer/Becker U-
shaped tenure proﬁle instead. Our data can replicate the standard tenure results. The
ﬁtted model of log wages at the day of displacement on tenure proﬁles, holding constant
for education, age, and gender (ˆ αXi) yields (t-statistics are given in brackets):
ln(W F
i ) = .02 Tenure − .28 Tenure
2/1000 + ˆ αXi , with R2 = .58
(5.05) (−3.47)
We observe ∆Wi only for workers who found employment. For those workers the oﬀered












i = Ωiγ + u2i (7.4)
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Where Ωi is a vector of characteristics determining the reservation wage of worker i and
u2i is a residual. We do not observe the reservation wage, but we do observe whether
or not the worker found work as well as the starting salary W a
i at the new job. We also
know W F




Then, the set of selection equations (7.3) and (7.4) can be written as the probability of
having found an acceptable match as a linear function of characteristics Ωi (Heckman
1979). To account for possible selection bias caused by non-randomness in ﬁnding new
work, we need to identify diﬀerences between Zi and Ωi. Ωi includes variables unobserved
by the outside employers but known by the worker and to the former employer. The
identifying variables should aﬀect the worker’s reservation wage but not the outside wage
oﬀer W a
i . Two variables are used. One variable records short spells of temporary inability
to work (WAO) while being employed at Fokker during the period 1987-1996. We assume
that asymmetric information on individual well-being lowers the reservation wage but not
the outside oﬀer. The other variable included records the last job performance evaluation
score at Fokker in 1996. Performance scores, unobserved by potential employers, are
positively correlated with reservation wages as they are associated with the quality of
work and possibly with the quality of search. But they are assumed to be unrelated to
the distribution of outside oﬀers.
7.4.1 Displacement Losses: The First Job
Table 7.3 displays results from simultaneously estimating the earnings diﬀerence equa-
tion (7.2) and the selection equation (7.4). We included pre-displacement job character-
istics (panel a) as well as post-displacement job characteristics (panel b). Both types of
variables are important in explaining variation in observed wage losses. In the Regres-
sion, we also controlled for the standard tenure proﬁles at the ﬁrm, rank, as well as at
the job level. Once we have controlled for old and new job speciﬁcations, none of these
experience proﬁles contribute to explaining observed wage losses.
The average wage loss predicted for the median worker in the sample is found to
be 11.9 percent. This number is much closer to the loss found in the US based on
individual workers’ data, and much larger than the numbers reported for Europe based
on administrative data. This may be due to the fact that these workers are very high
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Table 7.3: Estimates of Wage Diﬀerences
(a) Pre-Displacement Variables
Marg. Eﬀect s.e. t p Mean
Firm Tenure -0.003 0.003 -1.07 0.287 15.286
Firm Tenure2 /1000 0.052 0.085 0.61 0.543 0.300
Hierarchy Tenure 0.000 0.000 0.72 0.472 335.086
Hierarchy Tenure2 /1000 -0.000 0.000 -1.03 0.304 136.805
Job Tenure -0.000 0.000 -0.15 0.877 230.559
Job Tenure2 /1000 0.000 0.000 0.40 0.689 77.705
Number of Internal Trainings -0.001 0.002 -0.84 0.400 2.232
Number of External Trainings -0.004 0.005 -0.74 0.458 0.579
Job Activity: Administration – Reference – 0.067
Job Activity: Sales -0.010 0.031 -0.32 0.749 0.070
Job Activity: R & D -0.071 0.030 -2.37 0.018 0.188
Job Activity: Production Preparation -0.070 0.030 -2.29 0.022 0.121
Job Activity: Production Planning -0.046 0.032 -1.44 0.151 0.068
Job Activity: Production -0.063 0.030 -2.12 0.034 0.269
Job Activity: Support -0.061 0.038 -1.61 0.108 0.038
Job Activity: Human Resources 0.000 0.038 0.01 0.991 0.031
Job Activity: Quality Control -0.083 0.035 -2.38 0.017 0.070
Job Activity: Management -0.004 0.030 -0.13 0.893 0.078
Hierarchical Level 1 – Reference – 0.469
Hierarchical Level 2 -0.005 0.022 -0.21 0.833 0.127
Hierarchical Level 3 0.025 0.026 0.96 0.336 0.113
Hierarchical Level 4 0.022 0.028 0.79 0.432 0.173
Hierarchical Level 5 0.054 0.032 1.71 0.088 0.111
Hierarchical Level 6 0.031 0.035 0.86 0.389 0.090
Hierarchical Level 7 -0.037 0.049 -0.76 0.445 0.022
Hierarchical Level 8 0.053 0.053 1.00 0.316 0.022
Number of lateral movements 0.032 0.012 2.76 0.006 0.236
Idiosyncratic Ability -0.011 0.004 -2.55 0.011 0.084
1857 Heterogeneity among Displaced Workers
(b) Post-Displacement Variables
Marg. Eﬀect s.e. t p Mean
New Job: Much more responsibility 0.011 0.018 0.60 0.548 0.123
New Job: More responsibility 0.016 0.014 1.14 0.253 0.240
New Job: Same responsibility – Reference – 0.313
New Job: Less responsibility -0.048 0.014 -3.31 0.001 0.210
New Job: Much less responsibility -0.101 0.018 -5.52 0.000 0.114
Not Industry – Reference – 0.571
Other Industry 0.020 0.012 1.61 0.107 0.269
Aircraft Industry 0.042 0.015 2.69 0.007 0.160
Technical knowledge and job experience neces-
sary
0.027 0.017 1.64 0.100 0.208
Technical knowledge necessary 0.063 0.027 2.32 0.020 0.041
Job experience necessary 0.045 0.015 3.02 0.003 0.355
Technical knowledge & experience useful – Reference – 0.212
Neither experience nor technical knowledge -0.037 0.017 -2.18 0.029 0.184
ˆ ρ 0.018 0.135
Observations 1641
Predicted ∆ log(W) -0.119
Note: Sample consists of all workers that were neither employed by the bankruptcy trustees
nor by Aviation. Age, education, plant location, gender, and marital status are held constant
in this regression. All wages are corrected to reﬂect gross monthly full time wages.
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tenured, quite old, and also probably worked for a high-wage ﬁrm. Given this, these
results are probably not inconsistent with other European studies that look at a more
representative set of displacements (see Kuhn (2002)).
The (pre-displacement)job characteristics variables reveal large diﬀerences in esti-
mated wage losses due to diﬀerent types of work. Compared to an administrative worker
— who lost 11.9 percent — , R&D workers lost 7.1 percent more, production workers
lost 6.3 percent more, while workers in production preparation faced a higher wage loss
of 7.0 percent. Quality control workers lost 8.3 percent more. Workers in sales, planning,
support, human resources and management did not encounter signiﬁcantly higher wage
losses than administrative workers. Hierarchical levels do not explain variation in wage
losses.
The variable indicating the number of lateral movements between job activities on
the same hierarchical levels turns out to lower wage losses signiﬁcantly. This is an
indication that job rotation within the same hierarchical level lowers wage losses by 3.2
percent per ‘rotation’. This result is very interesting. It suggests that not the level
itself is important for ﬁnding a good match, but that the obtained level of generality
within each level cushions displacement losses. This is most likely a result from the
fact that workers who experienced more job rotations in the displacing ﬁrm have more
opportunities to ﬁnd similar jobs in a larger variety of ﬁrms.
For the post-displacement jobs characteristics we ﬁnd that workers remaining with
the same industry suﬀer less wage losses. Compared to workers leaving industrial jobs
altogether, staying in the aircraft industry reduces wage losses by 4.2 percent. Compared
to workers switching to other types of industries it can reduce wage losses by 2.2 percent.
This corroborates results found for the US (Neal 1995). Workers who take on jobs for
which their technical knowledge or their work experience was necessary see their wage
losses diminish by 6 and 4 percent respectively. Note that job experience does not
reﬂect (a) the time of the experience, nor (b) the speciﬁc ﬁrm where that experience was
gained. Having jobs with lower responsibility increases wage losses. Somewhat lower
responsibility translates to 5 percent wage losses, while much lower responsibility leads
to 10 percent higher wage losses.
Idiosyncratic ability enters the wage loss equation signiﬁcantly negatively. This is
consistent with our prediction that Fokker had to pay a ‘risk’ premium to make workers
stay during the period of demise.
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Table 7.4: Wage Losses Three Years after Displacement
Marg. Eﬀect s.e. t p X
Months unemployed -0.007 0.001 -6.49 0.000 5.026
Number of employers: 0 -0.023 0.024 -0.96 0.336 0.179
Number of employers: 2 0.034 0.013 2.55 0.011 0.278
Number of employers: 3 0.043 0.019 2.26 0.024 0.092
Number of employers: 4 0.070 0.031 2.27 0.023 0.032
Number of employers: > 4 0.012 0.039 0.30 0.763 0.020
Idiosyncratic Ability -0.336 0.054 -6.25 0.000 0.000
Observations 1574
Predicted ∆ log(W) -0.025
Note: We control also for age, ﬁrm, hierarchical and job tenure, as well as number of trainings,
job activity, hierarchical level, lateral movements, new job responsibility, education, required
knowledge, gender and marital status.
7.4.2 Three Years Later: Testing the Ranking Model
Until now, we have only considered the characteristics of the ﬁrst job after the bankruptcy.
In order to examine eﬀects of wage losses over time and of the length of unemployment
we re-estimate the wage loss regression, but now using the wage that was earned three
years after the bankruptcy, at the time the survey was conducted.
The estimate of ∆W = W S
i − W F
i (where W S
i is the wage at the time of the survey)
provides the opportunity to test Blanchard and Diamond’s (1994) hypothesis of the
ranking eﬀect. The ranking eﬀect assumes that ﬁrms receiving multiple acceptable
applications hire the worker who has been unemployed for the shortest period.
The reason is that short unemployment spells signal — according to this theory —
good, but unobservable, behavior. Ranking and non-ranking models show similar unem-
ployment dynamics and equilibrium wage outcomes, but diﬀerent wage dynamics. The
ranking model can be tested because in our survey we explicitly asked the respondents
for detailed information on their employment history between the time of displacement
and the time of the survey.
We deﬁne two additional variables in our model:
• the total amount of time unemployed between displacement and the date of the
survey.
• the number of diﬀerent employers between displacement and current job (0 =
unemployed, 1 = current job is ﬁrst job, 2 = current job is second job, etc.)
Both the ranking and the non-ranking model predict that the total time not worked
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enters the wage diﬀerence equation signiﬁcantly negative. In the ranking model long
unemployment duration signals below average skills. The ranking model assumes that
the longer the inactive spell the lower the probability that a worker will be hired by
another ﬁrm that can choose from multiple applicants. The ranking model would also
predict the second variable to enter the wage diﬀerence equation signiﬁcantly, whereas
the non-ranking model would not. According to Blanchard and Diamond, given the
unemployment duration having multiple employers reduces a worker’s possibility to ac-
quire a badge of good behavior. Thus multiple employers lower the matched wage. The
non-ranking model would not predict the eﬀect of multiple employers on wages to be
that negative. Table 7.4 shows the eﬀects of the two additional variables on wage losses
after three years of displacement. The longer a worker was unemployed the higher the
observed wage losses. This is consistent with the predictions of the ranking model as
well as the non-ranking model. Every month of unemployment adds 0.65 percentage
point to the observed wage loss. But having multiple employers is not harmful. Quite
the contrary, having had more employers reduces wage losses. This is a refutation of the
ranking model.
Idiosyncratic ability turns out to be signiﬁcantly negative, and the eﬀect is much
higher than that estimated for the ﬁrst job after employment. This is not in line with the
prediction that unobserved ability would have a negative eﬀect upon ﬁrst employment
which is subsequently diminished over time as the new employer learns about the ability
of the new worker.
We rather ﬁnd support for the alternative prediction of the eﬀect of ‘risk premium’
that Fokker paid to keep workers whom they needed to stay in the period of demise. As
other ﬁrms do not face distress they do not need to oﬀer such a risk premium.
7.5 Updating the Reservation Wage over Time
Table 7.5 shows the evolution of the nominal wages of observed matches after the
bankruptcy. It reﬂects the downward sloping curve so often portrayed in the search
literature, and suggested to result from the endogenous interaction between search, du-
ration of UI, adaptation of reservation wages, and hyperbolic discounting by the indi-
vidual worker (Postel-Vinay and Robin 2002). How the adaptation of the reservation
wage over time actually takes place is not well explained in the literature. Although
often referred to as ‘learning’ and modelled as a stochastic process accordingly, it re-
mains unclear how updating of the reservation wage actually occurs. Many view the
189Table 7.5: Average Salary and Number of Matches per 3 Month Period
Time tp 1 tp 2 tp 3 tp 4 time period 5
period < 6/96 < 9/96 < 12/96 < 3/97 < 6/97 < 9/97 < 12/97 < 3/98 < 6/98 < 9/98 ≥ 9/98
matches 835 393 191 68 58 43 23 20 15 8 25
avg salaris 5845 5237 5177 4964 4896 4120 3780 4225 3637 3543 4353
at risk 1679 844 451 260 192 134 91 68 48 33 25
Notes: The ﬁrst three time periods refer to a three month period. I.e. < 6/96 refers to the period from March 1996 to June 1996.
The period geq 9/98 refers to the period September 1998 until the 1st of April 1999, when the survey was conducted.7.5 Updating the Reservation Wage over Time
adaptation process as random, some say it depends on individual wealth (Bloemen and
Stancanelli 2001). Randomness is often assumed to result from trial and error. In fact,
for this to work a job-seeker needs the input of a large sequence of job-interviews. But
invitations for interviews are rare, and once invited for an interview the rejection prob-
ability is remarkably low: 26.75 percent receive an oﬀer which is rejected, however most
of those workers have received multiple oﬀers around the same time. If anything, the
process should be one that is based on – often unobserved – unsuccessful applications
that determine the reduction of reservation wages over time until a successful match is
found.
We propose a diﬀerent method of updating. It is based on the observation that after
the bankruptcy many former employees became members of clubs where people meet
regularly. Most of these clubs have a recreational purpose – we counted 14 diﬀerent
clubs, varying from a bowling club to a yoga club – and two more general interest
organizations that are responsible for the clubs’ activities. These are the Association
of Former Fokker Employees, with 2,000 members, and the Community of Interests of
Ex-Employees of Fokker, that had 1,100 members at the time we conducted our survey.
Our assumption is simple. Rather than basing the consideration of when and by how
much to adjust your reservation wage on idiosyncratic experiences alone we suggest that
people in these clubs and organizations are informed about the successes and failures of
people similar to them and that that information is used for updating. Although we do
not have information on who was a member and how often people met, we do observe
for every worker in the sample the characteristics of successful matches. The process of
peer updating is modelled in the following way.
Each updating process needs time. We call this a period, and we assume that periods
have similar lengths for all individual people. The risk set during each period consists
of all workers who are job-seekers at the beginning of the period, Nt. A peer is deﬁned
as a worker with observable characteristics, Xit, being similar to job-seeker i in period
t. Mt > 0 workers ﬁnd jobs during period t. Their matched wages and wage losses are
observed by all other workers, and the wages of recently matched colleagues may be
standing in for unobserved variations in local labor market conditions. At the beginning
of each consecutive period the risk set has been reduced to Nt+1 = Nt −Mt. In the ﬁrst




);i ∈ [1,N1] (7.5)
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where Wi1 is the last wage earned before displacement, and ¯ W−i1 is the average of all
last wages earned by the other workers subject to displacement from the same ﬁrm.
In period t > 1, we order all job-seekers in the previous period t − 1 according to the
observed successes in ﬁnding a job during that period, starting with the successful ones.
Deﬁne ˆ Wjt−1 as the observed matched wage in period t − 1 by the individual successful
worker j, j ∈ [1,Mt−1], and deﬁne W ∗
it as the expected wage at the beginning of period
t that would have been obtained by worker i, i ∈ [Mt−1 + 1,Nt] if a successful match
is believed – by the job-seeker – to be independent of unobservable ability diﬀerences
between fortunate workers and unfortunate job-seekers with similar characteristics, that








, i ∈ [Mt−1 + 1,Nt] , t > 1 , (7.6)
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∗
it = Pr(It−1 = 1|Xit) · E[ ˆ Wit−1|Xit] (7.7)
¯ W
∗











To calculate RWit we need to specify how to obtain estimates for Pr(It−1 = 1|Xit) and
for E[ ˆ Wit−1|Xit]. The ﬁrst component is estimated as a simple Probit model of observed
successful matches ( It−1 = 1) and unsuccessful workers ( It−1 = 0) during period t − 1
given Xit. The assumed randomness of successful matches among peers allows us to
compute the simple OLS regression of observed matches on characteristics Xjt , and
use the estimated coeﬃcients to compute the predicted wage E[ ˆ Wit−1|Xit]. Finally, we









The parameters λt will be estimated using a piecewise-constant hazard model suggested
by Lancaster (1990) including the correction for heterogeneity as suggested by Murphy
(1996). The likelihood function for this model is given in the Appendix of this chapter.
Table 7.6 gives the results of the estimation. The relative position of the expected
wages turn out to be highly signiﬁcant. All else equal they predict longer search for
higher expected wages. This conﬁrms the idea that workers learn over time and ob-
serve the matches of their coworkers rather than trying to learn from their labor market
failures alone. Based on matches of their coworkers they extrapolate their chances of
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Table 7.6: Piece-wise Constant Hazard Model
Coeﬀ. s.d. z p
t1 -7.262 0.296 -24.53 0.000
t2 -7.532 0.299 -25.20 0.000
t3 -8.789 0.326 -26.97 0.000
t4 -6.363 0.293 -21.68 0.000
t5 -5.700 0.279 -20.40 0.000
t1 * relative wage position 0.113 0.107 1.05 0.293
t2 * relative wage position 1.451 0.340 4.27 0.000
t3 * relative wage position 6.804 0.591 11.50 0.000
t4 * relative wage position -0.776 1.025 -0.76 0.449
t5 * relative wage position 0.301 0.918 0.33 0.743
Idiosyncratic Ability 0.484 0.280 1.73 0.084
1/lnυ -13.881 185.741 -0.07 0.940
Subjects 1613
Note: t1 to t5 represent the time speciﬁc intercepts. We also control for all other variables
that are used in the ﬁrst duration estimation.
ﬁnding a job and the market valuation of their skills. The ﬁrst row of Figure 7.1 gives
the distribution of the predicted chance that a worker will ﬁnd new employment based
on the observed matches of the previous period of his former colleagues. The second
row presents the distribution of expected (log) wages also based on observed matches of
former colleagues. The probability of employment times the expected wages – the third
row – is the distribution of expected reservation wages. Note that the distribution is
widely dispersed in the second time period, while it gets more concentrated in the later
time periods. The estimated coeﬃcients for the last two periods (time period four and
ﬁve) are statistically insigniﬁcant.
Idiosyncratic ability is signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with the ﬁrst wage after
displacement (Table 7.3), signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with earnings three years
later (Table 7.4), and positively but insigniﬁcantly correlated with search time (Table
7.6). From this we conclude that the residual of the wage growth equation does not
reﬂect unobserved ability, but rather reﬂects increased ‘risk’ premiums paid by Fokker
during the period of demise to prevent workers from leaving the ﬁrm.
193Figure 7.1: Development of Job Expectations, Predicted Wages and Wage Expectations
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We combined survey data from displaced workers and their personnel records from a
bankrupt ﬁrm to investigate post-displacement diﬀerences in search time and earnings.
We ﬁnd that wage losses as a result of a displacement in the Netherlands are large
and comparable to those found in the US. Since the workers in our data set are high
tenured, relatively old, and probably worked for a high-wage ﬁrm, these results may not
be inconsistent with other existing European studies that look at more representative
sets of displacement.
Pre-displacement job-characteristics are found to be important predictors of both
search time and earnings losses after displacement. Search time increases with age and
tenure, whereas workers with a higher hierarchical position search signiﬁcantly shorter
than lower level workers. Although, the search-time seems to be largely unaﬀected by
the speciﬁcation of the job activity, it plays an important role in explaining displacement
wage losses after displacement. The hierarchical level is inversely related to wage losses
if employment is found within a year, while it has no eﬀect afterwards. Pre-displacement
lateral job movements reduce earnings losses by 3.2 percent per job rotation. The wage-
losses of all workers together were estimated amount to 11.9 percent. Staying within
the same industry decreased the initial wage losses, but this eﬀect was insigniﬁcant after
three years.
We analyzed the displacement eﬀects of tenure with the ﬁrm, within ranks, and jobs.
None of these tenure variables are found to contribute to explaining observed wage
losses. Other information on characteristics of old an new jobs and how they diﬀer
nihilated the role of the variables traditionally suggested to represent ﬁrm-speciﬁc and
not transferable on-the-job investments in productive human capital. This is surprising
and possibly an important result. More research is needed that uses similar detailed
information on pre- and post-displacement job-characteristics before we can draw further
reaching conclusions. But for our data-set the explanation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital
to understand observed wage losses is not supported.
Our data refutes the Blanchard-Diamond (1994) ranking model. After a period of
three years, workers who had multiple employers have lower wage losses.
Idiosyncratic ability, measured as the residual wage growth during the last three years
at the displacing ﬁrm, turned out to be an important and insightful variable. Not because
unobserved ability was found to be important to explain variation in post-displacement
search time and wage losses, but because it revealed that the distressed ﬁrm had a wage
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policy of paying ‘risk’ premiums during its ﬁnal years of existence to entice workers not
to abandon the distressed ﬁrm.
Allowing workers to learn from the labor market experience of their former co-workers
and basing their search strategy on matching results observed of workers similar to them
is found to be an important explanation of the simultaneous dynamics of reservation
wages and observed unemployment durations. Similar workers who found high wage
jobs increase the unemployed peer worker’s reservation wage as well as the predicted
search time. Workers from higher hierarchical positions ﬁnd a new job faster than their
lower ranked counterparts.
1967.6 Conclusion
Appendix A: The Econometric Speciﬁcation of the
Reservation Wage Updating Model
Following Lancaster (1990) we divide the observation period into S intervals, let c1,c2,...,cS−1
denote the border of the interval. The hazard of a person i for interval s can then be
written as
θi(t) = µie
λs, cs−1 ≤ t < cs, s = 1,2,...,S (7.10)
Let µi = µ(Xi) = exp(Xiγ) and let us deﬁne an indicator ds such that,
ds(t) =
(
1 if cs−1 ≤ t < cs,
0 otherwise
This indicator identiﬁes the interval into which t falls. Let us further deﬁne Ds(t) =
Qs
j=1[1 − dj(t)], s = 1,2,...,S − 1; D0(t) = 1. The variable simply indicates whether t
falls at or after cs.
Given possible heterogeneity due to some unobserved characteristics in the true X∗, we
follow Lancaster and Nickell (1980) and Murphy (1996) in assuming that the heterogene-
ity can be captured in the single random variable υ with a distribution of function H(υ)
and density h(υ). This is assumed multiplicative in the hazard which thus becomes:
θi(X
∗
i ,t) = υµi · e
λs (7.11)
The hazard rate of person i for all S periods then becomes:
θi(X
∗

















λs[(ti − cs−1)dis + (cs − cs−1)Dis]}
υ
The likelihood contribution of person i who is leaving unemployment or censored at ti
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is







λs[(ti − cs−1)dis + (cs − cs−1)Dis] (7.14)
With δ being an indicator variable that takes on the value one if the observation is not
censored and zero otherwise. In order to write the log-likelihood more compactly, we
deﬁne
Tis = [(ti − cs−1)dis + (cs − cs−1)Dis]

















υµi · Tis (7.15)
1988 Job Oﬀers, Reservation Wages and
Acceptance in Local Labor Markets
“[A recent textbook in labor economics] notes that formal intermediaries
in the labor market are not widely used, and concludes that ‘the worker
who sets out to ﬁnd employment very likely goes through a process of
chasing down vague rumors or leads.’ ‘All too frequently,’ it adds, ‘the
buyers and sellers, blindfolded by a lack of knowledge, simply grope
about until they bump into each other.’ I shall argue here that the
analogies with commodity and security markets, even when qualiﬁed, are
mischievous and misleading and that the eﬀectiveness and advantages of
informal networks of information have been too little appreciated.
The search for information in any market has both an extensive and an
intensive margin. A buyer can search at the extensive margin by getting a
quotation from one more seller. He can search at the intensive margin by
getting additional information concerning an oﬀer already received.
Where the goods and services sold are highly standardized, the extensive
margin is the more important; when there is great variation in quality, the
intensive margin moves to the forefront.”
(Rees, 1966 , p. 560)
1998 Reservation Wages
8.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we have investigated how workers can learn from the experience
of their peers. In this chapter this notion is pursued further on a geographical scale.
We investigate the diﬀerences of the eﬀects of displacement for workers from diﬀerent
regions. Using the standard search model to relate wages directly with the search time,
we estimate the (reservation-)wages conditional on the search time and expected job
oﬀers.
We ﬁnd an inverse relationship between percentage of the local population receiving
social security and the number of job oﬀers in a region. In a region with more ﬁrms the
number of oﬀers is also bigger. However, these eﬀects do not have a signiﬁcant impact
on the ‘hazard’ of ﬁnding a job, implying that workers are less picky in the regions with
dimmer employment prospects.
While reservation wages play a decisive role in accepting or rejecting job oﬀers in
theoretical search models, only few empirical studies have direct evidence on reservation
wages. If indications of the magnitude of reservations can be obtained, it is usually
based on single point surveys. Ideally, one would like to interview unemployed workers
at ﬁxed intervals and ask them for which wage they would be willing to accept a job oﬀer.
The relevant question is on the dynamics of the reservation wage, whether reservation
wages decline over the course of an unemployment spell. The earliest empirical study is
by Kasper (1967). His work, as those that follow in his footsteps, is to investigate the
movement of reservation wage over the duration of the unemployment spell. Kasper in-
vestigates the determination of the reservation wage in relation to the last earned wage to
investigate whether this reservation wage declines with longer unemployment duration.
He uses information from unemployed workers informing the unemployment agency ‘for
which wage they would be willing to work’. He ﬁnds that those wages are generally less
than those that they earned in previous jobs. Using a simple wage diﬀerence OLS re-
gression on duration he ﬁnds that reservation wages decline by approximately 3 percent
annually. Barnes (1975) uses a similar approach as Kasper but investigates the reason
for this decline. He tries to identify whether the declining reservation wage is due to a
decline in the expected returns to search (ﬁnite horizon) as suggested in Gronau (1971)
or that it reﬂects a downward revision in the perceived wage oﬀer distribution as pro-
posed in McCall (1970). His result hints towards a ‘learning explanation’ for the decline
in the reservation wage: workers revise their expectation of the wage oﬀer distribution.
It is this idea that we pursue in this chapter. We include in a standard equilibrium
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search model local economic conditions and former organizational relationships through
which workers may learn about the labor market conditions and may receive referrals.
A second crucial element in theoretical job search models is the assumption of the dis-
tribution of oﬀers, unemployed workers draw from. Not many studies have information
on the number of job oﬀers or model them explicitly. Notable exceptions include Stern
(1989) and Jensen and Westerg˚ ard-Nielsen (1987). Stern (1989) models how workers de-
termine the optimal number of applications. Thus multiple oﬀers per period are feasible.
In a similar spirit Jensen and Westerg˚ ard-Nielsen (1987) have examined the transition
from school to work. Diﬀerent from Stern (1989) they observe the number of oﬀers.
In this chapter we will discuss a model of job search in which we include learning of
the workers as well as information passing about local labor market conditions. Workers,
being ﬁred from their previous job, determine a reservation wage given the information
on the job oﬀer arrival rate and the mean of the wage oﬀer distribution. Similar to Blau
and Robins (1986) we have information on the number of job oﬀers, but not their exact
timing.1 We will hence follow their suit in instrumenting for the number of job oﬀers
by recovering the distribution of job oﬀers, to then estimate the individual hazard rates.
This identiﬁcation of individual hazard rates allows us to recover the reservation wage
distribution. Then we examine the inﬂuence of information about other job matches on
the hazard ﬁnding a job and the reservation wage, as well as the inﬂuence of information
passing among peers.
8.2 Regional Job Oﬀers
It is quite common to assume that the oﬀer arrival rate is a ﬁxed Poisson process leading
to a ﬁxed (expected) number of oﬀers arriving within a speciﬁc time period. Wolpin
(1995, page 38) notes that in estimation of structural models,
“[J]ob oﬀer probabilities tend to be low and acceptance rates high. Using
diﬀerent data sets and diﬀerent formalizations of the job search model, Blau
(1991) estimates the oﬀer probability to be about 5 percent per week, Eng-
berg (1991) about 2 percent and Wolpin (1987) about 1 percent per week.
Acceptance rates are close to one in all of these studies.” He concludes that “
independently collected information on the number of rejected oﬀers should
show there to be few of them.”
1We do, however, observe the exact timing of the oﬀer that was accepted.
201Table 8.1: Number of Oﬀers: Fokker Survey
Local Region Number of Oﬀers received Wage Fokker Wage Unemp. Firms
(2 digit ZIP)
Obs. 0 1 2 3 4 > 4 mean s.d. mean s.d. mean
10–14 380 11.05 61.05 10.00 7.89 2.89 7.11 36 14 34 19 17.54 4.09
15–20 221 5.88 67.42 10.86 7.69 4.52 3.62 34 11 31 12 16.89 3.23
21–24 411 8.27 67.15 9.98 7.79 3.65 3.16 38 14 36 24 12.43 3.33
25–27 92 14.13 68.48 6.52 9.78 0.00 1.09 35 17 36 20 15.57 3.96
28–31 73 1.37 65.75 24.66 4.11 2.74 1.37 29 8 27 10 18.29 3.85
32–33 149 12.75 65.10 8.72 8.05 2.68 2.68 28 9 25 11 14.44 2.75
34–39 99 6.06 66.67 11.11 5.05 5.05 6.06 41 17 37 18 13.85 3.43
40–42 14 21.43 64.29 0.00 7.14 0.00 7.14 44 33 46 43 12.34 2.84
47–49 64 9.38 59.38 9.38 6.25 9.38 6.25 30 14 26 16 15.80 3.29
43–46 & ≥ 50 147 2.72 62.59 12.24 12.93 4.76 4.76 40 19 39 22 16.53 2.57
Total 1650 8.55 64.85 10.61 8.00 3.64 4.36 35 15 34 20 16.08 2.93
Notes: Number of Oﬀers received gives the number of oﬀers a worker reports he received prior to accepting his ﬁrst job.
Wage Fokker is the last hourly wage earned at Fokker. Wage is the hourly wage earned after displacement. Unemp. gives
the proxy for unemployment. It is the population weighted percentage of inactive labor market population. Firms is a
variable measuring the density of ﬁrms located in the region (1=lowest ... 9=highest).8.3 Role of Information
We observe the number of oﬀers received as well as which oﬀers are rejected or accepted
(cf. Table 8.1). Oﬀers are identiﬁed in our data by a set of questions in the survey. A
respondent is asked whether he received any speciﬁc job oﬀer to work for an organization
as well as some information on the ‘best’ oﬀer rejected, if multiple oﬀers were received.
While we can see that most workers receive only one oﬀer, a signiﬁcant proportion receive
multiple oﬀers. Table 8.1 splits up the distribution of oﬀers over two digit postal code
(ZIP) areas of workers’ home addresses. These areas were selected in order to form
coherent geographical regions (cf. Figure 8.1). The total distribution of job oﬀers shows
that less than ten percent of the workers have not received any oﬀer. Most workers have
received only one oﬀer, many of which have accepted this job oﬀer.2 However, there is
also a large proportion (more than 20 percent) of workers who report several job oﬀers.
The regional distribution of these job oﬀers is also interesting. The regions, identiﬁed
by the two digit postcodes 10-14, 25-27, 32-33 and 40-42 show a higher proportion of
workers who did not receive any job oﬀer.
8.3 Role of Information
The role of information on job search within networks of workers can be divided into
two separate parts. Firstly, job searchers can be referred to new jobs, which means
that not only do they get information about a possible position, but they are usually
introduced to the new employer by someone that is already employed there. Secondly,
job searchers can obtain information on the job market and their value by observing
similar workers and job searchers. This allows the worker to get a realistic valuation
of his skills upon which he can base his choice to accept or reject a job oﬀer. We will
model both eﬀects by the ratio of job searchers to the entire network of former Fokker
employees, while restricting networks to be regional. This regional restriction is done to
increase the likelihood that workers met regularly and exchanged information.
8.3.1 Job Referral
Many jobs are ﬁlled by referral (Granovetter 1974). The advantage for the employer is
that there is some screening of the new worker by an existing and known employee. One
of the problems employers are facing, is that they want to ﬁnd promising employees,
2Note though that respondents have the tendency to forget some job oﬀers if they did not perceive
them as attractive enough, especially if they have received such an oﬀer several years ago, which can
happen in our survey which asks questions over a retrospective time period of three years.
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Figure 8.1: Two digit Postcode Regions
NL Postcode-2
by val (2)
43-46 & >49  (24)
47-49   (3)
40-42   (3)
34-39   (6)
32-33   (2)
28-31   (4)
25-27   (3)
21-24   (4)
15-20   (6)
10-14   (5)
Notes: Gives all two digit postcode regions of the Netherlands. Shaded area’s form regions of interest
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leading eventually to a job oﬀer. Rees (1966) notes that referrals are one way to ﬁlter
workers. Referrals are usually comparable to existing workers, hence they ﬁt well into
the company. Kugler (2003) develops an equilibrium matching model in which ﬁrms
can choose to either use referrals or ‘formal’ methods of hiring. The former is assumed
to have lower hiring costs and better suiting candidates, while the ‘formal’ methods are
assumed to lead to more contacts, i.e. possibilities to hire. She shows that both hiring
methods can coexist in equilibrium. After the displacement Fokker workers stayed in
contact with each other. It is not uncommon that once a worker found employment
new job oﬀers within that ﬁrm were also transmitted to former employees of Fokker.
The passing of information through ‘informal’ networks has been modelled by Calv´ o-
Armengol and Jackson (2001). They model information of job openings to be passed on
to other members in the network by all employed workers.3 The more workers within the
network are employed the higher is the likelihood that the information on job openings
is passed on to the unemployed worker.
We will use the size of the fraction of those employed in the estimation of the condi-
tional oﬀers. A higher proportion of employed workers should lead to an increase in the
amount of job oﬀers passed through the informal channel as both the number of infor-
mants are increasing, but also the number of users – who do not pass on the information
– are decreasing. We will restrict the network to be within similar hierarchical levels
of the ﬁrm, as it is likely that those workers are homogenous with respect to jobs they
search for, but are also likely to interact with each other. Hence, white and blue collar
workers are assumed to have separate referral networks.
We will operationalize this by deﬁning a ratio of employed and total population within
the blue and white collar hierarchies identiﬁed by the subscript l for every time period





We do not explicitly model the size of the network. However, as networks grow, several
eﬀects can take place: updating information through the network can be time consuming
as there are many contacts made. On the other hand if information is passed on over
several network nodes, we can see a “snowball” eﬀect in the sense that information is
getting accumulated regarding workers and that the information collected individually
through network contacts will be passed on completely. Given suﬃcient time or through
3However, this is not speciﬁcally done for referrals. Rather the information ﬂow is modelled, without
any qualiﬁcation or information passing other than the existence of an opening is taken into account.
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contacts of the network participants we would end up in a situation in which the agents
have full information over all open positions available. However, as referrals also in-
clude an introduction of potential employees to employers it is doubtful that the referral
network will go through several nodes.
8.3.2 Neighborhood Networks
Workers are not only searching for job openings, but they also have to determine their
reservation wage wr. This reservation wage is derived from the knowledge about the
wage oﬀer distribution, and their chances of getting a job oﬀer. However, the wage oﬀer
distribution is not ﬁxed over time, but rather changes as the economic situation and
the institutional structure changes. Also, workers might not have unbiased perceptions
on the wage oﬀer distribution and tend to overestimate their chances on the labor mar-
ket in the ﬁrst instance, and gradually learn about their true wage oﬀer distribution
available. B¨ oheim (2002) compares the relation of reported reservation wages of British
unemployed job seekers to the predicted reservation wages. He ﬁnds that “job seekers
are too optimistic relative to the model when reporting their reservation wage to an
interviewer” (p. 13). These job seekers were interviewed at the beginning of their unem-
ployment spell. They have some idea of the pay that is available for their background,
but this is mostly based on experience on their previous job, rather than on actual job
search (on or oﬀ the job). So it is natural for a job seeker to base his estimate of the
available wage oﬀer distribution on the wage he earned in his previous job. Only through
job oﬀers that he receives, and by informing about job oﬀers or matches of colleagues
can he adapt his expectation towards the actual wage oﬀer distribution.4
Workers displaced from Fokker are high-tenured workers. It seems reasonable to as-
sume that they do not have a full grasp of the wage oﬀer distribution available to them.
They will base their judgement about the expected wage oﬀer distribution on their
pre-displacement wage, and on the information they receive from oﬀers and matches
of co-workers. Many of the workers interact within their old social network of former
Fokker employees; meeting former colleagues in social clubs directly or indirectly or-
ganized by their former colleagues. The three main plants employed the majority of
workers and many workers settled in the vicinity of the plants, creating neighborhoods
in which a high proportion was employed with Fokker. While former workers in these
4This is also in line with Bala and Goyal (1998) who theoretically model the learning process of
networks. They also postulate that the agents of the network are basing themselves on their own
experience and the information they receive through the network.
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neighborhoods did not necessarily work in associated groups within Fokker, they do
have contacts and presumably exchange information on their job search experiences or
successes.
The operationalization is similar to the referral network as we will again use the
proportion employed. However, we will also generate an expected wage for all workers,
so the information that is gathered through the neighborhoods consists of job openings












Let us call the ﬁrst part RN consisting of the ratio of employed over the total popu-
lation of displaced workers in a neighborhood N. The neighborhood is identiﬁed by the
two digit postal code (ZIP) as in Table 8.1. The second part Iw gives the relative ex-
pected wage position of the displaced worker, which is derived from wages of comparable
workers within the neighborhood given the probability of employment.5 We suggest that
if RN increases, the number of job oﬀers or job openings should also increase as more
employed workers will pass information about available job openings on as they have no
need for it themselves. An increase in wages paid should lead to lower acceptance rates,
ceteris paribus.
8.4 Search Model
The underlying model is the basic model of search as in McCall (1970) and Gronau
(1971). Let us deﬁne some discrete period of time t and a valuation of the alternative
use of a period of time b. A discount factor for future costs or beneﬁts is deﬁned as β(t).
F(w) is used to denote the cumulative distribution function of the wage oﬀers. Further,
q(n,t;In,t) describes the probability distribution over the number of oﬀers, n, received
per period of length t. And let us denote the probability that the best of n oﬀers is less
than or equal to w given that n ≥ 1 can be denoted by G(w,n).
5A workers chance of ﬁnding employment is estimated by using a simple Probit estimation. The
predicted wage is derived from a simple OLS regression of observed matches on the workers’ charac-
teristics. See also the updating process in Chapter 7
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w = max(w1,...,wn)
Let W(w) present the value of stopping and accepting the best oﬀer received, w, and
working forever at that wage. V (·) is the value of searching during the next period,
given today’s information. The worker continues to search as long as V (Ω) > W(w).
Where we can deﬁne the value of searching as
V (Ω) = (b − c(m))t + β(t)E{max[V (Ω(t0 + t)),w(x)]|Ω(t0)}
Here, x is some random “best oﬀer”, c(m) denotes search costs relative to search eﬀort
m, with cost increasing in search eﬀort, and Ω(Rl,t0,In,t0) the information set available
at time t0, which is updated as time progresses and matches are observed. The value of
searching can be solved to yield:






max[V,W(x)]dG(x,n) + q(0,t)V ]







There exists a reservation wage wr such that
W(w
r) = V
We can rewrite the equation 8.3, the value of searching, to yield:
rV = b − c(m) + λ
Z ∞
0
max[0,W(x) − V ]dF(x) (8.4)
Jobs are accepted when the value of accepting the job is higher or equal to the the










(rW(x) − rV )dF(x) = c(m) + w
r − b
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r)dF(x) = c(m) + w
r − b
If the participation constraint is fulﬁlled, which states that the expected returns of
search must cover the search costs c(m), there is a reservation wage equalling the value
of searching and higher than the alternative valuation, e.g. beneﬁts.
rV = w






r)dF(x) > c(m) (8.5)
8.5 Data
We use data from three sources. Fokker’s electronic personnel data system provided in-
formation about workers’pre-displacement careers inside the ﬁrm. In 1999 post-displacement
information was gathered through a mail survey among all workers who were laid oﬀ
after the ﬁrm’s bankruptcy. The ‘Fokker Survey’ collected data on the labor market
experience for the three years following the workers’ displacement. This survey data has
been linked to the information from the personnel ﬁles. Finally, local labor market indi-
cators as well as the density of plants are taken from the Statistics Netherlands’ regional
employment data. As an indicator of unemployment we use the population weighted
average of inactive population.
Regional Identiﬁcation
Regions are identiﬁed by the postal zip code. The Netherlands has a four digit zip
code, in which lower level zip codes aggregate to larger regions. Two digit zip codes of
workers’ home addresses were necessary to aggregate suﬃcient respondents of the Fokker
Survey while leaving a region that is still suﬃciently small to allow and expect regional
worker interaction. Often, several two digit zip codes were combined and compared to
the remaining regions in the Netherlands. The aggregation over several ZIP codes was
done in such a way that the areas form a coherent geographical region(cf. Figure 8.1 on
page 204).
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8.5.1 The Personnel Data
From Fokker’s personnel ﬁles we obtained information on each employee’s type of job,
compensation, and demographics. Demographic characteristics include date of birth,
gender, education, marital status, and the hiring date of each employee. The average
tenure at the time of bankruptcy was 15 years. The ﬁrm’s hierarchy distinguishes 8
diﬀerent levels below top management. The highest observable step, the eighth level,
is just below the top management and the Board of Directors. For reasons of possible
identiﬁcation, the two upper levels (9 and 10) were left out of the data-set.
The hierarchical structure roughly reﬂects the division of unskilled versus skilled work-
ers as well as the organization of supervision. Production workers are located in levels 1
to 3. Managers, engineers, and aircraft designers belong to levels 4 to 8.6 Every position
is ‘allocated’ to a job activity. These activities are Administration, Sales, Management,
Human Resources, R&D as well as Production Preparation, Production Planning, Sup-
port, Production and Quality Control. Job rotation is deﬁned as the number of lateral
job changes within a given hierarchical level. The lateral job change is a movement
across job activities without changing the hierarchical position to a higher (or lower)
level job. In addition to the normal tenure variable, we observe tenure within the hier-
archy and tenure within a speciﬁc position (job). The latter two tenure variables were
measured in months rather than years for the last position held before lay-oﬀ.
8.5.2 The ‘Fokker Survey’
The survey asked for information on the ﬁrst and the current job. Respondents reported
the date at which they started to work in the new position, their starting wage and
hours worked. Information was also collected on the type of ﬁrm. We categorize new
employers as belonging to the aircraft industry, other manufacturing industries, or non-
manufacturing. The respondents were asked to assess their responsibility in their new
job compared to that before displacement. On a ﬁve point scale, the middle category
reﬂecting a similar level of responsibility, they could indicate ‘more’, and ‘much more’
responsibility on the one hand, or ‘less’ and ‘much less’ on the other hand. Furthermore,
we collected information on the prerequisites for the new job – as perceived by the
respondent –. Here the answer categories were: ‘both their work experience and their
technical knowledge obtained while working with Fokker was necessary to obtain the
new job’, ‘only the work experience’ or ‘only the technical knowledge’ was necessary,
6For a detailed description of the company’s structure in 1987-1996 see Chapter 3.
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a category in which neither their experience nor their technical knowledge was strictly
necessary, and ﬁnally as last category, neither work experience nor technical knowledge
was necessary at all.
8.6 Empirical Model
As the wage oﬀer distribution cannot be (directly) observed since we do not have in-






Flinn and Heckman (1982) point out that f(w0) can be derived from f(w0|w0 > wr)





r) · (1 − F(w
r)) (8.6)
Following Flinn and Heckman (1982), we assume the distribution of wage oﬀers to be
drawn from the log-normal distribution with means diﬀering by worker based on their
characteristics (Xβ).7
lnw0 = Xβ + ￿ with ￿ ∼ N(0,σ
2) (8.7)






r − Xβ) = Xβ + σM (8.8)




r) = V (lnw
0|￿ > lnw
r −Xβ) = σ
2(1−M(M +(Xβ −lnw
r)/σ)) (8.9)
Where M = f[(lnwr − Xβ)/σ]/F[(lnwr − Xβ)/σ]. Flinn and Heckman (1982) suggest
using the minimum accepted wage over the entire sample as a consistent estimator of
the parameters of the untruncated wage oﬀer distribution, β and σ2. However, this
hinges on the homogeneity of the sample and is sensitive to measurement error in the
wage data. Following Blau and Robins (1986) we therefore use the number of oﬀers to
7Given the observations at or below zero, a mixture distribution might be more appropriate to acco-
modate for the few observations that are at or below zero. See Table 8.2.
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Table 8.2: Unconditional Mean Arrival Rate
ˆ δ
Number of Expected Oﬀers Number of Workers Percentage
≤ 0 26 1.64
(0 − 1) 383 24.13
[1 − 2) 1064 67.04
[2 − 3) 114 7.18
Total 1587 100.00
Notes: Unconditional mean arrival rate, ˆ δ, is estimated using a Tobit regression of the number
of oﬀers, correcting for the truncation at zero.
identify β and σ2.
The individual hazard can then be written to be:
τi = δi(t) · Φ[(Xiβ − lnw
r
i(t))/σ] (8.10)
Where Φ(·) denotes the standard normal distribution function. The hazard function
can in principle be estimated, however, identiﬁcation of β and σ2 needs additional in-
formation. Given our data we will use information on the number of oﬀers. Since many
workers do not receive an oﬀer, there is a mass point of observations at zero, and they
are bounded from below at zero. This is the result of the truncation of oﬀers which can
be recovered using a Tobit regression for the conditional mean arrival rates:
δi(t) = Piδ + ￿1 (8.11)
Where ￿1 ∼ N(0,σ2
1), Pi is a set of regressors. This gives us an instrument for the
unconditional mean arrival rate for each worker.8 Secondly, we estimate the individual
hazard rates, speciﬁed as
τi(t) = h(t) · exp(ZiΓ) (8.12)
Where Zi includes Xi and other observable variables that might aﬀect the hazard rate.
Using the estimated individual hazard and the estimated mean arrival rate we can calcu-
late the acceptance probability for each worker (τi(t)/δi(t)).The acceptance probability
8A similar methodology was also used in (Kiefer and Neuman 1979a), (Kiefer and Neuman 1979b),
and (Kiefer and Neuman 1981), but with the job oﬀer arrival rate set to one, as no information on
the arrival rate was available to the authors. This was criticized by Flinn and Heckman (1982) as
special case. In the more general case in which the oﬀers are below one, recovery is impossible without
additional information.
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allows us to recover the reservation wages from Equation (8.6):
lnw
r




The estimation thus goes through three steps. First the individual hazard is estimated.
Second, using the Tobit regression, the unconditional mean arrival rate for each worker is
estimated. From the individual hazard and the mean arrival rate the acceptance rate of
the wage oﬀers can be calculated. The last step is to estimate Equation (8.13) correcting
for the acceptance rate.
8.7 Empirical Results
Before we discuss the variables on possible referral and learning, let us discuss the results
of the other variables (cf. Table 8.3). First of all we have four variables indicating
the time at which a worker has started to search for a new job. Workers might have
anticipated their job loss — or even the closure of the ﬁrm — and hence started searching
before the ﬁrm went bankrupt. From the information in the survey we constructed an
indicator variable as to whether the worker started to search before the bankruptcy
(Job search started before bankruptcy), and the amount of weeks searched before the
bankruptcy date (Number of weeks before bankruptcy). Workers might also have started
early to search for a new job several weeks after they were actually informed about
the bankruptcy. This is captured in the indicator variable Job search started after the
bankruptcy, and the number of weeks are used in the accompanying variable (Number of
weeks after bankruptcy). As can be expected, workers that have started early to search
for new employment have a higher chance of ﬁnding a new job quickly. It also increases
the predicted reservation wage somewhat. Starting late, on the other hand, does not
signiﬁcantly increase the search time. It does however lead to lower reservation wages.
The eﬀect on the reservation wage makes sense for both variables, as in the ﬁrst case,
workers search while still being employed. They have a longer search horizon, and hence
can aﬀord to be selective in the jobs that are to be accepted. Workers that started to
search some weeks after the bankruptcy are also aware of the fact that they did start
late, and that they have a shorter time to ﬁnd new employment. Hence, they adjust the
expected reservation wage downward.
The expected search time is decreasing relative to the hierarchical level of a worker.
Analogously, the number of (expected) oﬀers are increasing with the level of the hier-
archy. Higher hierarchical levels usually go along with more exposure of a worker to
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Table 8.3: Regression Results
(1) (2) (3)
Time Oﬀers Log Wage
Local relative wage position 0.743 0.394
(0.281) (0.084)
Ratio of employed workers within region 9.188 0.898 0.845
(0.608) (1.141) (0.187)
Ratio of employed workers within layer1 0.117 1.364 -0.089
(0.476) (0.828) (0.121)
Job search started before bankruptcy 0.287 0.046 0.030
(0.075) (0.133) (0.021)
— number of weeks before bankruptcy -0.008 -0.001 0.000
(0.003) (0.006) (0.001)
Job search started after bankruptcy 0.036 0.320 -0.050
(0.067) (0.112) (0.017)
— number of weeks after bankruptcy -0.020 -0.004 -0.002
(0.006) (0.008) (0.001)
Hierarchical Level 2 0.169 -0.009 0.089
(0.096) (0.157) (0.025)
Hierarchical Level 3 0.520 0.104 0.212
(0.121) (0.183) (0.032)
Hierarchical Level 4 0.585 0.134 0.348
(0.151) (0.198) (0.041)
Hierarchical Level 5 0.733 0.330 0.450
(0.198) (0.232) (0.057)
Hierarchical Level 6 0.658 0.369 0.491
(0.264) (0.258) (0.075)
Hierarchical Level 7 -0.155 0.342 0.561
(0.382) (0.375) (0.112)
Hierarchical Level 8 0.577 0.928 0.528
(0.504) (0.415) (0.140)
Evaluation: Unsatisfactory -1.183 -1.124 0.130
(0.287) (0.429) (0.088)
Evaluation: Very good 0.158 0.060 0.002
(0.067) (0.113) (0.017)




Observations 13500 1435 1161
R-squared 0.66
Notes: (1) is a parametric duration model with Weibull distribution. (2) is the Tobit regression of the
number of oﬀers, (3) is the wage regression of log monthly wages including the correction factor −σ. All
regressions also include variables of Table 8.4, a constant and variables for age, tenure, and education
level. Standard errors are given in parentheses below the coeﬃcient estimates. The ratio of employed
workers within layer is calculated separately for blue and white collar workers.
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Table 8.4: Regression Results – Local Variables
(1) (2) (3)
Time Oﬀers Log Wage
Postcode 10–14 -0.531 0.149 -0.086
(0.142) (0.243) (0.039)
Postcode 15–20 -0.365 0.109 -0.076
(0.154) (0.261) (0.041)
Postcode 21–24 -0.328 -0.237 -0.086
(0.156) (0.273) (0.041)
Postcode 25–27 -0.472 -0.510 -0.037
(0.175) (0.297) (0.047)
Postcode 32–33 -0.306 0.148 -0.076
(0.173) (0.287) (0.045)
Postcode 34–39 -0.684 -0.070 -0.116
(0.179) (0.311) (0.048)
Postcode 40–41 0.444 -0.287 0.035
(1.015) (1.765) (0.249)
Postcode 47–49 -0.389 0.417 -0.120
(0.190) (0.319) (0.050)
% Local Unemployed1 -0.026 -0.082 -0.001
(0.019) (0.033) (0.005)
Density of Firms in Region [1-9]2 0.056 0.316 -0.012
(0.094) (0.158) (0.024)
Observations 14727 1587 1293
R-squared 0.66
Notes: (1) is a parametric duration model with Weibull distribution. (2) is the Tobit regression of the
number of oﬀers, (3) is the wage regression of log monthly wages including the correction factor −σ.
All regressions also include the variables of Table 8.3, a constant and variables for age, tenure, and
education level. Standard errors are given in parenthesis below the coeﬃcient estimates.
1 This is measured as a the percentage of the population between 25 and 64 who is not employed.
2 The Density is on a scale from 1 to 9, where 1 is the lowest density and 9 the highest.
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Notes: All wages are presented to reﬂect monthly gross wages in Dutch guilders. They are smoothed over all observations using a nearest neighbor
density estimator. Predicted wages are wages predicted without correcting for job oﬀers and job acceptance. Accepted wages are the observed
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The graph gives the linear prediction as well as a scatter plot of the estimated reservation wages over the duration of job
search. Bands give the 95 percent conﬁdence intervals. All salaries are in Dutch Guilders (HFL) and reﬂect monthly wages,
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Notes: The graph gives the linear prediction of the accepted wages over the duration of job search. Bands give the 95 percent
conﬁdence intervals. All salaries are in Dutch Guilders (HFL) and reﬂect monthly wages, while the duration is in months.8.7 Empirical Results
people outside of the ﬁrm and can hence lead to more job oﬀers.
The evaluation also shows that compared to an average evaluation score, those that
were below average also search much longer and have lower chances of receiving job
oﬀers. This can be both an eﬀect of a worker’s type, i.e. a worker that under-performs
in their job also under-performs in job search. But he could also receive less job referrals
from former colleagues, family, or friends, as those people are likely to know that the
person performs below average. A worker that performs above average, on the other
hand, has shorter search duration and more job oﬀers. There is, however, no eﬀect on
the reservation wages of the evaluation score. We also included variables to correct for
tenure, age, and education. As they turn out insigniﬁcant, we do not report the result
in Table 8.3, nor do we discuss the results here.
We have proxied referral networks by the proportion of employed workers within the
same hierarchical layer. Workers of the same layer are most likely to interact with each
other, but also most likely to come across job openings suitable for their fellow workers
of the same hierarchical level. While it is deﬁnitely not true that all workers of one
hierarchical level are employed in similar jobs, or even know each other, it is true that
the chance that they know each other is higher within the hierarchical level than across.
The variable Ratio of employed workers within layer is updated over time, taking into
account all changes that happened in the past. We can see that an increase in the ratio,
i.e. an increase of employed workers, leads to shorter search time and more job oﬀers
being received.
Similar to the referral networks over hierarchical layers, one can also argue for infor-
mation ﬂows among workers that live close to each other. This local proximity is likely
to lead to more information exchange and job referrals compared to workers that live
far apart. However, in this context, job openings that are known and passed on are
less likely to be suitable for a worker, as they are not necessarily similar — as was the
case among workers in the same hierarchy. Local proximity will probably lead to more
informal exchanges among workers than similar backgrounds (in terms of hierarchical
level) would warrant.9 We have determined local proximity by the two digit postal code.
The local ratio of employed workers among the entire (Fokker) population is also neg-
atively related to the search time. However, diﬀerent from the referral networks within
hierarchical layers, the expected number of oﬀers is not (signiﬁcantly) increased with
higher ratios of employed workers. This could be interpreted to conform with the earlier
9As we pointed out in the previous chapter, there was and still is (organized) interaction among former
Fokker employees. This interaction within (social) clubs allows regular encounters and the exchange
of information.
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suggestion, that while information is exchanged (even more frequently), relatively less
referrals are taking place, as workers diﬀer more.
For the same local regions that we used to calculate the ratio of employed persons
among the Fokker population, we calculated a wage position of the worker. A worker
is assumed to observe the wage realizations within the local neighborhood of his former
co-workers. Further, by the new levels of employment realized he calculates his chance
of reemployment. Together this forms the expected wage.This expected wage is then
evaluated relative to the average wage paid to former co-workers in his neighborhood,
yield the Local relative wage position. We can see in Table 8.3 that a higher position, i.e.
higher expected wages, leads to shorter search times and to higher reservation wages.
Figure 8.2 summarizes the development of the reservation wage over time. The line
with small circles gives the development of the predicted wages of workers if we had
not corrected for the number of oﬀers and the duration of search. The line with bigger
circles gives development of the observed accepted wages. The normal line, ﬁnally, gives
the predicted reservation wage. It can be clearly seen that the reservation wage is falling
over time. This cannot be due to a composition eﬀect of (observed characteristics of)
the workers, as we would expect the predicted wage to fall as well. Further we can note
that the initially accepted wages are much higher than the reservation wages, but that
after a year of job search, reservation wages and accepted wages coincide. This can be
explained by the fact that workers who accept jobs shortly after the bankruptcy got
good job oﬀers, i.e. at the higher end of the job oﬀer distribution, but also that learning
and information passing among the workers will lead them to accept wage oﬀers on their
reservation wage, even if this means that compared to their former Fokker salary, they
encounter wage losses.
8.7.1 Regional Diﬀerences
The regression results of Table 8.4 show that almost all regions that have a larger group
of former Fokker employees living there, have longer search times than those workers
that happen to live farther away from the plants, and are not in a region with many
former Fokker employees. We see also that the local economic condition has a signiﬁcant
impact on the number of job oﬀers, but not on the wage or the search time. This implies
that the acceptance ratio of job oﬀers in regions with higher unemployment and fewer
ﬁrms is higher. Workers seem to know that job oﬀers are sparse and therefore will accept
jobs more readily. Wages are lower in those regions that are close to the plants. Postcode
10–14, 21–24, and 34–39 are all around the three plants that were closing down. Note
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Table 8.5: Interquartile range of search time, accepted salary and reservation wage
Postal Code Obs. Search Time Accept. Salary Reservation Wage
(Two Digit) q25 q50 q75 q25 q50 q75 q25 q50 q75
10–14 380 2 5 14 3600 4700 6000 3490 4382 5914
15–20 221 2 4 8 3500 4375 6000 3424 4348 5799
21–24 411 2 5 11 3717 4950 6500 3571 4690 6445
25–27 92 2 6 18 3550 4650 6750 3182 3792 5909
28–31 73 2 3 8 3300 3800 4917 3312 3641 4148
32–33 149 2 5 19 3200 3627 4350 3168 3424 4051
34–39 99 1 4 9 3930 5500 7000 4009 5298 6853
40–42 14 2 6 36 3700 5000 5600 2957 4428 6011
47–49 64 2 4 11 3200 3525 4535 3156 3427 4048
43–46 & ≥ 50 147 2 3 8 3618 5000 7350 3745 5139 6819
All 1650 2 4 11 3500 4500 6200 3415 4236 5830
Note: All postal codes with 20 or more observations are reported. Search time is in months. Wages
are gross monthly wages in Dutch guilders for full time employment. The table gives the 25th, 50th,
and 75th percentile of the distribution, denoted by q25, q50, q75 respectively.
that all these coeﬃcients are corrected for the hierarchical composition, education level,
age tenure and evaluation scores.
8.8 Conclusion
This chapter investigated the interrelatedness of search, oﬀers and (reservation) wages.
We could show that reservation wages and accepted wages converge over time and oﬀered
an explanation based on learning and information passing. We use the fact that the
Fokker Survey observes the number of oﬀers a person receives. With this information,
using the methodology developed by Blau and Robins (1986), we could identify and
estimate the reservation wages of the workers. Information passing can be shown to
take place both locally as well as among similar workers. We show speciﬁcally that
workers within the same hierarchical level beneﬁt from a higher proportion of workers
being employed. We interpret this as being (partly) due to job referrals among similar
workers. This is conﬁrmed by a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of the ratio of employed
workers on the number of oﬀers received. The local ratio of employed workers — across
all levels — is also negatively related to unemployment duration, but it does not aﬀect
the number of oﬀers. Hence, the eﬀect upon duration should be attributed to channels
other than job referrals, e.g. information passing and learning. They could also reﬂect
the general economic situation within the region, which would also yield a similar eﬀect.
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A higher relative wage position leads to shorter search times. If we compare ‘accepted
wages observed’ with the estimated reservation wages, we can see that over a short
period of time accepted wages coincide with reservation wages predicted.
Also, the correction for search time turned out to be signiﬁcant and essential. As we
could illustrate graphically the estimation of expected wages, not correcting for oﬀers
and search time, overestimates the level of wages actually accepted.
As the information passing and learning was only investigated using proxy variables,
we would suggest further research that collects data speciﬁcally geared towards exam-
ining the process of searching while interacting with former co-workers, neighbors and
family. Also, the arrival and possible rejection of job oﬀers seems to be important, yet
is often neglected as the information is not easily obtainable.
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At the end of this thesis it is time to take stock of what we have learned. The
bankruptcy of Fokker and the survey among the displaced workers has allowed us in-
vestigate many issues in, or related to, the displacement literature that could not have
been done in earlier work.
While the thesis has not been written in the same order that the chapters appear,
their ordering amplify both the timing of the events faced by the displaced workers,
but also the preparatory work necessary to do the displacement study of chapters seven
and eight. This displacement study is novel in the sense that it includes ﬁrm and
career speciﬁc variables as well as worker interaction post displacement. The career
and ﬁrm variables are derived in chapter three, in which we describe and analyze the
functioning of the internal labor market of the displacing ﬁrm. Chapter four describes
and models the bankruptcy trustees’ reorganization decision to select several workers
into a leaner company. Chapter ﬁve and six are again preparatory as they describe
the development, conduct and the results from the collection of post-displacement labor
market information. The ﬁnal chapters seven and eight were possible by combining the
information from the early chapters on the ﬁrm and the information collected through
the survey.
In Chapter 3 our analysis conﬁrms the existence of an internal labor market and
the importance of lateral and vertical job mobility therein. We add to the scant, but
growing empirical literature by noting that wages are related to job level. This implies
that transitions are material for workers’ wage growth. Although immediate gains upon
promotions are small — often job transitions and wage changes do not even coincide —
compared to the average diﬀerence in wages for adjacent job levels, promoted workers
can look forward to a period of sustained wage growth as they move up in their new job
level’s wage distribution. The spread of these job-level wage distributions is substantial
so that wages in job levels overlap. Therefore wages are not strictly tied to jobs as
there remains considerable scope to reward workers individually. Within-level careers
are another valuable possibility for workers to secure wage growth. Lateral job changes
are a signiﬁcant phenomenon, which can be explained by ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital require-
ments in particular jobs, involving more workers and more job changes than vertical job
transitions.
For the ﬁrm, the staﬃng of positions from within is essential especially in jobs which
require ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge. Such organizational or ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital seems cru-
cial in a number of jobs. Workers hired from outside must make up for the lack of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital by obtaining higher completed schooling degrees than workers pro-
224moted from within. Even though entry occurs at all levels, entry rates are substantially
smaller in some career tracks for jobs further down the career path. We ﬁnd that the
ﬁrm’s hierarchy of job levels is relatively stable throughout periods of expansion and
contraction. Neither are levels added to the hierarchy during expansion, nor are job lev-
els cut from the hierarchy during contraction. However, we can show that relative sizes
of job levels change during downsizing when the ﬁrm becomes top-heavy. This is most
likely the result of sizeable diﬀerences in adjustment costs for diﬀerent workers, partic-
ularly when ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital is substantial in jobs further down a career path and
future growth is expected, as was the case at our ﬁrm. Changes in ﬁrm size in general
and changes in relative entry and exit rates have considerable impact on job transition
rates. Promotion rates fall and demotion rates rise the more the net employment growth
rates fall.
The role of a ﬁrm’s organizational structure on the decision to restructure the ﬁrm’s
workforce was studied in Chapter 4. We modelled a hierarchical ﬁrm’s optimal downsiz-
ing decision. Changes in the organizational structure can be described by a hierarchical
menu costs model. If the ﬁrm’s input of workers comprises diﬀerent skill groups, and
if the production of each of these skill group’s is organized in ranks, then the ranks’
contributions to the future value to the ﬁrm determines their size. During a reorganiza-
tion rank-speciﬁc cut-oﬀ values determine changes in the ﬁrm’s hierarchical structure.
Factors that explain the cut-oﬀ values are rank-speciﬁc expected future proﬁt growth,
the uncertainty surrounding that growth, rent-sharing rules, as well as ﬁring costs. The
theoretical predictions of our model, that proﬁt growth and ﬁring costs lead to increases
in higher ranks at the expense of lower ranks, and that increased uncertainty and worker
rents broaden the bottom ranks of the hierarchical structure, are supported by the data
from Fokker.
We ﬁnd that reorganizations that modify the composition of ranks within skill groups
can give rise to increased wage inequality between skill groups. Increased uncertainty
about future proﬁt growth increases the ﬁrm’s propensity to hold a larger share of
workers in ranks that contribute most to this uncertainty, because the ﬁrm is reluctant
to lay oﬀ workers that may be needed in the near future. Finally, shocks that increase
the workers’ share of ﬁrm-speciﬁc rents, such as increased union power or aggregate
positive demand shocks, will increase the negotiation power of workers and decrease
proﬁts ﬂowing to the ﬁrm. If such shocks lead to reorganization of the workforce, the
restructuring is such that it will lead to a decrease in wage inequality between low and
high skilled workers.
2259 Conclusion
The combination of survey data from displaced workers and their personnel records
allowed to investigate post-displacement diﬀerences in search time and earnings. We
ﬁnd that wage losses in the Netherlands are large and comparable to those found in
the US. Since the workers in our data set are high tenured, relatively old, and probably
worked for a high-wage ﬁrm, these results may not be inconsistent with other existing
European studies that look at more representative sets of displacement.
Pre-displacement job-characteristics are found to be important predictors of both
search time and earnings losses after displacement. Search time increases with age and
tenure, whereas workers with a higher hierarchical position search signiﬁcantly shorter
than lower level workers. Although, the search-time seems to be largely unaﬀected by
the speciﬁcation of the job activity, it plays an important role in explaining displacement
wage losses after displacement. The hierarchical level is inversely related to wage losses
if employment is found within a year, while it has no eﬀect afterwards. Pre-displacement
lateral job movements reduce earnings losses by 3.2 percent per job rotation. The wage-
losses of all workers together were estimated to amount to 11.9 percent. Staying within
the same industry decreased the initial wage losses, but this eﬀect was insigniﬁcant after
three years.
We analyzed the displacement eﬀects of tenure with the ﬁrm, within ranks, and jobs.
None of these tenure variables are found to contribute to explaining observed wage
losses. Other information on characteristics of old and new jobs and how they diﬀer
annihilated the role of the variables traditionally suggested to represent ﬁrm-speciﬁc
and not transferable on-the-job investments in productive human capital. More research
is needed that uses similar detailed information on pre- and post-displacement job-
characteristics before we can draw further reaching conclusions. But for our data-set
the explanation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital to understand observed wage losses is not
supported.
Our data refutes the Blanchard-Diamond (1994) ranking model. After a period of
three years, workers who had multiple employers have lower wage losses. There is no
‘badge of good behavior’ to be earned after a bankruptcy, or at least none that has an
eﬀect after three years.
Idiosyncratic ability, measured as the residual wage growth during the last three years
at the displacing ﬁrm, turned out to be an important and insightful variable. This is
not because unobserved ability was found to be important to explain variation in post-
displacement search time and wage losses, but because it revealed that the distressed
ﬁrm had a wage policy of paying ‘risk’ premiums during its ﬁnal years of existence to
226entice workers not to abandon the distressed ﬁrm.
Allowing workers to learn from the labor market experience of their former co-workers
and basing their search strategy on matching results observed of workers similar to
themselves is found to be an important explanation of the simultaneous dynamics of
reservation wages and observed unemployment durations. Similar workers who found
high wage jobs increase the unemployed peer worker’s reservation wage as well as the
predicted search time. Workers from higher hierarchical positions ﬁnd a new job faster
than their lower ranked counterparts.
This last ﬁnding is extended in Chapter 8, in which we investigate the interrelation
of search, oﬀers and (reservation) wages. We could show that reservation wages and
accepted wages converge over time and oﬀered an explanation based on learning and
information passing. We used the fact that the Fokker Survey observes the number of
oﬀers a person receives. With this information, using the methodology developed by
Blau and Robins (1986), we could identify and estimate the reservation wages of the
workers. Information passing can be shown to take place both locally as well as among
similar workers. We show speciﬁcally that workers within the same hierarchical level
beneﬁt from a higher proportion of workers being employed. We interpret this as being
(partly) due to job referrals among similar workers. This is conﬁrmed by a positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀect of the ratio of employed workers on the number of oﬀers received.
The local ratio of employed workers — across all levels — is also negatively related to
unemployment duration, but it does not aﬀect the number of oﬀers. Hence, the eﬀect
upon duration should be attributed to channels other than job referrals, e.g. information
passing and learning. They could also reﬂect the general economic situation within the
region, which would also yield a similar eﬀect.
A higher relative wage position leads to shorter search times. If we compare ‘accepted
wages observed’ with the estimated reservation wages, we can see that over a short
period of time accepted wages coincide with predicted reservation wages. The estimation
of expected wages not correcting for oﬀers and search time, overestimates the level of
wages actually accepted.
On a regional level the learning process and the adjustment of the reservation wages
diﬀer. Workers seem to have some notion of the economic environment in their region,
and adjust their expectation accordingly. In regions that fared economically well, the




Thanks to the detailed character of the data we could show many interesting aspects
that determine the post displacement wage and search outcomes. This can be partly
attributed to the decision to step away from the large data-sets and to also examine
‘case studies’ of displacement as have been done in the 1920s and 1950s, but now using
the tools of modern economics and econometrics. This is an avenue that is promising.
A replication with another case and other data, as only in such a way can the conclusion
drawn here been validated for more general cases, therefore seems promising. More
research is needed that uses similar detailed information on pre- and post-displacement
job-characteristics before we can draw further reaching conclusions. But for our data-set
the explanation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital to understand observed wage losses is not
supported.
Further research is needed in displacement and lay-oﬀs in Europe in general. There
are only a few studies, most of which in a recent book. However, these studies are by
no means exhaustive and the depth of research compared to the U.S. studies can still be
improved.
As the information passing and learning from co-workers was only investigated using
proxy variables, we would suggest further research that collects data speciﬁcally geared
towards examining the process of searching while interacting with former co-workers,
neighbors and family. Integrating search time, the acceptance of wage losses and learning
also seems to be important. Preferably with similar data, or even with more detail on
the learning aspect of job searchers. Also, the arrival and possible rejection of job oﬀers
seems to be important, yet often neglected, as the information is not easily obtainable.
The use of personnel data — though diﬃcult to obtain — contains a wealth of in-
formation. Careers with ﬁrms determine the wages paid to many workers. They can
only be observed by using ﬁrm level data. Also, the empirical research into internal
labor markets is still in its infancy. Every additional study allows generalizations of
ﬁndings that are supported by all studies on ﬁrmer grounds, while contributing through
diﬀerences found relative to other studies.
While the option model allowed us to give some theoretical insights into the reorgani-
zation process, by determining optimal cut-oﬀ values for a given hierarchical structure,
it fell short of explaining the size within a rank and the number of ranks simultaneously.
This is also research that calls for personnel data to test ideas and examine decision
maker’s choices.
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Het faillissement van Fokker in maart 1996 was het einde van een langdurige periode
van zelfstandige vliegtuigbouw in Nederland. De faillissementsprocedure monde uit in
een afsplitsing van enkele delen van het bedrijf, die niet verlieslijdend waren. Deze delen
werden ondergebracht bij Stork N.V. en het faillissement van de rest van Fokker ging
gepaard met een groot aantal gedwongen ontslagen. Doel van dit proefschrift was dan
ook om inzichten te krijgen in de gevolgen van zo’n grootschalig faillissement voor de
medewerkers.
In hoofdstuk twee wordt het kader van economisch onderzoek omtrent massa-ontslagen
bij bedrijven geschetst. In de VS, waar het meeste onderzoek naar dit soort fenome-
nen werd gedaan, vindt men dat zulke ontslagen tot beduidende loonverliezen leiden.
Ontslagen werknemers moeten gemiddeld genomen lagere lonen accepteren. Maar zowel
in de duur van werkloosheid als ook in termen van loonverliezen staan zij er beter voor
dan werknemers die ontslagen worden zonder dat het bedrijf reorganiseert of gesloten
wordt.
Hoewel gemiddeld genomen duidelijke loonverliezen de gevolgen van zulke gedwongen
ontslagen zijn, is er toch een duidelijke heterogeniteit onder werknemers vast te stellen.
Een verklaring die hiervoor al gegeven is, is de parti¨ ele transfer van speciﬁeke kennis
binnen industrie¨ en. Om de heterogeniteit van uitkomsten nader te verklaren, wordt in
dit proefschrift gebruik gemaakt van de gedetailleerde informatie over de structuur van
het sluitende bedrijf, de positie en het carri` ere-verloop van de werknemers voor ontslag,
en hun banen na het faillissement.
Om dit te kunnen doen, hebben wij eerst de interne arbeidsmarkten binnen Fokker
onderzocht gedurende de laatste tien jaar van het bestaan. Deze interne arbeidsmarkten
worden in hoofdstuk drie beschreven. Wij onderzoeken de relatie van lonen en posities
in het bedrijf, waarbij we ook analyses van andere, eerdere studies reproduceren en
veriﬁ¨ eren. Deze veriﬁcatie is belangrijk omdat onze, nieuwe data van een ander bedrijf,
uit een ander land en in een andere industrie afkomstig is dan de data in de bestaande
literatuur. Maar het unieke karakter van de data laat een verdergaande analyse toe;
de periode van groei, van eind jaren tachtig tot begin jaren negentig, en de daarop
volgende krimp laten inzichten toe in de stabiliteit van interne arbeidsmarkten over
deze ﬂuctuaties.
Wij identiﬁceren een hi¨ erarchische ordening van posities door middel van transitities
244Nederlandse Samenvatting
van werknemers. Werknemers beginnen meestal op het laagste niveau van de hi¨ erarchie,
hetzij binnen de productieafdeling, hetzij op hoger niveau onder het hoger personeel.
Promoties binnen de organisaties zijn belangrijk voor het invullen van hogere posi-
ties. Hieruit kan geconcludeerd worden dat bedrijfsspeciﬁeke kennis belangrijk is. De
hi¨ erarchische structuur is stabiel in tijden van groei — een feit dat ook andere studies al
eerder hadden aangetoond. Nieuw daarentegen is dat in de periode van krimp de struc-
tuur weliswaar overeind blijft, maar dat er eerst aan de onderkant van de hi¨ erarchische
structuur gereorganiseerd wordt. Promotiekansen nemen in deze tijden af en het aantal
degradaties neemt toe.
De loondistributie van een functie laat loongroei binnen een functie toe. Ook overlap-
pen loondistributies van opeenvolgende hi¨ erarchische posities elkaar. Toch is opwaartse
mobiliteit cruciaal voor lang aanhoudende loongroei, omdat de loongroei binnen een
functie beperkt is bij de bovengrens van de functiespeciﬁeke loondistributie. Slechts
een gedeelte van het gemiddelde verschil tussen de loondistributie van de initi¨ ele positie
en de hogere nieuwe positie wordt bij de promotie vergoed. Werknemers promoveren
van de hogere gedeeltes van een loondistributie naar een lager gedeelte in de nieuwe
loondistributie. Laterale baanmobiliteit, “job rotation”, is ook belangrijk binnen de on-
derneming; het bevordert promotiekansen, verhoogt de loongroei en verlaagt de kans
op ontslag. Ook wordt in dit hoofdstuk aangetoond dat neerwaartse mobiliteit niet
gepaard gaat met lagere nominale lonen. Toch voert een degradatie tot lagere verwachte
loongroei. Re¨ ele loonsverandering wordt wel gevonden in tijden van krimp, doordat het
nominale loon over meerdere jaren niet wordt aangepast.
Vervolgens onderzoeken wij de selectiebeslissing tijdens het faillissement. Voor de
winstgevende gedeeltes van het bedrijf moest een deel van het personeel geselecteerd
worden. Wij ontwikkelen in hoofdstuk vier een theoretisch model waarin de opti-
male grote van reorganisaties wordt bepaald. Baserend op bestaande modellen van
aanpassingskosten, ontwikkelen wij een model van organisatieverandering, waarbij de
hi¨ erarchische structuur van het bedrijf met zijn onderlinge afhankelijkheid wordt meege-
nomen. Tijdens de reorganisatie worden drempelwaardes per niveau op basis van verwachte
toekomstige groei in winst bepaald. Factoren die invloed hebben op deze drempelwaarde
zijn niveauspeciﬁeke toekomstige (verwachte) winstgroei, de onzekerheid omtrent deze
winstgroei, de verdeling van winsten tussen werknemer en werkgever en ontslagkosten.
De theoretische voorspelling van het model is dat winstgroei en hogere ontslagkosten
leiden tot een vergroting van de hogere ten koste van de lagere hi¨ erarchie¨ en.
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Wij vinden empirisch dat reorganisaties die de composities van hi¨ erarchie¨ en binnen
opleidingsniveau’s veranderen tot meer loonsongelijkheid tussen opleidingsniveau’s kan
leiden. Grotere onzekerheid omtrent deze winstgroei vergroot het aandeel van werkne-
mers op hi¨ erarchische niveau’s die het meeste bijdragen tot deze onzekerheid; het bedrijf
wil geen werknemers ontslaan die het in de toekomst wellicht nodig zal hebben. Een
verhoging van het werknemersaandeel aan de bedrijfsspeciﬁeke winst zal leiden tot een
versterking van de onderhandelingspositie van werknemers en tot een verlaging van de
winsten van het bedrijf. Als een dergelijke verandering in een reorganisatie uitmondt,
zal deze een vermindering van loononsgelijkheid met zich meebrengen tussen hoog en
laag opgeleiden.
De interne personeelsdata van Fokker geven ons slechts een beeld van de situatie voor
het faillissement. Om ook de situatie van de ontslagen werknemers na het faillisse-
ment te onderzoeken, hebben wij een schriftelijke enquˆ ete gehouden onder alle ontslagen
werknemers gehouden. Deze ‘Fokker-Enquˆ ete’ werd in 1999 aan de werknemers ver-
stuurd. Hoofdstuk vier beschrijft de ontwikkeling en de implementatie van deze enquˆ ete.
Gezien het feit dat de kwaliteit van het onderzoek afhankelijk is van de kwaliteit van
de data, hebben wij getracht de ontwikkeling van de enquˆ ete zo zorgvuldig mogelijk te
doen. Verder hebben wij ook na aﬂoop nog een onderzoek gedaan naar de gevolgen van
nonresponse voor onze data. Gelukkig blijkt de nonresponse niet afhankelijk te zijn van
variabelen die cruciaal zijn voor het onderzoek naar massa-ontslag.
Zo heeft een jaar na het faillissement slechts driekwart van de medewerkers nieuw werk
gevonden. Tien procent van de medewerkers zegt nog op zoek te zijn naar werk. Daarmee
ligt het werkloosheidscijfer van oud-Fokker medewerkers op dat moment duidelijk hoger
dan het vergelijkbaar landelijk gemiddelde van 1996. Ook de categorie werknemers die
zich teruggetrokken heeft uit de arbeidsmarkt is vier keer zo hoog als het vergelijkbaar
landelijke gemiddelde van 1996. Het werkloosheidspercentage onder oud-Fokker mede-
werkers daalt in 1998 naar 6,2 procent, om in 1999 op 4,3 procent terecht te komen — dat
is vergelijkbaar met het landelijk gemiddelde. Tweederde van de werkenden zijn na drie
jaar nog bij de eerste werkgever. Eenderde van de werkenden had al meerdere nieuwe
werkgevers nodig om de baan te vinden die zij drie jaar na het faillissement bekleden.
Hoger opgeleiden veranderen minder vaak van werkgever en komen sneller terecht in een
stabiele werkomgeving.
Veel werknemers die gedwongen werden ontslagen als gevolg van het faillissement
moeten bij hun eerste nieuwe baan een positie op een lager niveau accepteren dan de
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positie die zij bij Fokker hadden. Echter, drie jaar naar faillissement geeft de helft van
de respondenten aan dat zij inmiddels meer verantwoording hebben dan zij bij Fokker
hadden.
In hoofdstuk zeven onderzoeken wij de loonverliezen en de duur van de werkloosheid
van werknemers waarbij we gebruik maken van zowel de personeelsdata van Fokker als
de data die door middel van de enquˆ ete verkregen werd. Wij vinden dat de loonver-
liezen groot zijn. Met een gemiddelde van 11.9 procent vinden wij waardes die ook in
eerdere studies in de VS gevonden werden. Deze verliezen zijn wel hoger dan die de
Europese studies tot nog toe gevonden hadden. De werkloosheidsduur is langer met een
hogere leeftijd en met een langere staat van dienst binnen het bedrijf. De zoekduur is
duidelijk korter naarmate werknemers hogere posities in de hi¨ erarchie hadden. Ook al
wordt de duur van werkloosheid niet signiﬁcant be¨ ınvloed door de job-activiteiten van
de werknemer, toch spelen zij een grote rol bij het verklaren van loonverliezen.
Ook bij loonverliezen geldt dat hogere hi¨ erarchische niveau’s er relatief beter van af
komen. Laterale veranderingen in posities — dus binnen een hi¨ erarchisch niveau, maar
over verschillende activiteitsgebieden van de onderneming — reduceren loonverliezen
met ongeveer drie procent per beweging. Loonverliezen blijken — conform de bestaande
literatuur — lager voor diegenen die binnen de luchtvaartsector blijven. Dit resultaat
verdwijnt echter drie jaren na het faillissement.
Wij analyseren ook de invloed van ‘tenure’, dus de duur dat iemand bij het bedrijf
werkzaam was, op de hoogte van de loonverliezen. Deze tenure wordt vaak als indi-
catie van de hoogte van het bedrijf- en industrie-speciﬁek menselijk kapitaal of opge-
bouwde kennis gezien. Gegeven het speciﬁeke karakter van de data kunnen wij naar de
tenure-eﬀecten voor het gehele bedrijf, voor het hi¨ erarchisch niveau en voor de functie
kijken. Geen van deze variabelen kan de verschillen in loonverliezen verklaren indien
voor alle overige variabelen gecontroleerd wordt. Wij moeten dus concluderen dat de
tenure-variabelen door de speciﬁeke informatie in de andere variabelen geen toegevoegde
verklarende waarde hebben.
Onze data verwerpen ook het Blanchard-Diamond (1984) ‘ranking’ model. Na een
periode van drie jaar hebben werknemers die in deze tijd bij meerdere werknemers hebben
gewerkt, lagere loonverliezen.
Idiosyncratisch kunnen — gemeten als het residu van de loongroei van de laatste drie
jaar — blijkt een belangrijke variabel te zijn. Deze variabel toonde aan dat het bedrijf
aan het einde risico-premia betaalde. Dit om te voorkomen dat belangrijke medewerkers
247Summary in Dutch
het bedrijf verlaten.
Werknemers leren van de arbeidsmarktervaring van hun voormalige collega’s. In een
model waarin wij een leerproces aan de hand van vergelijkbare werknemers die een baan
gevonden hebben modelleren, kunnen wij de dynamiek van zoektijd en reservatieloon
onderzoeken.
Dit model wordt uitgebreid en met een locale interactie in een context van zoektijd,
baan-aanbiedingen en de dynamiek van reservatielonen over de tijd geplaatst. Gegeven
dat wij het aantal aanbiedingen kennen, kunnen wij gebruik maken van een methode die
door Blau en Robbins (1986) is ontwikkeld. Hierdoor kunnen wij loonsverdeling aan de
hand van het aantal aanbiedingen en de zoektijd identiﬁceren en zo het reservatieloon
uitrekenen.
We kunnen aantonen dat informatie over de loonsverdeling, maar ook over open posi-
ties, lokaal wordt uitgewisseld. Ook tussen het hoger dan wel tussen het productieperso-
neel wordt informatie doorgegeven. De ratio van werknemers van hetzelfde hi¨ erarchisch
niveau heeft een positieve invloed op het vinden van een baan. Ook passen werknemers
hun reservatieloon over tijd aan. De ratio daarentegen heeft geen invloed op het aantal
aanbiedingen dat een werknemer krijgt. Wij interpreteren deze eﬀecten als het gevolg
van een leerproces over de (lokale) arbeidsmarktsituatie.
Ook het vinden van nieuwe banen door middel van een bemiddeling van oud-collega’s
blijkt belangrijk te zijn. Het aandeel werknemers dat op hetzelfde niveau bezig was als
de werkzoekende, heeft een positieve invloed op het krijgen van aanbiedingen.
Als wij de geaccepteerde lonen met de reservatielonen vergelijken is te zien dat zij in
korte tijd redelijk dicht bij elkaar komen. Ook is een neerwaartse aanpassing van het
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1. Periode rond het faillissement van Fokker 
 
1.1 Hoeveel jaren hebt u bij Fokker gewerkt?  
______ jaren 
 
1.2 Hoeveel jaren werkervaring had u voordat u bij Fokker begon te werken?  
 _____________________  jaren 
 




1.3b Gaf u in uw functie leiding aan andere medewerkers?  
p ja, ik gaf leiding aan  ................... personen 
p nee, ik gaf geen leiding aan anderen 
 
1.4 Hoeveel verdiende u bruto per maand in deze functie? (excl. overwerk, 
vakantiegeld, 13e maand e.d.) 
   bruto  ____________________  gulden per periode van 4 weken. 
 
1.5 Beschouwde u zichzelf voor het faillissement als kostwinner?  
p ja  
p nee 
  
1.6 Bent u voor het faillissement actief naar een andere baan gaan zoeken?  
  p   ja,  ca.  ____________ weken voor het faillissement 
  p nee 
 
1.7 Na faillissement van Fokker: na hoeveel weken begon u actief naar een nieuwe 
baan te zoeken?  
  _____________ weken na het faillissement 
 
1.8 Na het faillissement van Fokker: na hoeveel weken heeft u uw eerste 
sollicitatiebrief geschreven?  
    __________________ weken na het faillissement 
 
1.9 Na het faillissement van Fokker: hoeveel uren per week besteedde u aan zoeken 
naar een geschikte baan?  
  _________ uren per week 
 
 
1.10 Na het faillissement van Fokker: hoeveel sollicitatiebrieven schreef u gemiddeld 
per vier weken gedurende deze periode?  
  ________ brieven per vier weken  
Fokker Enquête 




1.11 Na faillissement van Fokker: heeft u banen aangeboden gekregen, die u niet heeft 
aangenomen?  
p nee 
  p ja  Þ zo ja:  
1.11.1  Hoe vaak heeft u een baan aangeboden gekregen?   
__________ keer  
[indien u één of meerdere banen aangeboden kreeg, vul de volgende vragen in voor 
het beste aanbod] 
1.11.2 Wat voor werk was dit?   _______________________  
(functieomschrijving) 
 
1.11.3 Hoe hoog zou het bruto maandsalaris zijn?  
____________ HFL per maand. 
 
1.11.4 Hoeveel werkuren zou  u per week aangesteld worden? 
 ___________ uren per week. 
 
1.11.5 Over hoeveel mensen zou u leiding geven? ________ mensen. 
 
1.11.6 Wat is de belangrijkste reden dat u deze baan niet aangenomen 
heeft?  
p te laag salaris     p tijdelijk dienstverband 
p te weinig uren werktijd  p te grote reisafstand  
p te laag functieniveau    p andere reden, namelijk: 
_________________________ 
  
1.12 Hoe lang duurde het voordat u uw eerste nieuwe baan vond?  
  p direct een nieuwe baan gekregen in “doorstart”:   
p Fokker Aviation 
p Boedel 
  p direct elders een nieuwe baan gevonden  
  p na ongeveer  _________ maanden 
p met pensioen   Þ Þ ga door naar pagina 12 
p niet meer gewerkt wegens arbeidsongeschiktheid   Þ Þ ga door naar pagina 12 
  p nog geen nieuw werk gevonden    Þ Þ ga door naar pagina 3, vraag 1.15 
 
1.13 Hoe heeft u uw eerste nieuwe baan na het faillissement gevonden?  
p via het Arbeidsbureau 
  p via een uitzendbureau 
  p via een commercieel bemiddelingsbureau 
  p via een open sollicitatie 
  p via een gerichte sollicitatie 
p via een oud-collega van Fokker 
  p via contacten uit uw werk bij Fokker 
  p via familie 
p via vrienden of kennissen  
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  p anders, namelijk ...................................................... 
 
1.14 Hoeveel bedroegen de sollicitatiekosten voor deze nieuwe baan?   
(dit zijn alle sollicitatiekosten vanaf het faillissement totdat u uw eerste baan gekregen hebt)   
______________     HFL 
 
 
De volgende vragen gaan over hulp die u gekregen heeft bij het vinden van een nieuwe baan na 
ontslag door Fokker.  
 
1.15 Heeft u bij het vinden van een baan hulp ontvangen van een instelling?  
  p ja 
  p nee     Þ Þ ga door naar pagina 4, “werk historie”.  
 
1.16 Heeft u hulp gekregen over hoe u zelf werk kunt vinden?  
p ja    dit heeft...  p veel geholpen 
     p geholpen 
     p nauwelijks geholpen 
     p helemaal niet geholpen 
  p nee 
 
1.17 Heeft een instelling u in contact gebracht met potentiële werkgevers? 
  p ja    dit heeft...  p veel geholpen 
     p geholpen 
     p nauwelijks geholpen 
     p helemaal niet geholpen 
  p nee 
 
1.18 Heeft u hulp gekregen met het schrijven van een CV of ter voorbereiding van 
sollicitatiegespreken?  
  p ja    dit heeft...  p veel geholpen 
     p geholpen 
     p nauwelijks geholpen 
     p helemaal niet geholpen 
  p nee 
 
 
1.19 Wie heeft voor deze hulp betaald:  
  p Fokker 
  p het Arbeidsbureau 
  p zelf betaald 
p de vakbond 
p EU 
p niet bekend 
  p anders, namelijk ___________________________________ 
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2. Werk historie 
 
 
  1998 
  1  2  3 
     
1.betaald werk  1  1  1 
































































































































































                                           
1. betaald werk  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
2. zelfstandig   2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
3. werkloos  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3 
4. onbetaald werk  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4 
5.cursus/opleiding  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5 
6. anders, nl.:  
........................  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6 
 
 























































































































.                                
1. betaald werk  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
2. zelfstandig   2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
3. werkloos  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3 
4. onbetaald werk  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4 
5. cursus/ opleiding  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5 
6. anders, nl.:  
........................  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6  6 
 
2.1 Geef in de onderstaande kalender voor iedere 
maand aan wat volgens u op dat moment het best 
paste bij uw situatie. Zie het voorbeeld hiernaast. 
U mag per maand maar één cijfer omcirkelen.   
Fokker Enquête 





2.2 Heeft u na faillissement van Fokker een baan gevonden?    
p nee, maar ik heb wel zelfstandig / freelance gewerkt     
Þ Þ ga door naar pagina 11, “Zelfstandig”,  vraag 2.40  
p nee, ik heb na het faillissement niet meer gewerkt 
  Þ Þ ga door naar pagina 12, “Demografische Gegevens”,  vraag 3.1 
p ja      
zo ja: Is uw huidige baan uw eerste baan na het faillissement bij Fokker?  
  p ja, mijn huidige baan is de eerste baan na het faillissement    
Þ Þ ga door naar pagina 8, “Huidige Werkgever”, vraag 2.21  
p nee, mijn huidige baan is niet mijn eerste baan na het faillissement 
  Þ Þ ga door naar vraag 2.3  
 
De volgende vragen hebben betrekking op de eerste baan na u vertrek bij Fokker 
indien u nu niet meer in dienst bent bij deze eerste werkgever. Als eerste baan telt 
ook werk voor de boedel, de afbouw, Fokker Aviation, en dergelijk.   
 
2.3 Wanneer bent u met deze eerste baan begonnen?  
maand:  ________   jaar: 19 _____ 
 
2.4a  naam werkgever:   __________________________ 
2.4b  adres:      __________________________ 
2.4c  postcode / plaats  ______  ___________________ 
 
2.5 Wat was de officiële naam van uw eerste functie? ________________________ 
        ( f u n c t i e o m s c h r i j v i n g )  
 








2.7 Hoeveel mensen werkten bij de organisatie of het bedrijf waar u werkzaam was?  
p 1 tot met 5 
p 6 tot met 20 
p 21 tot en met 50 
p 50 tot en met 100 
p 101 tot en met 500 
p meer dan 500 
  
Fokker Enquête 




2.8 In wat voor dienstverband werkte u?  
p werk via een uitzendbureau, naam uitzendbureau: ____________________ 
p in loondienst bij werkgever 
p als oproepkracht 
p gedetacheerd, naam detacheerend bedrijf: __________________________ 
p zelfstandig in eigen bedrijf of freelance 
p anders, namelijk _______________________________ 
  
2.9 Wat voor aanstelling had u?  
p oproepcontract 
p tijdelijke aanstelling voor ............. maanden, zonder uitzicht op vaste baan 
p tijdelijke aanstelling voor ............. maanden, met uitzicht op vaste baan 
p proeftijd voor vaste baan. 
p vaste aanstelling  
 
 
2.10 Gaf u in uw functie leiding aan andere medewerkers?  
p ja, ik gaf leiding aan  ................... personen 
p nee, ik gaf geen leiding aan anderen 
 
2.11 Had u meer of minder verantwoordelijkheid dan bij Fokker?  
p veel meer verantwoordelijkheid 
p meer verantwoordelijkheid 
p dezelfde verantwoordelijkheid 
p minder verantwoordelijkheid 
p veel minder verantwoordelijkheid 
 
2.12 Was de ervaring die u bij Fokker opgedaan had noodzakelijk voor het krijgen van 
deze baan?  
p ja, vooral mijn beroepservaring van Fokker  
p ja, vooral mijn technische kennis van Fokker 
p ja, zowel mijn technische kennis als ook mijn beroepservaring van Fokker 
p nee, niet noodzakelijk maar wel een pre 
p nee 
 
2.13 Hoeveel scholing (of inwerktijd) zou iemand met een vergelijkbare opleiding 
nodig hebben om uw taken in dit bedrijf over te nemen?  
  ________  maand(en) scholing 
en  ________  maand(en)  inwerktijd 
 









2.15 Hoeveel verdiende u aan het begin van uw dienstverband bruto per maand in deze 
functie? (excl. overwerk, vakantiegeld, 13e maand e.d.) 
bruto _________________ gulden   p per maand  
p per periode van vier weken  
 
2.16 Op hoeveel werkuren  per week was dit gebaseerd?  
  ______________ uren per week 
 
  
2.17 Aan het einde van het dienstverband: hoeveel verdiende u bij deze werkgever? 
(excl. overwerk, vakantiegeld, 13e maand e.d.) 
bruto _________________ gulden   p per maand  
p per periode van vier weken  
 
2.18 Op hoeveel werkuren  per week was dit gebaseerd?  
  ______________ uren per week 
 
 
2.19 Wanneer bent u gestopt bij deze werkgever?  
  ___________ - 19_____  
 
 
2.20 Wat was de redenen ervoor?  
p betere baan gevonden     
p afloop tijdelijk contract    
p zelf ontslag genomen   
  p ontslagen door werkgever   
p arbeidsongeschiktheid 
p  pensioen     
p andere reden, namelijk ______________________ 
  
Fokker Enquête 





De volgende vragen hebben betrekking op uw huidige werkgever. Indien u op het ogenblik niet 
in loondienst werkt, vul dan dit gedeelte voor uw laatste werkgever na uw ontslag bij Fokker in.  
 
Huidige / Laatste Werkgever 
 
2.21 Hoe vaak bent u van werkgever veranderd sinds het faillissement van Fokker?  
_________ verschillende werkgevers sinds faillissement  
(vul in 1 indien dit uw eerste werkgever sinds het faillissement is).  
 
 
2.22 Wanneer bent u bij uw huidige werkgever begonnen?  
maand:  ________   jaar: 19 _____ 
 
 
2.23a  naam werkgever:   __________________________ 
2.23b  adres:      __________________________ 
2.23c  postcode / plaats  ______  ___________________ 
 
 
2.24 Hoe heeft u van deze baan vernomen?  
  p via het Arbeidsbureau 
  p via een uitzendbureau 
  p via een commercieel bemiddelingsbureau 
  p via een gerichte sollicitatie 
  p via een open sollicitatie 
  p via een oud-collega van Fokker 
  p via contacten uit uw werk bij Fokker 
  p via familie 
p via vrienden of kennissen 
  p anders, namelijk _________________________________ 
 
2.25 Wat is de officiële naam van uw huidige functie? _________________________ 
        (functieomschrijving) 
 
2.26 Hoeveel mensen werken bij de organisatie of het bedrijf waar u werkzaam bent?  
p 1 tot met 5 
p 6 tot met 20 
p 21 tot en met 50 
p 50 tot en met 100 
p 101 tot en met 500 
p meer dan 500 
  
Fokker Enquête 












2.28 In wat voor dienstverband werkt u?  
p werk via een uitzendbureau, naam uitzendbureau: ____________________ 
p in loondienst bij werkgever 
p als oproepkracht 
p gedetacheerd, naam detacheerend bedrijf: __________________________ 
p zelfstandig in eigen bedrijf of freelance 
p anders, namelijk _______________________________ 
 
 
2.29 Wat voor aanstelling heeft u?  
p als oproepkracht 
p tijdelijke aanstelling voor ............. maanden, zonder uitzicht op vaste baan 
p tijdelijke aanstelling voor ............. maanden, met uitzicht op vaste baan 
p proeftijd voor vaste baan 
p vaste aanstelling  
 
2.30 Geeft u in uw functie leiding aan andere medewerkers?  
p ja ik geef leiding aan ................... personen 
p nee, ik geef geen leiding aan anderen 
 
2.31 Heeft u meer of minder verantwoordelijkheid dan bij Fokker?  
p veel meer verantwoordelijkheid 
p meer verantwoordelijkheid 
p dezelfde verantwoordelijkheid 
p minder verantwoordelijkheid 
p veel minder verantwoordelijkheid 
 
2.32 Was uw ervaring die u bij Fokker opgedaan had noodzakelijk voor het krijgen 
van deze baan?  
p ja, vooral mijn beroepservaring van Fokker  
p ja, vooral mijn technische kennis van Fokker 
p ja, zowel mijn technische kennis als ook mijn beroepservaring van Fokker 
p nee, niet noodzakelijk maar wel een pre 
p nee 
 
2.33 Hoeveel scholing (of inwerktijd) zou iemand met een vergelijkbare opleiding 
nodig hebben om uw taken in dit bedrijf over te nemen?  
________  maand(en) scholing  
Fokker Enquête 




en  ________  maand(en) inwerktijd 
 
2.34 Hoe groot is de afstand woon-werkverkeer (enkele reis) die u dagelijks terug 
moet leggen?  
___________ km 
 
2.35 Hoeveel verdiende u bruto per maand aan het begin van uw dienstverband? (excl. 
overwerk, vakantiegeld, 13e maand e.d.) 
bruto _________________ gulden   p per maand  
p per periode van vier weken  
 
2.36 Op hoeveel werkuren  per week was dit gebaseerd?  
  ______________ uren per week 
 
2.37 Hoeveel verdient u nu bruto per maand? (excl. overwerk, vakantiegeld, 13e 
maand e.d.) 
bruto _________________ gulden   p per maand  
p per periode van vier weken  
 
2.38 Op hoeveel werkuren  per week is dit gebaseerd?  
  ______________ uren per week 
 
 
2.39 Werkt u nog voor deze werkgever?  
p ja  Þ Þ ga door naar “Zelfstandig” op de volgende pagina, vraag 2.40 
p nee  
Þ Þ zo nee:  
2.39.1 Wanneer bent u gestopt bij deze werkgever?  
  ________________ - 19 ______ 
  
2.39.2 Wat was de redenen ervoor?  
p afloop tijdelijk contract     
p zelf ontslag genomen   
  p ontslagen door werkgever   
p arbeidsongeschiktheid 
p  pensioen     
p andere reden, namelijk ______________________ 
Fokker Enquête 






2.40 Heeft u inkomen uit uw eigen bedrijf of zelfstandig werk?  
  p ja    
  p nee    Þ Þ ga door naar pagina 12, “Demografische Gegevens”   
 
 
2.41 Sinds wanneer heeft u uw eigen bedrijf?    
___________ - 19____ 
  (maand  -  jaar) 
 









2.43 Voor ontslag bij Fokker: hoeveel uren heeft u gemiddeld per week voor uw eigen 
bedrijf gewerkt?  
  _________ uren per week 
 
 
2.44 Na ontslag bij Fokker, heeft u meer tijd voor uw eigen bedrijf gewerkt?  
  p ja Þ Þ  zo ja: Hoeveel uren heeft u gemiddeld per week gewerkt:  
    _________  uren  per  week 
  p nee 
 
 
2.45 Is uw werk in het eigen bedrijf een belangrijke bron van inkomsten?  
  p ja   Þ Þ zo ja:  
2.45a Wat waren de gemiddelde jaarlijkse inkomsten (belastbaar  
           inkomen) over de periode na ontslag bij Fokker?  
__________________ Guldens per jaar.  
p nee 
 
2.46 Bent u nog op zoek naar een betaalde baan?  
  p ja 
  p nee  
Fokker Enquête 




3. Demografische gegevens 
Opleiding 
 
3.1 Wat was de hoogste opleiding die u voltooid had toen u vertrok bij Fokker?  
 
p     Lagere school of basisonderwijs      
p     MAVO of MULO of ULO       
p     H A V O   o f   M M S      
p   VWO (incl. HBS) 
 
p     L B O   /   L T S        
p     MBO  of  KMBO     
p     H B O         
p     W O         
p     T U         
 
3.2  Wat is de naam van de studierichting of beroepsopleiding?   
 
___________________________     
 
 
3.3 In welk jaar heeft u dit diploma gehaald:  
 
19  _______          
 
3.4 Heeft u na het faillissement van Fokker nog een school- of beroepsopleiding 
afgesloten?  
p nee 
p ja, ˛ zo ja:  
  p  MAVO     
p    HAVO        
p  VWO  
 
p    LBO  /  LTS       
p    M B O       
 p     H B O         
p    W O         
p    T U         
 
3.5  Wat is de naam van de studierichting of beroepsopleiding?   
___________________________     
 
3.6 In welk jaar heeft u dit diploma gehaald:  
19  _______           
Fokker Enquête 




Omscholing / Bijscholing 
 
3.7 Heeft u na ontslag bij Fokker deelgenomen aan een omscholing of bijscholing?  
p ja,   Þ zo ja:  
3.7.1 Aan hoeveel om- of bijscholingen hebt u deelgenomen?  
 _________________   
 
3.7.2 Hoe lang duurde deze scholing(en) gemiddeld?  
_________  weken 
 
3.7.3 Hoeveel uren per week had u (gemiddeld) deze scholing(en)?  
_____  uren per week 
 
3.7.4 Wanneer heeft u de laatste omscholing of bijscholing afgesloten?  
_____________ - 19______ 
  (maand  /  jaar) 
 
3.7.5 Heeft de om- of bijscholing(en) geholpen bij het vinden van een 
nieuwe baan?  
  p veel geholpen 
     p geholpen 
     p nauwelijks geholpen 
     p helemaal niet geholpen 
 
  p nee,  Þ Þ zo nee:  
3.7.6 Waarom heeft u niet aan een omscholing of bijscholing  
deelgenomen?  
   p had meteen een baan 
   p onvoldoende informatie om een goed programma te vinden 
   p extra scholing niet nodig voor een nieuwe baan  
   p scholing  te duur  
   p te moeilijk  
   p anders, namelijk ______________________________ 
 
3.7.7 Zou het achteraf gezien verstandig of beter zijn geweest om een 
bijscholing of omscholing te hebben gevolgd?  
  p ja, ik had aan een scholing deel moeten nemen 
   p nee 
 
Overige Informatie 
3.8 Hoeveel kinderen heeft u:  
p geen kinderen 
____  kind(eren) met een leeftijd  tot en met 3 jaar 
____  kind(eren) met een leeftijd  van 4 t.m. 16 jaar 
____  kind(eren) met een leeftijd  van 17 t.m. 21 jaar 
____  kind(eren) met een leeftijd  boven de 21 jaar  
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3.9 Wat is uw geboortejaar?  
 19  ______ 
 
3.10 Burgerlijk staat 
 
p gehuwd      sinds: ___________ - 19______ (maand / jaar) 
p samenwonend    sinds: ___________ - 19 ______(maand / jaar) 
 
p gescheiden      sinds: ___________ - 19 ______(maand / jaar) 
p weduwe / weduwnaar 
p alleenstaand 
 
Indien u gehuwd bent of samenwoont:  
3.10.1 Werkt uw partner in loondienst of zelfstandig?  
  p ja 
  Þ zo ja: (3.10.2) Wat is het jaarlijkse bruto inkomen van uw partner:   
_________________ HFL 
  p nee 
 3.11 Beschouwt u zichzelf nu als kostwinner?  
p ja  
p nee 
 
3.12 U woont in een...  
p koopwoning 
p huurwoning 
p anders, namelijk ___________________________________ 
 
4. Overig 







Hartelijk dank voor het invullen van deze enquête. 
 
Wilt u een rapport over de resultaten van deze enquête ontvangen?  
  p ja 
  p nee 
 
A.u.b. het ingevulde enquêteformulier in de bijgevoegde retourenvelop 
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